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ABSTRACT
Three Essays on the Political Economy of Business Mobility:
Electoral and Policy Implications of Business Location
Decisions
Joonseok Yang
The key underlying question of this dissertation is whether and how business actors
are able to use their heightened mobility to affect electoral outcomes and constrain
the policy choices of elected officials. Focusing on cases of interstate corporate head-
quarters (HQ) relocation and its effects on gubernatorial elections, this dissertation
investigates the electoral effects of HQ relocation and its implications for policy. The
first chapter examines electoral effects of interstate HQ relocation. My analysis shows
that HQ relocation generates electoral responses but in an asymmetrical manner be-
tween HQ inflow and HQ outflow: when HQ relocate in, citizens tend to vote for
the incumbent party in gubernatorial elections, expecting similar positive events to
continue. When HQ relocate out, voters increase support for the Republican Party
in an effort to lower the chances of recurrence. This is because of the pervasive belief
that the Democratic Party tends to pursue the main policy drivers of HQ outflow—
high corporate tax rates and less- friendly business environments. Building upon the
findings in the first chapter, the second chapter investigates whether the asymmetric
responses of voters to HQ relocation gives rise to different practices in offering lucra-
tive tax incentives depending on the partisanship of the elected officials. The analysis
provides evidence that mobile firms such as multinational corporations and firms op-
erating in multiple states, pay lower effective corporate tax rates under Democratic
governors than Republican governors. Lastly, the third chapter investigates micro-
foundtional support for partisan blame attributions in the wake of HQ relocation
using a survey experiment. I find that the effects of party label only prevail in the
aftermath of an HQ outflow since voters believe that Democrat politicians tend to
support high corporate tax rates and less-friendly business environments, which, these
voters believe, push corporate HQ out of their states. The findings of my disserta-
tion have implications for the political economy of business-government relationships,
broad debates on the effects of economic globalization on policy levers of governments,
and our understanding of electoral accountability.
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Introduction
My dissertation research, “Three Essays on the Political Economy of Business Mo-
bility: Electoral and Policy Implications of Business Location Decisions,” engages an
important question at the intersection of the political economy of business-government
relations, electoral politics, and economic globalization: Whether and how business
location decisions affect affect elections and the policy choices of elected officials.
In this dissertation, I investigate a particularly important aspect of corporate
presence—namely, corporate headquarters (HQ). Thanks to sharp decreases in trans-
portation and communication costs, firms have become highly mobile. In response,
local and state governments frequently offer lucrative incentives to attract firms to
given locales (Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy, 2013; Jensen and Malesky, 2018).
Noticeably, corporate HQ, defined as the hub of a firm’s operations, are frequently
the beneficiaries of these incentives. In fact, the competition for corporate HQ across
jurisdictions is fierce as illustrated by the recent case of the Amazon’s second HQ.1
In particular, to attract and retain corporate HQ in the given locales, policymakers
have offered generous tax benefits—often in very large amounts—to firms. However,
the direct economic effects of corporate HQ operation alone cannot fully justify the
use of lucrative incentives. Numerous studies have found that the net impact of pro-
1A total of 238 local and state governments and Canada submitted bids which skyrocketed to
$8.5 billion in incentive packages including tax exemptions and cash grants, which far exceeded the
$5 billion value of the HQ that Amazon itself had estimated.
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viding incentive packages is uncertain and frequently negative (e.g, Thomas, 2011).
The stakes, however, are not only economic. An answer may lie in the electoral ef-
fects of HQ relocation, which, if they exist, may motivate politicians to offer financial
inducements.
I offer a theory to explain how firms’ HQ relocation decisions influence voters’
perceptions of economic performance and, thereby, their voting decisions as well as
the decisions of policymakers. Building on the economic voting, partisan politics,
and behavioral economics literature, I highlight three aspects about mechanisms by
which corporate HQ relocation affects voting decisions. First, as a signal of current
and future economic conditions, location decisions of firms help voters to assess the
government’s economic performance and local economic conditions. Though voters
cannot directly observe the incumbent’s efforts or the implementation of all poli-
cies, the highly visible nature of locational decisions serves as informational channels
through which voters judge whether the government’s economic policies are good or
bad.
Second, the partisanship of the elected officials can affect the assessment process
through the well-established connection between partisanship and policy orientation.
In the context of HQ relocation, the pro-business party (i.e., the Republican Party
in the United States) can be perceived to have a comparative advantage over the
pro-labor party (i.e., the Democratic Party in the United States). This is because of
the pervasive belief that the pro-business party tends to implement more business-
friendly policies and especially lower corporate tax rates that can spark HQ inflow
and deter HQ outflow.
Lastly, my theory accounts for the possibility that voters respond differently de-
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pending on whether an HQ relocates into or out of their respective localities. Exten-
sive research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics suggests that losses
are weighed more heavily than gains (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lau, 1985).
High sensitivity to loss implies that once a negative event is observed, individuals
tend to place more emphasis on avoiding future losses than on simply punishing the
incumbent. In this regard, positive signals from HQ inflow can lead voters to reward
the incumbent party; conversely, when HQ outflow occurs, the negative implications
can magnify voters’ incentives to support the pro-business party at the ballot in an
effort to lower the chances of recurrence.
The theory that I propose can generalize across countries with political parties
perceived to more or less ‘business friendly’. Yet, I focus on cases of interstate HQ
relocation in the United States and its implications for gubernatorial elections. Since
interstate HQ relocation is predominantly affected by the state-level business envi-
ronment over which governors have significant authority, limiting the scope to U.S.
state-level variation helps untangle complex webs of responsibility across policymak-
ers at various levels of government. Furthermore, with a focus on state-level HQ
relocation, my analysis controls for the country-level heterogeneity such as culture
and political institutions at the country level.
In the first essay, “Nonpartisan Reward and Partisan Punishment: Electoral Ef-
fects of Corporate Headquarters Relocation,” I examine whether and how voters eval-
uate the events of corporate HQ relocation and make voting decisions accordingly.
Nevertheless, studying the electoral impact of HQ relocation presents substantial em-
pirical challenges mainly due to a lack of comprehensive and systematic data pertain-
ing to historical HQ relocation cases in the United States. To overcome this obstacle,
3
I tracked all of the cross-state HQ relocation cases of both public and private com-
panies using more than 144,000 news reports in approximately 500 national or local
news archives in the United States from 1995 to 2015. Using automated programming
to extract information from these reports, I constructed an original dataset that con-
tains various types of information, such as the name of an entity, the original location
of the HQ and its destination, and time-related information, such as the date the
report was published and the actual timing of the relocation. With this detailed and
extensive dataset, I generated a county-level dataset of 3,546 unique interstate HR
relocation cases. The county-level dataset allows the comparison between the coun-
ties affected by HQ relocation with those not affected, while holding time-varying
state-level policies constant.
The empirical analyses using the original dataset provide robust evidence for the
theory: counties affected by HQ inflow account for a greater share of the votes in
favor of the incumbent party, whereas those that witnessed HQ outflow exhibit an
increase in the vote share of the Republican candidate in gubernatorial elections.
The second essay, “Partisan Responses to the Mobility of Firms: Political Incen-
tives to Retain Firms and Tax Treatment,” extends the findings of the first essay by
interrogating whether and how partisan governments respond differently to mobile
firms. Expecting strong electoral punishments in the wake of the outflow of firms,
left-leaning governments have incentive to offer lower corporate tax burden. However,
doing so can also result in electoral losses from their core constituents since it implies a
deviation of its long-standing position in tax policy issues, which is to champion high
corporate tax burdens. Left-leaning governments overcome such dilemmas by relying
on providing mobile firms with lucrative tax treatment, which voters are not well-
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informed about than adjusting statutory tax rates, which is public information. As
a result, left governments tend to provide mobile firms with more favorable effective
corporate tax environments to a greater degree than right governments.
I test this argument by exploiting firm-level variation in effective corporate tax
rates in the U.S using a database of public firms in the U.S. from 1996 to 2014. The
results from a range of models—fixed effects estimations, regression discontinuity de-
sign, and panel matching method—show that firms with the relatively high possibility
of relocation (i.e., multinational corporations and multi-state firms) tend to pay lower
effective corporate tax rates under Democratic governors than Republican governors.
The final essay of my dissertation complements the first essay by lending micro-
foundational support for partisan blame attributions. The third essay, “Asymmetric
Effects of Party Label: Roles of Partisan Cues and Policy Information in the Attri-
bution Process,” interrogate whether and how partisan policy orientation affect the
attribution process in the wake of economic events. This essay underscores the ef-
fects of party label in its interaction with policy information about the cause of the
negative event. Voters rely on the partisanship of the incumbents as a information
shortcut for her policy orientation in a complex policy environment, and use the
perceived partisan policy orientation by matching them with policy information to
attribute responsibility. This step is magnified when the event has negative conse-
quences, as suggested by cognitive traits of ‘loss aversion’ and ‘negativity bias.’ To
test this claim, I conduct a randomized survey experiment of 1,211 U.S. voters, using
interstate corporate headquarters (HQ) relocation as a salient economic event.
The results show that in the aftermath of an HQ outflow, voters assign less re-
sponsibility to the Republican governor than to the Democratic party, and they do so
5
because they believe that Demo- crat politicians tend to support high corporate tax
rates and less-friendly business environments, which, these voters believe, push cor-
porate HQ out of their states. Yet in the case of HQ inflows, such partisan differences
disappear, suggesting that positive economic events reduce incentives to undertake an
important additional cognitive step: linking policy information relevant to the event
and the incumbent’s party, which is regarded as a proxy for her position on policy
issues.
The findings of my dissertation provide an insight into the broader discussion of
business-government relationship in the context of economic globalization. My dis-
sertation research show that business location decisions, thanks to their heightened
mobility, can influence the electoral process and various government policies through
their impact on political perceptions, apart from campaign contributions and lobbying
which existing studies have predominantly focused on. In addition, my dissertation
contributes to the large volume of literature on the political implications of invest-
ment. The conventional wisdom holds that investment is motivated largely by the
investors’ long-term prospects for making profits, and that it involves assets that can-
not be moved without considerable loss. This characteristic suggests that the host
government can lever- age greater bargaining power by threatening to expropriate
the investment already made by the firm (e,g., Vernon, 1971). However, my theory
suggests that, thanks to an increase in mobility and the fierce competition among
governments, the bargaining power of a firm operating in one region can increase as
policymakers fear a potential relocation, which in turn offer benefits to the firm un-
der the particular political environment (e.g., under the Democratic governors in HQ
relocation cases). Furthermore, this research contributes to the study of fundamen-
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tal questions about economic voting and electoral accountability more broadly. The
results show that immediate economic changes are not the sole basis through which
the local economic conditions affect elections. Rather, even though direct economic
consequences are not sizable, observable economic events, such as location decisions,
can affect voters’ perceptions and thereby electoral results.
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Chapter 1
Nonpartisan Reward and Partisan Punishment:
Electoral Effects of Corporate Headquarters
Relocation
1.1 Introduction
Battles for corporate headquarters (HQ) across governments are fierce. It is no secret
that local and state governments in the U.S. frequently offer lucrative incentives to
attract firms to given locales (Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy, 2013; Jensen and
Malesky, 2018). In particular, corporate HQ, defined as the hub of a firm’s operations
in a wide range of areas, including strategic planning, management, administration,
financial, and legal activities, are frequently the beneficiaries of these incentives. The
recent case of Amazon illustrates this point well. In October 2017, the company
announced plans to build a second HQ. A total of 238 local and state governments and
Canada submitted proposals, such that a bidding war began. The bids skyrocketed
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to $8.5 billion in incentive packages including tax exemptions and cash grants,1 which
far exceeded the $5 billion value of the HQ that Amazon itself had estimated.2
Not only do governments offer generous incentives to attract corporate HQ, but
they also do the same in their efforts to retain the HQ that have already operated in
their constituencies. For instance, when Marriott announced plans to move its HQ out
of Maryland in 1999, the 59th Governor of Maryland, Parris Glendening, convinced
the company to stay by offering around $43 million in incentives, with no strings
attached. Seventeen years later, history repeated itself: Marriott again announced
plans to move its HQ out of Maryland, to which then state governor, Larry Hogan,
responded with $62 million in grants and tax benefits.3 Similar high-profile retention
efforts have been undertaken in Illinois and other states.4
Why do local and state governments dedicate millions or billions of dollars to
attracting and retaining corporate HQ? The direct economic effects of corporate HQ
operation alone cannot fully justify the use of fiscal incentives. Numerous studies
have found that the net impact of providing incentive packages is uncertain (e.g., Fox
and Murray, 2004; Peters and Fisher, 2004; Hicks and Shughart II, 2007; Thomas,
2011). Moreover, in many cases, the substantial fiscal costs of lucrative incentives
1The largest publicly known incentive package of $8.5 billion was offered by Maryland government,
followed by New Jersey’s offer of $ 7 billion in November, 2017.
2For example, see Nathan M. Jensen, “Do Taxpayers Know They Are Handing Out Billions to
Corporations?,” New York Times, April 24, 2018. See also Lucinda Shen, “This Unexpected City
Says It Has Everything Amazon Wants for a New Headquarters,” Fortune, October 16, 2017.
3See Jonathan O’Connell, “The trap that causes states to give millions to corporations like Mar-
riott,” Washington Post, October 21, 2016
4For example, when the Illinois government announced that it would increase corporate the tax
rate in 2012, some of the large companies in Illinois such as Sears and Motorola threatened to
move out of the state. In response, the Illinois government awarded multi-year tax breaks to these
companies.
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for investment even exceed the expected benefits.5 In cases of HQ relocation, the
economic rationale for incentive packages is usually weaker than for other investment
decisions (i.e., building a factory), because the number of jobs involved in HQ relo-
cation is usually not large. For instance, the recent relocation of General Electric’s
HQ from Fairfield, Connecticut, to Boston, Massachusetts, moved 800 jobs—far less
than the number of jobs provided by many of the city’s existing companies.6
The stakes, however, are not economic only. I argue that the electoral effects of
HQ relocation motivate politicians to offer financial inducements to firms. Building
upon the idea that political incentives can explain motivations behind lucrative of-
fers to companies (e.g., Jensen et al., 2014; Jensen and Malesky, 2018),7 I provide
evidence that firms’ locational decisions influence voter’s perception of current and
future economic conditions and ultimately affect electoral outcomes. Voters do not
always follow all offers of incentive packages to firms. Gathering such information
entails costs in terms of time and cognitive effort spent learning about government
policies. Thus, it is essential to know whether for the more observable HQ reloca-
tion events affect elections. If so, the anticipation of such electoral effects alone can
motivate policymakers to utilize lucrative inducements to attract of to retain HQ.
To better understand the political consequences of corporate HQ relocation, I the-
5A notable example of excessive incentives concerns Mercedes-Benz. In 1996, the German au-
tomobile maker received a $253 million incentive deal, equivalent to over $200,000 for each new
job that Mercedes-Benz was expected to create. See Richard Waters, “Bidding War Reaches New
Heights,” The Financial Times. November 20, 1996.
6See Jon Chesto, “GE is huge, but its future headquarters will be anything but,” The Boston
Globe. March 12, 2016
7Jensen et al. (2014), for example, show that voters are more likely to support a governor who
offers incentives to that firm to invest in a new manufacturing plant than to support a governor who
does not provide such incentives, regardless of the firm’s investment decisions
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orize about how voters evaluate HQ relocation and translate these evaluations into
voting decisions. In particular, I account for three key aspects regarding the electoral
implications of economic events—signaling effects, interactive effects between parti-
san cues and information on policies that cause the event, and asymmetries between
positive and negative events. As a signal of current and future economic conditions,
economic events help voters to assess the incumbent’s economic performance. Nev-
ertheless, in the assessment process, partisan cues on policy orientation interact with
information about policy drivers. The role of partisan cues, however, is magnified
only for negative event cases. This is because adverse effects incentivize voters to en-
gage in costly information gathering. Hence, voters, on average, place more weight on
prospective evaluations of effects in order to mitigate the chances of negative events
reoccurring.
In the context of HQ relocation, the arguments developed here offer the following
observable implications, which can be specified as distinct hypotheses: Voters are
more likely to punish the Democratic Party or support the Republican Party in the
negative event of HQ outflow due to perceived beliefs that the Democratic party tends
to implement unfriendly business policies, such as high corporate tax rates, which are
the main drivers of HQ outflow (Devereux and Maffini, 2006; Dyreng and Lindsey,
2009; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Chow et al., 2016). On the other hand, when an
HQ moves in, the partisan effects weakens. Voters simply reward the incumbent for
the positive event with increased electoral support, expecting that economic welfare
will likely increase in the future under the same government.
To test the hypotheses, I focus on state-level corporate HQ relocation and its elec-
toral effects in gubernatorial elections. State-level HQ relocation is predominantly
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affected by the state-level business environment such as the corporate tax rate that
governors have significant authority over, helping to untangle complex responsibil-
ity across policymakers at various levels of government.8 It is important to note,
however, that studying the electoral impact of HQ relocation presents substantial
empirical challenges, mainly due to the lack of existing data pertaining to historical
HQ relocation cases in the United States. I have overcome these challenges by track-
ing cross-state HQ relocation cases using over 140,000 reports in around 500 national
or local news media outlets in the U.S. Using automated programming to extract
information from these reports, I constructed an original dataset of cross-state HQ
location cases in each county in the U.S. for the period of 1995-2015, identifying 3,546
unique cases. These data provide the most comprehensive coverage of historical HQ
relocation cases to date. While existing studies on corporate HQ hinged mainly on
publicly traded firms due to the methodological difficulty of tracking the historical
HQ locations of private companies, my data capture both public and private compa-
nies.9 Moreover, the county-level dataset allows the comparison between the counties
affected by HQ relocation to those not affected, while holding constant time-varying
state-level policies, political institutions, culture, and other non-observed heterogene-
ity that can lead to biased results.
My empirical analysis provides robust evidence for nonpartisan rewards to the
incumbent party when HQ move in and for electoral support to the Republican Party
8Jensen and Malesky (2018) provides a detailed explanation on how a focus on the state-level
variation and governors has a comparative advantage over other levels of analysis such as the country-
level studies.
9In fact, according to my data, the number of cases related to public companies accounts for only
9% (a total of 320 cases) of total interstate HQ relocation cases, showing the need to include private
firms to the shed more light on corporate HQ.
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when HQ move out. Counties affected by HQ inflow account for a greater share of the
votes in favor of the incumbent party in gubernatorial elections than do the counties
that are not affected, whereas HQ outflow decreases only the Democratic Party’s
vote share and results in greater vote share for the Republican Party candidate. The
analysis using survey data further shows that voters update their beliefs in the wake
of HQ relocation. Another noteworthy result is that the presidential party does not
strongly affect the electoral response to cross-state HQ relocation in gubernatorial
elections. This finding suggests that voters attribute the relocation cases to the
appropriate level of government. I also find important clues that the signaling effects
and intangible values attached to HQ relocation, rather than immediate changes in
local economic indicators such as employment and wages, may drive electoral effects.
This chapter’s findings contribute to the literature on the political economy of
business-government relationship by suggesting that business actors are able to use
their mobility to shape the policy choices of elected officials. Despite the rich liter-
ature on the pressing importance of firms and organized interests through campaign
contributions and lobbying, not much academic attention has been paid to how busi-
ness location decisions influence the electoral process and various government policies
through their impact on political perceptions. This study begins to address that gap.
Furthermore, contrary to the idea that the host government can leverage greater bar-
gaining power by threatening to expropriate the investment already made by the firm
(e.g., Vernon, 1971), my findings suggest that, thanks to an increase in mobility and
the fierce competition among governments, firms can use threats to relocate as bar-
gaining leverage to extract more incentives ex-post from the host government. Under
the particular political environment (e.g., under the Democratic governorship in HQ
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relocation cases), the bargaining power of a firm operating in one region can increase
as policymakers fear a potential relocation, which in turn offer benefits to the firm.
This study also contributes to the literature on economic voting. First of all, I
show that immediate economic changes are not the sole basis through which the local
economic conditions affect elections. Economic events can shape voting decisions by
signaling current and future economic circumstances and by having effects on intan-
gible values. Second, the findings offer new insights into how partisan cues function
beyond a perceptual screen to affect voting outcomes. The idea that partisan cues
are influential heuristics in processing information and making political decisions is
not new (e.g., Bartels, 2000; Rudolph, 2003; Kam, 2005). Yet, this study shows that
voters can rely on pervasive beliefs relating to a party’s policy orientation especially
when attributing negative economic events to elected officials. Last but not least, the
results demonstrate that the direction of the event—positive or negative—can play
a crucial role in voters’ evaluations. The possibility of such asymmetry is seldom
accounted for in the economic voting literature, mainly because it requires a refer-
ence point, which is not necessarily determined in an objective manner (Levy, 2003).
However, with a focus on the HQ inflow and HQ outflow cases, where the direction of
expected welfare change is clear, this research uncovers that voters’ evaluations can
be asymmetric between positive and negative events.
1.2 Theoretical Overview and Background
In this section, I expand on my theory about how voters evaluate economic events.
Next, I explain the benefits and costs of HQ relocation as well as the primary policy
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drivers of the state-level relocation cases. Finally, I discuss the electoral effects of HQ
inflow and HQ outflow on gubernatorial election results and present my hypotheses,
which are tested empirically in the following section.
1.2.1 Voters’ Evaluations of Economic Events
Building on the economic voting, partisan politics, and behavioral economics litera-
ture, I theorize how voters evaluate economic events such as HQ relocation, and how
translate these evaluations into voting decisions. Specifically, I highlight three aspects
about mechanisms by which economic events affect credit and blame attributions—
the signaling effects on voters’ perception of economic conditions, the role of partisan
heuristics in interaction with information on policy drivers behind the events, and the
asymmetries between positive and negative events.
First, economic events function as signals about the government’s economic per-
formance. Since voters cannot directly observe the incumbent’s efforts or the imple-
mentation of all the policies, highly visible economic events serve as informational
channels through which voters judge whether the government’s economic policies are
good or bad. No economic event takes place in a vacuum. The reasons underlying
each event vary, allowing a specific policy or the incumbent government to be more
susceptible to public discontent or credit. In its simplest form, if the event is posi-
tive, it may provide voters with a signal about the effectiveness of the incumbent’s
policies. Conversely, a negative event may suggest that the incumbent’s policies lead
to adverse consequences.10
10The very visible nature of economic events also helps the signals to be clear, lessening the
possibility of misjudgment. In most cases, it is clear whether the events happens or not and whether
the effects are positive or negative, which is also pronounced in media coverage. For example,
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Importantly, for economic events to have electoral implications, they need not be
large or have immediate economic effects. Voters are both retrospective and prospec-
tive in evaluating economic conditions: They respond not just to changes in economic
conditions that already happened but also to the economic outcomes that are likely
to follow (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002). Economic events, such as HQ
relocation, may not affect the local economy for some time, if at all. Nevertheless,
such events influence voters’ perceptions about the direction of change in the local
economic environment as well as changes in future economic welfare. By extrapolat-
ing from events that unfold under the current government, voters form expectations
about the economic future and translate them into voting decisions.11
Second, partisan heuristics on policy positions play a vital role in the attribution
process of economic events. Party polarization is one of the most robust and persistent
trends in American politics (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006). Historically,
the Democratic and Republican parties have not only been increasingly polarized on
various issue areas, but this policy divergence is also well recognized by the mass
electorate (Carsey and Layman, 2006). For example, majorities of Americans believe
that Republican party favors lower corporate tax burdens while Democratic party
favors corporate tax increases, and such divergence is found across various policy
areas such as education, environment, and health care spending (Egan, 2013). Party
labels of policymakers therefore serve as influential heuristics in a complex policy
environment (e.g., Popkin, 1994; Bullock, 2011): By providing meaningful information
economic crisis or debt crisis in the local governments are clear negative events while success in
attracting new investment in the region is likely to be perceived positive.
11Also, even if voters themselves are shielded from the future effects of the event, sociotropic
concerns may also heighten voter responsiveness when it is perceived as detrimental to the local
economy (e.g., Feldman, 1982).
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about policy orientation, party labels help voters engage in the cognitive processing
of credit or blame attribution.
Specifically, the partisan policy orientation helps voters judge how likely an incum-
bent’s policies are to bring about certain types of events. When the incumbent party’s
perceived policy preference matches the policy drivers of the event, voters can easily
attribute the event to that party. In contrast, when information about the policies
that generate the event does not conform to existing perceptions of that party’s pol-
icy orientation, attributing the event to the incumbent party becomes harder. This is
because, as cognitive dissonance theory suggests, people tend to discount information
that does not match their prior beliefs (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Akerlof and Dickens,
1982). This internal need for consistency thus affects the evaluation of government
performance. Relatedly, partisan cues can affect the effectiveness of the blame-shifting
strategy, a frequently used strategy when policymakers face punishment for negative
events (Weaver, 1986). When the opposing party’s policy orientation is perceived as
a likely cause of an event, blame-shifting is more likely to be effective. Further, par-
tisan heuristics relating to policy orientation can also work prospectively by fostering
voters’ assessments of the likelihood that similar events will occur in the future. For
example, if voters want to see more events of the same kind, they can support the
party that favors the policies that are perceived as having led to the event regardless
of its incumbency status.12
12The perspective on the electoral effects of party labels of politicians somewhat echoes the “issue
ownership theory’ (Petrocik, 1996; Wright, 2012). The main difference lies in the theoretical focus
on the roots of the problem. Issue ownership theory hinges on the reputation of each party in regard
to which handles a given issue more effectively, and less weight is given to the cause. In contrast,
my theory suggests that voters take the reason behind the event into account. Also, issue ownership
theory speaks more to prospective than to retrospective evaluations, emphasizing the perceived
difference between the parties in terms of problem-solving ability whereas my theory focuses on
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Third, the impact of partisan cues on voter’s assessment is asymmetric between
positive and negative economic events.13 Scholars in behavioral economics and psy-
chology have long documented that losses are weighed more heavily than gains (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Lau, 1985). High sensitivity to loss implies that once
a negative event is observed, individuals tend to place more emphasis on avoiding
future losses than simply punishing the incumbent. This means, in order to mitigate
the chances of a negative event recurring, individuals seek further information about
the reason behind the event. Hence, as suggested by the literature on negativity bias,
voters also tend to be more attentive to information about negative events than posi-
tive events (e.g., Lau, 1985; Kiewiet, 1983; Soroka, 2006; Arceneaux, 2012). Therefore,
when citizens observe bad signals in the local economy, they are more likely to be
informed about the policy drivers. This in turn enlarges the influence of the partisan
heuristics on policy positions.14
On the other hand, in positive event cases, voters have weak incentives to seek
costly information regarding the events and their policy drivers. A positive event
provides reassuring information that the incumbent’s policies will lead to beneficial
results. In a forward-looking fashion, the event enhances voter’s belief that the in-
cumbent will again deliver positive events and economic benefits. Consequently, such
both retrospective and prospective evaluations.
13There is a handful of economic voting literature that accounts for the asymmetric effects (e.g.,
Bloom and Price, 1975; Singer, 2011). However, these studies posit that economic recession makes
the economic issue salient, and predict null relationship in an economic boom, which is inconsistent
with the theoretical focus and predictions presented in this paper.
14Here, media can also play an important role in characterizing and disseminating policy infor-
mation about negative events. Bad economic news than good economic news are more frequently
covered in the media (Soroka, 2006). Intense media attention on negative events provides greater
exposure to information about what types of policies are likely to affect the occurrence of the events.
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enhanced belief increases the voter’s expected utility from having the current govern-
ment reelected.
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of theoretical logic in positive and negative event
cases: For the negative event cases, suppose that an average voter believes that Party
A’s policy orientation is more likely to result in the negative event than Party B.
Taking these three key aspects regarding voters’ evaluations of economic events
together, my theory offers specific observable implications. Figure 1.1 graphically il-
lustrates the theoretical logic and the testable hypotheses specified for the two differ-
ent types of events—positive and negative. If the event is positive, both retrospective
and prospective evaluations lead voters to vote for the incumbent party. Receiving
a signal that the economy is well managed, voters reward the incumbent and in-
crease electoral support toward the incumbent, expecting that similar positive events
continue to occur under the same government.
If the event is negative, voters tend to become more informed and attentive caus-
ing electoral responses to vary depending on the partisanship of the elected officials.
Consider the scenario where an average voter believes that Party A’s policy orien-
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tation is more likely to result in the negative event than Party B. When Party A is
in office, both retro and prospective evaluations direct electoral support for the chal-
lenger party B. However, if Party B is in power, there exist competing forces. The fact
that the negative event occurred incentivizes voters to punish the incumbent (vote for
Party B). Still, citizens can cast votes for Party B because of the prevalent belief that
Party B’s policies have a comparative advantage in reducing the likelihood of recur-
rence. More specifically, as noted above, the partisan heuristic on policy orientation
decrease the magnitude of punishment due to cognitive dissonance, but relative power
of prospective evaluations is magnified as incentives to avoid similar losses become
large when an event has negative effects. As a result, when a negative economic event
takes place, voters will cast more votes for the party whose policy manifestation seems
less likely to cause the event (Party B) than the other party (Party A).
1.2.2 Economic Implications and Drivers of Corporate HQ
Relocation
“Listen, you don’t want to be the governor who lost Marriott to Virginia.”
— Maryland Senate President Thomas V. Mike Miller Jr. (1987 - present)
Though the costs of financial incentives provided to firms to place or keep their
HQ may exceed the direct economic benefits, the operation of a corporate HQ itself
has positive economic impacts on the localities. Although the instant benefits such as
the creation of jobs and increased income are often not sizable, corporate HQ tend to
attract a highly qualified pool of labor and hire highly skilled labor. This in hand can
lead to more consumption in the local economy (Shilton and Stanley, 1999; Strauss-
Kahn and Vives, 2009; Laamanen, Simula, and Torstila, 2012). HQ operations may
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also generate an agglomeration effect, whereby other businesses are drawn to the area
to do business with or support the activities of the HQ (Garcia-Mila and McGuire,
2002; Davis and Henderson, 2008; Voget, 2011).
Beyond the impact on the local economy, HQ operations also bring intangible
benefits to the local community. The location of an HQ has a significant symbolic
value such that communities take pride in their identity being the “hometown” of the
company. Additionally, corporate philanthropy such as prestige sometimes becomes
a feature of local civil affairs (Klier and Testa, 2002). Hence, according to the Card,
Hallock, and Moretti (2010)’s estimate, corporate HQ yields around $3-10 million per
year in charitable contributions to local non-profit organizations.
In contrast, HQ relocation to other location clearly represents a negative event.
HQ relocation is a zero-sum game where every relocation is a gain for one region and
a loss for another. “Benefits” therefore turn into “costs” when a firm relocates its
operations to another region. In addition, when an HQ relocates, fears may spread
that the move signals an unhealthy business environment that may result in other
facilities or companies also moving out of the region. For example, when Boeing
announced plans to move out of Seattle in 2001, the expected employment loss was
about 500 jobs. However, the potential domino effect of other facilities and companies
leaving Seattle provoked significant fear of future economic losses. A loss of local
pride is another potentially important cost of HQ outflow. Again, in the Boeing case,
residents in Seattle were upset about losing the title of “Jet city.”
Identifying motivations for HQ relocation has received considerable attention in
financial economics and economic geography (Baaij et al., 2015; Strauss-Kahn and
Vives, 2009; Voget, 2011; Laamanen, Simula, and Torstila, 2012; Chow et al., 2016).
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These studies suggest that a variety of factors including company age, new market
conditions for new innovative products, and proximity to airport hubs drive HQ re-
location at the margin. However, researchers have consistently found that unfriendly
business policies, such as unionization and high corporate tax rates, are the main
drivers of HQ relocation decisions (Devereux and Maffini, 2006; Dyreng and Lindsey,
2009; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Chow et al., 2016). In particular, corporate tax
pays a key role by directing affecting a wide range of business activities and registering
as a significant cost for companies (Giroud and Rauh, 2017). The location of the HQ
determines the tax regime the company is subject to and the tax rates it ultimately
has to pay. High taxes can lead companies to leave a state, whereas low taxes or tax
incentives attract companies. For example, Laamanen, Simula, and Torstila (2012)
report that a one percentage point rise in corporate tax rates, on average, is estimated
to increase the likelihood of HQ outflow by 6.8%.
In the U.S., not only do state taxes constitute a critical part of firms’ overall
tax burden, but also average marginal tax rates that firms pay varies significantly
across states.15 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) thus estimate that state taxes alone
account for over one-fifth of total income taxes paid. Most importantly, corporate
tax burdens vary considerably from state to state. This incentivizes companies to
relocate or threaten to relocate their HQ to low tax states (Gupta and Hofmann,
2003; Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013). While state legislatures also play a role
in implementing the state-level policies, governors are known to be more active than
state legislatures in defining state tax agendas (Bingham, Hawkins, and Hebert, 1978)
15Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that top marginal tax rates vary significantly across states.
For example, it ranges from 4.63% in Colorado to 12% in Iowa in 2012. They have also varied
considerably over time.
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and in state budget negotiations (Kousser and Phillips, 2012) in which corporate tax
policy and business incentives are discussed. In this regard, this article focuses mainly
on the role of governors.
1.2.3 Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation
The clear benefits of HQ operation on the localities renders HQ inflow a positive event.
HQ inflow signals that the incumbent is doing her job well for the local economy, and
future economic conditions are expected be favorable. Receiving such positive signals,
citizens are more likely to vote for the incumbent party.
However, the negative event of an HQ outflow generates a different prediction.
High corporate tax rates and unfriendly business policies constitute the main push
factors. This information crucially interacts with the voters’ perceived partisan policy
orientation toward business and corporate tax in the wake of HQ outflow. The Demo-
cratic Party and the Republican Party are perceived as having opposing positions for
business policies and the corporate tax rates. The Republican Party, often labeled as
the pro-business party, is perceived as supporting policies favorable to businesses such
as decreasing corporate tax rates, whereas the Democratic Party is perceived as being
favorable to labor, supporting policies like increasing corporate tax burdens (Quinn
and Shapiro, 1991). On the basis of such partisan heuristics, voters estimate that
there is a higher likelihood of state-level HQ outflow under Democratic rather than
under Republican governorship. Voters are therefore eased into attributing blame to
the former and into supporting the latter in the hope of forestalling the repetition
of the negative outcome. For example, Kimberley-Clark’s relocation of its HQ from
Wisconsin to Texas in 1985 sounded a public alarm centering on claims that Wis-
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consin’s unfriendly business climate as evidenced by the state’s high corporate tax
rates had pushed the paper giant out of the state, resulting in an economic catastro-
phe. At that time, Wisconsin was notorious for its high tax rates, sometimes referred
to as “tax hell,” and the relocation of Kimberly-Clark’s HQ was a catalyzing event
that provoked public resentment and wariness. The Kimberly-Clark case eventually
turned out to be a major contributing factor to the incumbent Democratic governor’s
loss in the following gubernatorial election in 1986 (Dresang and Sidorick, 2002).
Furthermore, the well-established connection between the Democratic Party and
less-friendly business policies means that the Republican Party is better positioned
to shift the blame for HQ outflow to the Democratic Party than the latter. The Re-
publican Party can blame the Democratic Party by emphasizing that party’s creation
of an unfavorable business climate as the reason for the outflow. This practice is well
illustrated in the former New Jersey governor, Chris Christie’s 2015 State of the State
address immediately after Mercedes Benz USA had announced its decision to relocate
its HQ from New Jersey to Georgia:
“Mercedes, in New Jersey since the early 1970’s, is leaving for a very simple
reason—it costs less to do business in Georgia than it does in New Jersey.
Don’t take my word for it—the leaders of Mercedes said it themselves.
Economic incentive laws help—but lower taxes are better . . . Yet I
cannot make this a reality alone. It is you, and only you, the (Democratic)
State Legislature, who can lower taxes further and make New Jersey more
prosperous for our middle class families and their children.”
Moreover, the punishment suffered by the Democratic Party does not arise solely
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from retrospective blame attribution. Voters are more likely to cast votes for a Re-
publican candidate whose policy is believed to lessen the chance of HQ outflow than
for a Democratic candidate. In order to deter negative events from recurring, voters
can demand that the business climate be improved, resulting in electoral benefits to
the Republican Party. In this sense, when HQ relocated out, Republican candidates
can also better convince voters that their party is best positioned to solve the problem
in political campaigns. This logic is applied regardless of which party is in power.
Even under Republican governorship, the heightened demand for business-inducing
policies implies further support for the Republican Party.
Given that the Republican Party is an electoral beneficiary of HQ outflow, does
the party have an incentive to provoke firms to relocate out of state? The answer is
no: Although the Republican Party benefits electorally from HQ outflow, any policy
designed to facilitate it will result in net electoral losses. Business policies that push
a HQ out of state hurt core supporters, i.e., local business owners. Almost every
strategy likely to push firms out of state, such as an increase in the corporate tax
rate, runs contrary to the interests of the Republican Party’s core constituencies.
Also, related to this phenomenon, policies that increase the chance of outflow are
in opposition to the party’s general policy orientation. A deviation of this nature,
therefore, would erode the party’s identity.16
16Still, the Republican party can indirectly affect HQ outflow by not making efforts to retain the
HQ when a firm threatens to move out given that such negotiations are seldom publicized and the
incentive package itself can even result in political backlash.
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1.3 Research Design
I begin by introducing the original dataset of historical HQ relocation used in this
study. Then, I present the estimation strategy that I employ to investigate the elec-
toral effect of the state-level HQ relocation on gubernatorial elections.
1.3.1 Data and Specifications
To estimate the electoral effects of HQ relocation, I constructed an original dataset
of cross-state HQ relocation cases in the US for the period of 1995 to 2015 by ex-
tracting information from over 144,000 reports covering corporate HQ relocation in
around 500 national or local news media. First and foremost, the principal empirical
challenge encountered in investigating the electoral impact of HQ relocation lies in
the limited data available on HQ relocation incidences. In fact, the historical dataset
presented in this study is the first pertaining to HQ relocation. The existing studies
on HQ relocation are based on Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Compustat North America
database, which covers all the publicly traded companies in the US and their current
HQ location information. To track the historical locations of HQ, recent studies in
business scholarship rely on firms’ regulatory filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013; Heider and Ljungqvist,
2015). Nevertheless, whereas the SEC mandates publicly traded companies to report
regulatory filings such that data on HQ relocations are available for those companies,
there is no such mandate for private companies such that corresponding data are not
available for those companies.
Moreover, empirical analysis of the effects of HQ relocation requires information
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about both historical HQ locations and firm-level financial records. A firm is hetero-
geneous in various aspects including the number of people it employs, its assets, and
its social contributions. Moreover, even the same firm can have different implications
for local economies across locations. In interacting with local economic indicators,
such as market size or population, these factors, determine the magnitude of local
effects. Unfortunately, however, detailed financial information is available only for
public companies, which constitute only small set of corporations operating in the
U.S.
To overcome these obstacles, I tracked all the cross-state HQ relocation cases of
both public and private companies from local and national news archives in the US
from 1995 to 2015. An underlying assumption of this strategy is that HQ relocation
cases considered important to the local economy are covered in the news media.
Although the relocation of a firm is often a significant event in a local economy such
that it draws great media attention (Freeman, 2009), not all HQ relocations have
a strong enough impact on the local economy to affect voters’ economic welfare. I
utilize news coverage as a cutoff to screen out trivial cases that had a very limited
effect on the local economy.
To code information on HQ relocation incidences from media reports, I employ
automated programming to extract information on HQ relocation incidences from
144,000 media stories about HQ relocations including duplicated and irrelevant cases.
I acquired various types of information such as the name of an entity (by matching
the proper nouns in the title of the news report to the name), the original location
of the HQ and its destination (city, state and Zip code if available), and time-related
information such as the date the report was published, the actual timing of the re-
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location using various forms of algorithms.17 Finally, I cross-checked original news
reports with extracted information via computer programming to minimize the possi-
bility both of miscoding information and of missing relevant information. As a result,
I identified 3,546 unique cross-state HQ relocation cases.18 In the section A1 in Ap-
pendix, I provide the detailed description of the procedure, the search terms, and
algorithms that I utilized.
In order to demonstrate the validity of the data, I investigated the public com-
pany cases extracted from official reports available from the SEC’s Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Using company names, I iden-
tified a total of 320 events relating to public companies in the dataset. For each case,
I matched the geographical information and timing of the relocation to the official
records. For cases for which the micro-level location is missing, I used information of
state. Also, in regard to timing, I used a narrow window of year to account for the
cases where the relocation initiated in year t but reflected in the report later t + α
in accounting or in the year when the relocation was completed. The result shows
that 96.5% (309 of 320) of the cases are verified as accurate, strongly suggesting the
validity of the measure. The validated cases are listed in Tables A1 - A3.19
17For example, to identify the original and new HQ location, I used the algorithm capturing
the words from the corpus such as “relocate/move (its headquarters / the headquarters / its
corporate headquarters / its HQ) from [original location] to [destination].”
18I filtered out duplicate and irrelevant cases such as those related to a non-profit organization
or to a relocation within a state. I also omit M&A cases in which the governor and/or economic
policies played a limited role or no role at all. Also, of the various types of HQ, central HQ, the
managerial center of a corporate legal entity, is the principal focus in this study. However, I also
applied a broader definition of HQ encompassing regional and divisional HQ on the assumption that
these types of HQ tend to use similar inputs in terms of labor, business services, and/or information
as central HQ do (Chow et al., 2016). The results are virtually the same regardless of whether
regional or divisional HQ are included or excluded.
19I also present the non-matched cases in Table A4. An inspection of the 11 not-matched cases
shows that the majority were involved with either regional HQ relocation (i.e., Investools) or foreign
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Based on the HQ relocation event data, I constructed a time-series county-level
dataset in which county-year is a unit of observation. For each observation, I cre-
ated indicators of the number of HQ inflow and HQ outflow cases across the state
border that occurred in a county in a given year. In this procedure, cases with miss-
ing information about county- or city-level geographical information for the original
location, the destination, or both of these were not counted in the number for the
HQ outflow inflow variable. Also, my main specification focuses on the incidences for
which a news article clearly reports the timing of the relocation, as media reports can
describe a potential scenario or a rumor, which does not entail an official decision.20
As a robustness check, I relaxed this specification and show that the results are stable
even when cases are included for which an official moving decision is made but the
actual move year is not specified.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 display maps of HQ inflow and outflow as well as temporal
trends of relocation in each state. The figures show that HQ relocation occurs in many
regions. HQ relocation is more common in counties on the West and East Coast than
in counties in the North-West and Mid-West areas where corporate activities are
less concentrated. Further, both HQ inflow and outflow cases are reported in many
counties across all the regions, although with varying degrees of frequency. Figure
1.3 also shows that HQ relocation occurred at least once in each state in from 1995
to 2015. Overall, corporate HQ relocations do not appear to follow specific time
trends, echoing the findings of Chow et al. (2016) who use data pertaining to public
companies (i.e., Oxigene Inc.) for which the U.S. HQ was relocated.
20Even when a firm has publicly announced a relocation, it is still possible for the plan to be can-
celed. To address the concern that including these cases can compound the effects of HQ relocation,
I mainly focus on HQ relocations that actually took place.
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companies. Again, some states, such as New York, Texas, and California showed more
frequent and fluctuating temporal variation during the focal period. Nevertheless, the
figures illustrate that every state covered in the dataset experienced a HQ relocation
of sufficient importance to be covered in the news media.
I also provide a simple exploration focused on whether or not firms moved their HQ
to a state with lower corporate tax burden. Specifically, I establish the proportion of
cases in which a HQ moved to a state with statutory corporate tax rates higher than,
lower than, or the same as the state from which it moved.21 One important caveat
of this approach is that the statutory corporate tax rate is only the tip of iceberg.
Although top-line statutory tax rates account for a large portion of a company’s tax
burden, other instruments such as tax incentives, apportionment, and throwback rules
significantly influence the de-facto tax burden (Dyreng and Markle, 2015; Serrato and
Zidar, 2016). In Figure 1.4, a visualization of the results is presented. The majority
of cases (62%) involve a relocation to a state with a lower corporate tax whereas
36% of cases involve a relocation to a state with a higher corporate tax rate, and 2%
to a state with a corporate tax return equal to that of the state the HQ is leaving.
Although this result is inconclusive, the descriptive statistics are consistent with the
results reported in the literature on HQ relocation: Corporate tax burden affects the
motivation of HQ relocation.22
21Data for the state-level corporate tax rates are extracted from Serrato and Zidar (2016) from
1995 to 2010 and the Tax Policy Center (http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/
state-corporate-income-tax-rates.) from 2011 to 2015.
22I also consider whether there are any partisan trends in regard to HQ relocation based on
descriptive statistics represented in a graphical format. Section A3) shows that there is no distinct
pattern along the partisanship of governor, and the frequencies of HQ relocation are balanced across
the different treatment conditions.
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Figure 1.2: Maps of counties where HQ moved in (top panel) and HQ moved out
(mid panel), respectively. The bottom panel shows the flow of HQ relocation.
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Figure 1.3: HQ relocation cases by states, 1995-2015. The line colored with green (above) represents HQ inflow, while
the purple line (below) presents HQ outflow cases. The vertical lines denotes the gubernatorial election years.
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Figure 1.4: Proportion of HQ relocation to the states with the higher or lower or
same corporate tax rates, respectively, 1995-2015.
For the outcome variable, I use the Democratic candidate’s share of the two-
party vote in gubernatorial elections. The data on county-level election outcomes in
gubernatorial races for the 1995-2015 period are from the Congressional Quarterly’s
Voting and Elections Collection. The main independent variables are indicators for
HQ inflow and indicators for HQ outflow. The HQ relocation variables encompass
the cases in the two-year window before the gubernatorial elections. Many studies
of democratic accountability suggest that voters are myopic in the sense that they
reward or punish incumbents by evaluating economic conditions in a narrow window
before the election rather than based on the conditions throughout an incumbent’s
term (e.g., Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1978; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1992; Healy
and Lenz, 2014; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Specifically, Wlezien (2015)’s analysis of
the effects of economic change at various points in the election cycle to show that
citizens tend to develop their evaluations based on the last two years of the term.
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Although my main specification is based on a two-year window, I also determine
whether the electoral effects vary depending on the timing of the HQ relocation.
In coding the HQ relocation variables, I considered the county from which the
HQ moved, the county to which it moved, and the nearby counties affected by the
events. The local economic implications of HQ are not limited to one county. Instead,
labor and businesses affected by HQ operations are more likely to be in the broader
economic geography where at least voters can commute. To bracket counties in the
same economic region, I mainly used commuting zones (CZ), as originally proposed
by Tolbert and Killian (1987) who delineated the labor-shed based on commuter-flow
data between counties. The CZ data were extracted from Autor and Dorn (2013).23
I mainly use the CZ for 1990; however, classifications based on the other base years
yield very similar results. Alternatively, I grouped the counties into the designated
market areas (DMAs) created by Nielsen Media Research. A DMA encompasses the
city and counties in the same media market.24 The effect of HQ relocation covered in
the news can take place at the DMA level, as media tend to meet consumer demand by
conveying information that they are likely to be interested in (Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2010).
For the main explanatory variables, I mainly used the binary indicators of HQ
relocation. The distribution of the HQ relocation variables in county i at a given
election year t is presented in Figure 1.5. During most of the county year (89.9%),
23In the literature on regional economic analysis, CZ is frequently used as the main geographical
unit of analysis (Autor and Dorn, 2009; Gibbs and Bernat, 1997; Davis Connolly and Weber, 2003;
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2009; Tickamyer and Bokemeier, 1987).
24The deciding factor in determining which DMA a county is assigned to is viewing habits. If
more than half of the households in a county watch Baltimore TV stations, then the county belongs
to the Baltimore DMA. This is true even when the county is geographically closer to another city,
such as Washington, DC.
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Figure 1.5: Histograms of HQ inflow (left panel) and HQ outflow (right panel).
the sample did not experience HQ relocation and the distribution is neither continuous
nor normal, suggesting that using a continuous measurement of the HQ outflow/inflow
cases is problematic. I, therefore, coded the HQ inflow variable as 1 when county i
experienced interstate HQ inflow in CZ j to which county i belongs and coded the HQ
outflow variable as 1 when county i experienced interstate HQ outflow from CZ j. As
a robustness check, I estimate the models using total count of outflow (inflow) cases.
The results remain substantively same with the main specifications (Table A12).
1.3.2 Estimation Strategy
The main estimation strategy relies on a difference-in-differences design. It exam-
ines changes in gubernatorial vote outcome in CZ with an inflow (outflow) compared
to changes in CZ without an inflow (outflow) in the same state. I estimate linear
regression models with county fixed effects and state-year fixed effects to control for
invariant confounders in county and each state-year.25 In particular, given that gover-
25The optimal model might be one with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to control for time-
varying confounders on the righthand side of the equation in addition to fixed effects (Beck and Katz,
2011). However, it is well-known that the Fixed effects-LDV model is biased when the number of
time periods is small relative to the number of geographic units (Nickell, 1981). In this application,
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nors presumably different strategic incentives to attract or retain HQ, it is important
to control for the time-varying state-level policies that a governor can implement at
particular times. The inclusion of state-year fixed effects allows to estimate the effect
of variation in HQ relocation within state-year by comparing the outcomes in counties
affected by HQ relocation to the outcomes in counties not-affected by HQ relocation,
holding the state-level covariates constant.
The primary regression equation is specified as follows:
Dem.Gov.V oteSharei,t = α + β1HQInflowi,t + β2HQOutflowi,t
+ β3HQInflowi,t ∗Rep.Govi,t + β4HQOutflowi,t ∗Rep.Govi,t
+ µi + ζk,t + i,t,
where i refers to county and t indexes election year. HQInflowi,t and HQOutflowi,t
are binary indicators for cases in which a HQ has moved into or out of a county
in the same CZ (j), respectively, with in the last two year window. To examine
the economic voting hypothesis, I interacted the HQ relocation indicators with the
dichotomous variable of Republican governorship (Rep.Govi,t).
26 I also estimated the
models without the interaction terms to check whether the effects accrue in relation
to partisanship irrespective of the incumbent party. If HQ inflow results in electoral
reward for the incumbent party, we should find that β3 is statistically significant and
negative. Also, if HQ outflow results in electoral punishment for the incumbent party,
I observed no more than five elections in each state. I also used alternative identification strategies.
First, I estimated OLS with fixed effects. Second, I estimated various dynamic models. I also checked
whether the inclusion of LDV in the main FE estimations change the results.
26Further tests were also performed by using a binary variable denoting Democratic governorship
to better show the HQ relocation effects on the Democratic Party vote share under Republican
governorship.
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the results will show negative coefficient of β4, statistically distinguishable from 0. µi
and ζk,t denote a vector of county (i) fixed effects and state (k)-year(t) fixed effects,
respectively. Throughout the estimations, clustered standard errors at the CZ-level
are calculated.
For some models, I substituted CZ fixed effects for county fixed effects in order to
determine whether the results change when omitted variables in each CZ are controlled
for. Also, I estimated the same models with CZ (j) as the unit of analysis, instead
of county (i). For the models for the CZ-level analysis, CZ fixed effects are included.
Also, as noted, I used DMA specification as an alternative to CZ. Finally, all models
were weighted using the number of people who voted in the gubernatorial election in
each county. This down-weights small counties, which often have volatile economic
statistics, and decreases the precision of the county vote share due to the low number
of votes. This weighting strategy also ensures that the results are representative of the
average voter and captures the political reality whereby politicians care more about
counties with large populations than those with small populations.
A difference-in-differences approach relies on the parallel trend assumption to
produce unbiased estimates. In the absence of treatment, both control and treatment
groups would have followed similar trends in the outcome variable over time. To probe
the identification assumption of parallel trends, I run the difference-in-differences
regression for the pre-HQ relocation period. Specifically, I estimate the effects of
HQ inflow and HQ outflow in the next election cycle on the Democratic Party’s
vote share in the gubernatorial election in current election using a pre-treatment
dataset that only includes counties that have not experienced HQ relocation.27 Table
27This test also helps to address the possibility that voters anticipate HQ relocation in the next
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B2 presents the regression output from the falsification test. As the table shows,
I found a null effect, suggesting that the pre-treatment parallel trend holds. For all
the key variables—HQ relocation variables and their interactions—the coefficients are
not statistically significant at the conventional level in any of the various estimated
models. In the Appendix, I also present Figure A4, showing the coefficients plots of
the effects of HQ relocation cases that took place in one, two, and three years following
an election. The null results from various specifications increases the confidence in
identification assumption.
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary, Next Election) -0.104 0.388 -0.154 0.417 -0.146 0.416
(0.465) (0.596) (0.415) (0.531) (0.360) (0.440)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary, Next Election)* Rep. Gov -0.972 -1.034 -1.016
(0.996) (0.893) (0.717)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary, Next Election) 0.662 0.498 0.581 0.527 0.608 0.648
(0.522) (0.679) (0.492) (0.619) (0.374) (0.458)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary, Next Election)* Rep. Gov 0.307 0.063 -0.157
(0.983) (0.937) (0.717)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3927 3884 12774 12643 12774 12643
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.1: Falsification Test for Parallel Trend Assumption: Electoral Effects of HQ
Relocation in the Next Election (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share).
election cycle and make voting decisions accordingly to facilitate or prevent it.
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1.4 Findings
In this section, I present main empirical findings that voters electorally reward incum-
bent governors regardless of party in the event of HQ inflow whereas voters punish only
Democratic politicians when HQ outflow occurs such that Republican candidates are
favored in gubernatorial elections. Next, to determine whether HQ relocation cases
in the “next” electoral cycle affect electoral outcomes, I describe the placebo tests
performed, which yielded null results. Then, I demonstrate results from a battery of
robustness checks. Also, I show that such HQ relocation does not affect the results
of presidential elections. Finally, using mediation analysis, I investigate whether HQ
relocation affects electoral outcomes mostly through its effects indirectly on the local
economy or through direct effects on election results.
1.4.1 Electoral Impact of HQ Relocation
Table 1.2 shows the estimation results from OLS regressions of the Democratic Party’s
vote share in gubernatorial elections on HQ inflow and HQ outflow and their inter-
action terms with the binary indicator of the Republican Party governorship. The
table presents several model specifications: Models 1 and 2 are based on the CZ-level
estimation, whereas Models 3 to 6 are based on the county-level unit of analysis but
with different fixed effects (CZ or county fixed effects). For each set of models, I
examined the impact of HQ inflow and outflow (Models 1, 3, and 5). I then added
the interaction terms to each of the other models (Models 2, 4, and 6).
First, the results from the interaction models suggest that voters reward the in-
cumbent governor when they experience HQ relocation to their region: HQInflow is
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positive and statistically significant, and the interaction term between HQInflow and
Rep.Gov appears to be negative and significant at the 0.01 level across all the spec-
ifications. The results indicate that Democratic candidates receive electoral rewards
from HQ inflow when the current governor is a Democrat. However, the electoral
fortunes of the Democratic Party decline when the state is under Republican gover-
norship. The results of the CZ-level analysis are very similar to those at the county
level. Specifically, HQ inflow under a Democratic governor is predicted to yield a
gain of roughly 1.26-1.48 percentage points of the two-party vote for the Democratic
Party in gubernatorial elections whereas HQ inflow under a Republican governor is
predicted to yield a loss of around 0.47-0.74 percentage points for the Democratic
Party.28
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary) 0.124 1.327∗ 0.262 1.482∗∗ 0.009 1.261∗∗
(0.446) (0.604) (0.397) (0.544) (0.297) (0.401)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.955∗∗ -1.953∗∗ -1.998∗∗∗
(0.712) (0.668) (0.502)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary) -1.103∗ -1.061 -0.932∗ -0.842 -1.121∗∗∗ -0.974∗
(0.444) (0.622) (0.397) (0.560) (0.336) (0.465)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov 0.014 -0.092 -0.190
(0.766) (0.700) (0.529)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4450 4395 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.2: Estimation results (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share): electoral effects
of HQ relocation.
28The size of the effects under Republican governorship is estimated in the models that use the
interaction term with a binary indicator of Democratic governor.
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Given that the effects are estimated for the CZ-level, which might represent a
small fraction of a state’s population, I compute the change in vote share and weight
it by population of the affected CZ. On average, I found that the Democratic party’s
vote share at the state-level in the gubernatorial elections decreases by 0.5-0.54 per-
centage points when HQ moves out and increases (decreases) by 0.6 (0.5) percentage
points when HQ comes in under the Democratic (Republican) governorship. Further,
I simulate the results of all elections in my sample, and predict how many election
results would have changed because of the HQ relocation: If there had been no HQ re-
location, according to the simulation, total three gubernatorial elections in the period
of 1995-2015 might have been changed—New Jersey (1997), Washington (2004), and
Minnesota (2006). The findings suggest that governors have a considerable electoral
incentive to offer various incentives and inducement policies to attract corporate HQ
to their states.
In contrast, the electoral effects of HQ outflow are partisan. Regardless of the
incumbent party, HQ outflow means that Democratic candidates lose and Republi-
can candidates gain in the vote share. The coefficient for HQOutflow is negative
and statistically significant. Unlike HQ inflow, the estimations including the inter-
action term do not show that the effects of HQ outflow depend on the incumbent
party. In opposition to the prediction of economic voting argument, HQ outflow fa-
vors Republican Party candidates over Democratic Party candidates, even when the
outflow occurred under a Republican governor. The results based on the CZ level
are very similar to those based on the county level. HQ outflow incidence leads to a
0.93-1.12 percentage point decrease in the vote share of Democratic Party candidates.
Again, the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that HQ relocation has important
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implications for state politics.
Table 1.3 presents the results from the DMA-level specification. The findings are
substantively the same as those at the CZ level. As the economic voting hypothesis
suggests, I found that HQ Inflow has positive effects for the incumbent party, as
shown in the models with interaction terms. On the contrary, HQ Outflow translates
into a lower vote share for Democratic candidates even when it took place under a
Republican governor. The size of the effects are also consistent: HQ inflow leads
to an approximate percentage point gain of 1.58-1.63 for the Democratic Party and
0.74-0.83 for the Republican Party whereas HQ outflow decreases the vote share of
Democratic candidates by roughly 0.86-0.88 percentage points, on average.
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
DMA-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Inflow in DMA (Binary) 0.307 1.583∗ 0.308 1.632∗∗ 0.261 1.608∗∗∗
(0.433) (0.692) (0.366) (0.594) (0.281) (0.417)
HQ Inflow in DMA (Binary)* Rep. Gov -2.326∗∗ -2.396∗∗ -2.432∗∗∗
(0.850) (0.738) (0.540)
HQ Outflow in DMA (Binary) -0.873 -1.248 -0.856∗ -1.226∗ -0.879∗∗ -1.169∗∗
(0.480) (0.640) (0.417) (0.553) (0.320) (0.445)
HQ Outflow in DMA (Binary)* Rep. Gov 0.366 0.334 0.182
(0.769) (0.663) (0.528)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DMA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1879 1852 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.3: Estimation results using the DMA (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share):
electoral effects of HQ relocation.
To better describe the effects of HQ inflow and outflow in relation to the incumbent
governor’s party, I present a graphical comparison of the estimated coefficients in
Figure 1.6. The point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals presented are from
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Figure 1.6: Coefficient plots with 95% confidence level. Dependent variable is Demo-
cratic party vote share in gubernatorial elections. The estimates under the Democratic
governor are based on the model (6) in the Tables 1.2 and 1.3, which include state-year
fixed effects and county fixed effects. The estimates under the Republican governor
are from estimations using the interaction term between HQ relocation variables and
a binary indicator of the Democratic governorship, instead of the Republican.
models 8 and 9 in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. To calculate the effects under Republican
governorship (represented in red), I used the interaction terms with a binary indicator
of a Democratic governor and recorded the respective coefficients of HQ inflow and
HQ outflow. As clearly demonstrated in the figure, HQ inflow and HQ outflow each
has a significant effect on gubernatorial elections but not in the same way. HQ
inflow has a positive effect on the vote share of the Democratic Party candidate when
a Democratic governor is in office, but a negative effect on the Democratic Party
candidate when a Republican governor is in office. Also, HQ outflow is found to have
a negative effect only on Democratic Party candidates.
I also explore whether the timing of the HQ relocation matters. Although the
influence of ‘myopic voters’ is commonly cited in a vast literature on economic voting,
some scholars suggest that voters also take earlier events into consideration (Hibbs,
1987; Erikson, 1989; Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). Although recognizing that the most
recent events have the greatest impact on the evaluations of economic conditions,
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Figure 1.7: Coefficient Plots with 95% Confidence Level about the effects of HQ
relocation that happened across different years before the election. In the plots, t
represents the election year. Dependent variable is Democratic party vote share in
gubernatorial elections. The estimates under the Democratic governor are based on
the model with state-year fixed effects and county fixed effects. The estimates under
the Republican governor are from estimations using the interaction term between HQ
relocation variables and a binary indicator of the Democratic governorship, instead
of the Republican.
these studies emphasize the need to consider the various time horizons of events. In
this regard, I estimate the effects of HQ relocation at four points in time (t − 3,
t − 2, t − 1, and t, where t denotes the election year), respectively, on gubernatorial
elections.29 The results, which suggest that voters react most strongly to the most
recent economic events, are plotted in Figure 1.7. The estimates at t − 3 and t − 2
show statistically insignificant effects. However, as HQ inflow or outflow occurs closer
to elections, the electoral effects do become statistically significant echoing the finding
of Wlezien (2015) that voters mostly react to the last two years only.
29In estimating the models using t − 3 and t − 2, I exclude New Hampshire and Vermont, which
have two-year gubernatorial terms.
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1.4.2 Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the findings, I estimated a battery of additional tests such
as including county-specific time trends, controlling for local economic indicators,
using a different coding of the HQ relocation variables, estimating dynamic models,
and diagnosing outliers. The results are reported in Section A6 of the Appendix.
Each CZ may exhibit different time trends with respect to economic conditions
that might be correlated with treatment intensity. Hence, CZ-level changes can drive
incentives for governors to implement policies to attract or retain HQ in the region.
To rule out the possibility that the effects of HQ relocation might have resulted from
the CZ-level time-varying unobserved confounders, I estimated my main regression
models by including CZ-specific linear time trends. As shown in Table A8 in the
Appendix, the results remain very stable with CZ-specific time trends. This reassures
that local trends in unobserved confounders are not main driver of the electoral effects
of HQ relocation.30
In addition, I address the possibility that the main findings are driven by gen-
eral economic changes than HQ relocations. To resolve this matter, I control for
contemporaneous economic changes at the county-level. To capture changes in local
economic conditions, I take the average of the percentage changes in wages and em-
ployment in each county i in year t.31 I used the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Local Area Personal Income and Employment data which contain annual measures
of county-level economic conditions based on the population of business establish-
30This robustness check also provide additional evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds.
31This measure of the local economy better captures the overall state of the labor market (e.g.,
workers in counties with strong employment growth but weak wage growth probably have an over-
supply of labor) (Healy and Lenz, 2017; Warshaw, 2017).
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ments. I further checked the results from using other local economy indicators such
as percentage changes in the local employment rate, wage per capita, and income per
capita. Across all the estimations, the results remain substantively unchanged (Table
A15).
Hence, I check whether the main results are sensitive to particular specifications
of the HQ relocation variables. First, I included cases for which media reports do
not specify the timing of the relocation but do state that the decision to relocate is
official.32 To estimate the relocation years for these cases, I drew on the official records
of public companies available from the SEC’s EDGAR. Focusing on the cases that
describe public companies’ HQ relocations without details on timing, I calculated the
mean difference between the published year of the report and the year in which the
relocation actually took place as stated in official documents. These cases are listed
in Table A17. The average of the differences turned out to be 1.07. Based on this
result, I added one year to the published year in order to code the year of relocation
for these cases.33 As an additional sensitivity check, I checked the results when adding
two years to the year of publication. As Table A9 indicates, the analyses including
the cases without a year specified for the relocation produced substantively the same
results as the main estimations. Although the standard errors of the variables become
larger, the signs of the coefficients remain the same as the main results. Also, the p
values indicate statistical significance at the conventional level.
Next, I examined whether the findings are robust when a different base year is
32Most news articles in this category use the word ‘will” or “plan” without any information about
the timing. My analysis does not include either canceled or unconfirmed relocation incidences
reported as a rumor or a possibility, which are supposed to have no local economic effects.
33For example, HQ relocation with no specific timing mentioned in news reports published in 2000
were coded as having a moved year of 2001.
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used for the CZ measure (Table A10). As an alternative base year for CZ, I used
CZ measures based on the year 2000 instead of the year 1990 on which the main
estimations are based.34 In all cases, the results give rise to very similar findings.
In addition, to ensure that the presence of serial correlation does not drive the
main results, I implemented a series of dynamic models. The inclusion of the lagged
development variable (LDV) will almost certainly reduce the degree of serial corre-
lation and will often eliminate it (Beck and Katz, 2011). However, when LDV is
incorporated into the OLS with fixed effects, what is known as the “dynamic panel
bias” or “Nickell bias” arises particularly in the small t, large N context (Nickell, 1981;
Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).35 To address this problem, I employed the generalized
method of moments (GMM) system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
which incorporates fixed effects in the small t, large N panel setup.36 The results from
the dynamic estimations, presented in Table A13, show that the main findings hold.
Lastly, despite concerns about the dynamic panel bias, I assessed the LDV models to
check whether they generate findings that differ from those of the models used to this
point. Table A14 shows that the findings are robust to the inclusion of LDV.
34The CZ has been updated every ten years following the same cycle of the U.S. Census on which
the CZ estimation is based. A consistent methodology was employed for all updates. The number
of CZs is also subject to change: 768 CZs are listed in 1980, 741 in 1990, and 709 in 2000.
35The LDV is endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, generating bias. The bias is
particularly harmful when t is small, but becomes trivial when t is greater than 20 (Beck and Katz,
2011).
36The Arellano Bond GMM estimator deals with the endogenous relationship between the lagged
dependent variable and the fixed effects in the error term, which is the root of dynamic panel
bias (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009). By transforming the
instruments so that they are exogenous to the fixed effects, this method enables researchers to
overcome the dynamic panel bias problem in controlling for fixed effects (Roodman, 2009). In
addition, I also implemented Prais-Winsten estimation (Prais and Winsten, 1954) and Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation models (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949), which take into account the serial
correlation of a first-order autoregression type, AR(1), in the OLS setup.
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Last, but not least, I performed a diagnosis of the main models through partial
residual plots in order to detect any outliers. As the Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show, there is
a non-trivial level of variance both within a state and across states over time. More-
over, HQ relocations are not common events, which suggests the possibility that any
specific observation—a certain county in a given election—can influence the results
significantly and generate biased estimates. To address this concern, I constructed
partial residual plots to identify influential observations in multiple regression models
(Myers, 1990). Partial residuals represent the residual after the other variables have
been taken into account.37 Figure A6 in the Appendix presents the partial residual
plots in which the residual of the dependent variable is represented on the X-axis and
the residuals of each HQ relocation indicator are represented on the Y-axis. The plots
show no clear sign of outliers.
1.4.3 Individual-Level Evidence: Analysis Using the CCES
Panel Survey Data
In this section, I utilize the individual-level survey data to test if voters update their
beliefs in the wake of HQ relocation, which is the main mechanism underlying the
electoral effects of HQ relocation that my theory posits.38 Specifically, I utilize the
37Details on the construction of partial residual plots are noted in the section A6.5 in the Appendix.
38Some studies show that the micro-level analysis using survey data which hinge on respondents’
self-reported belief are more susceptible to some biases affected by their previous vote choices and
ideological orientations than the macro-level analysis employing voting outcome data (Kramer, 1983;
Erikson, 2004). In this regard, my estimation mainly relies on the macro-level analysis based on
gubernatorial election outcomes at the county-level. Nevertheless, to further explore the main mech-
anism by which HQ inflow and outflow affect voting decisions, I conduct a randomized survey experi-
ment in (Yang, 2018). The results demonstrate that the belief updating at the voter level takes place,
and voters are more likely to attribute blame for HQ outflow to the Democratic Party’s business
policy orientation.
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Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) 2010-2014 Panel Study.39
To examine if the CZ-level HQ relocation influences the individual’s opinion, I
use a gubernatorial approval question. Respondents were asked about whether they
“approve of the way the Governor is doing their job” on a 1-4 scale (with 1 indicating
strong approval and 4 indicating strong disapproval).40 For the dependent variable,
I construct an indicator for changes in gubernatorial approval between each round
at the respondent level: I assigned a value of -1 for a change from approval (either
a score of 1 or 2) to disapproval (either score of 3 or 4), 0 for no change, and 1 for
a positive change (to approval) between consecutive rounds of the survey (2010-2012
and 2012-2014).41 Using the first difference in the responses on the gubernatorial
approval question across as the dependent variable, the regression models control
for any unobserved time-invariant, individual-level characteristics that are correlated
with support for the governor’s performance. For the HQ relocation variables, I focus
on the HQ relocation incidences that occurred within the one-year window before the
survey was conducted.
The estimations are based on OLS regression models. For some models, I control
for a standard set of demographic and political controls. Also, I included the CZ-
level fixed effects to account for the CZ-specific attributes such as other local economic
39The CCES Panel Study 2010-2014 interviewed a nationally representative sample of individual
respondents in 2010, 2012, and 2014, by administering the same questionnaires in each round. In
addition, the CCES data reveals the county-level identifier which facilitates a match with my HQ
relocation data.
40The responses to a wide range of questions regarding economic evaluations would allow testing
of many mechanisms that might affect the electoral effects. Unfortunately, the CCES data do not
cover such questions.
41Using the changes in gubernatorial approval based on an original 4 scale provides essentially
same results (Table A16).
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Under Demo. Gov. Under Rep. Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary) 0.320∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.079) (0.079)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary) -0.083∗∗ -0.083∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.050∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030)
Age -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Party ID -0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
B.A. Degree -0.002 -0.010
(0.014) (0.013)
Some College -0.006 -0.013
(0.016) (0.015)
Unemployed 0.002 -0.008
(0.018) (0.017)
Income < $20000 0.028 -0.046∗
(0.027) (0.024)
$20,000 < Income < $40,000 0.025 0.036∗∗
(0.019) (0.017)
$40,000 < Income < $80,000 0.006 0.015
(0.014) (0.012)
$120,000 < Income 0.022 0.007
(0.015) (0.015)
Married -0.000 0.002
(0.012) (0.011)
Female -0.010 0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 5555 5545 6221 6216
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
CZ-fixed effects are included in all models.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.4: Estimation results using survey data: effects of HQ relocation on changes
in gubernatorial performance approval.
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conditions in the same labor market that may also contribute to opinions regarding
the governor’s performance.42 I excluded the observations that entail state-to-state
migration and that a new governor with different partisanship from the former one
came to the office between the survey rounds. Since the question simply elicits an
opinion about the incumbent governor’s performance, I estimate separate models
for the cases under the Democratic Party governorship and the Republican Party
governorship. I clustered the standard errors at the CZ level, the level at which HQ
relocation is assigned.
Table 1.4 shows the results for the regression model for the changes in opinions
about gubernatorial approval under the Democratic governors and the Republican
governors, respectively. The coefficient for HQ inflow is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that respondents are more likely to become supportive of the
governor’s performance when HQ inflow happened, regardless of the governor’s par-
tisanship. For the HQ outflow, the estimations give consistently negative coefficients
for HQ outflow in the models for the difference in approval of the Democratic gover-
nor’s performance. In contrast, the coefficients for HQ outflow are positive across all
specifications for the Republican governor’s performance. The findings provide micro-
level evidence that individuals update their beliefs about a governor’s job performance
when HQ relocates to different states, differently dependent on the partisanship of
the governor. This finding is consistent with the theoretical logic that I suggest:
voters are more likely to disapprove (approve) of the performance of the Democratic
(Republican) governor when HQ outflows happen.
42The respondent fixed effects are also included in some models, instead of the CZ fixed effects,
to exploit within-individual variation. The models including the respondent fixed effects give sub-
stantively same findings.
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1.4.4 Role of the President’s Party?
Next, I interrogate whether the U.S. president’s party affects voters’ evaluations in
the wake of an HQ relocation. Broadly, there are two ways in which the party of the
president influences the political effects of HQ relocation. First, voters may take into
account whether the gubernatorial candidate is a member of the president’s party. A
large body of the economic voting literature on the impact of local economic conditions
on presidential elections provides evidence that depending on anticipated changes to
their economic welfare, voters reward or blame the president’s party accordingly.
Unlike the economic indicators used in previous studies on economic voting, however,
cross-state HQ relocation provides very limited room for the role of the president’s
party given that relocations arise principally from state-level differences in tax systems
and incentive packages on which the president has little to no influence. Nevertheless,
if focusing mainly on changes in economic welfare from HQ relocations but failing
to consider the level of government responsible, voters may use the information of
the president’s party to translate cross-state HQ relocation into electoral decisions in
gubernatorial races. Second, in a similar vein, voters can directly hold the president,
rather than the governor, responsible for HQ relocation across states. In this case,
HQ relocation will have effects on the vote shares in presidential elections.
To investigate the confounding effects of the president’s party on gubernatorial
elections, I estimated the models by adding the interaction terms between each HQ
relocation variable and the president’s party (coded as 1 when a Republican president
is in office, and 0 otherwise).43 The results, reported in Table 1.5, show no evidence
43The data source for presidential votes at the county level is the CQ Voting and Elections Col-
lection.
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DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary) 1.502∗ 1.633∗∗ 1.468∗∗∗
(0.665) (0.603) (0.440)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.922∗∗ -1.933∗∗ -1.958∗∗∗
(0.703) (0.663) (0.485)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Pres -0.490 -0.395 -0.592
(0.663) (0.626) (0.452)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary) -0.985 -0.737 -0.904
(0.666) (0.598) (0.490)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov 0.153 0.065 -0.046
(0.754) (0.683) (0.525)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Pres -0.371 -0.463 -0.350
(0.812) (0.718) (0.520)
State-Year FE Yes Yes No
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes No
County FE No No Yes
Observations 4395 15753 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.5: Estimation results (DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share): effects
of the president’s partisanship
that the president’s party has any electoral effects on HQ relocation. While the
signs of the coefficients of HQ relocation variables and their interaction with the
governor’s party remain the same as the main results, the interaction term with the
president’s party is not statistically significant at the conventional level across all the
specifications, indicating that the electoral effects of HQ relocation on gubernatorial
elections do not depend on the president’s party.
Second, it is possible that voters perceive local economic events as resulting from
federal-level policies and, therefore, assign credit/blame to the president. To check
this possibility, I assessed the effects on presidential elections, as presented in Table
1.6. Here, the dependent variable in the analysis is the Democratic Party’s two-
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DV = Democratic Presidential Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary) -0.072 -0.323 -0.072 -0.323 -0.059 -0.309
(0.412) (0.556) (0.379) (0.512) (0.251) (0.324)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Pres 0.588 0.588 0.585
(0.604) (0.555) (0.367)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary) -0.082 -0.301 -0.082 -0.301 -0.070 -0.319
(0.319) (0.440) (0.293) (0.404) (0.213) (0.306)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Pres 0.564 0.563 0.637
(0.612) (0.563) (0.380)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4340 4339 15558 15558 15558 15558
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.6: Estimation results (DV = Democratic Presidential Vote Share): effects of
HQ relocation on presidential elections.
party vote share in the presidential elections. The results show no evidence of any
relationship between HQ relocation and presidential voting across all specifications.
Both coefficients for HQ Inflow and HQ Outflow as well as their product terms are
small and never statistically significant. These null results imply that voters assign
neither credit nor blame to the president.
To summarize, the results suggest that voters attribute HQ relocation to the
appropriate level of government, which is the governor level in the context of across-
states HQ relocation. As the main findings show, HQ relocation has a clear effect on
gubernatorial elections. However, according to my analysis in which the role of the
president’s party is accounted for, the results are null. Taken together, the findings
suggest that voters consider the reasons behind economic events and determine the
level of government responsible. Instead of translating changes in economic welfare
into voting decisions at the ballot, voters take the politicians who directly influence
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the outcomes into account in the context of HQ relocation when it is clear who is
responsible.
1.4.5 Checking Effects Through Immediate Changes in Local
Economic Indicators
The main results, as well as the robustness checks, provide strong evidence of the
effects of HQ relocation on gubernatorial elections. Still, the robust electoral effects
occur possibly due to the changes in local economic indicators such as employment
and income that HQ relocation influences. In this section, I examine whether HQ
relocation affects the electoral outcomes mainly through its immediate economic ef-
fects on the local economy. Specifically, I estimate the average controlled direct
effect (ACDE), which represents the direct treatment effects when the mediator is
fixed at some value following an algorithm suggested by Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen
(2016).44 The proposed method, based on the sequential g-estimator (Vansteelandt,
2009), helps rule out the treatment effects through the mediator and account for in-
termediate confounders for the treatment and the mediator.45 In my application, the
mediator is the local economic performance variable that I constructed following the
methods proposed by Healy and Lenz (2017) and Warshaw (2017).
44Alternatively, it is possible to estimate the average direct effect (ADE) as proposed by (Imai
et al., 2011). The main difference between this approach and the method proposed by Acharya,
Blackwell, and Sen (2016) is that the latter accounts for intermediate confounders in the estimations.
I determined whether the results differ by implementing the mediation package in R (Imai et al.,
2010). The results, presented in Figure A5, remain the same.
45I implement the proposed methods via DirectEffects package in R, available at https:
//CRAN.R-project.org/package=DirectEffects In implementation, I demeaned the ex-
planatory and dependent variables in regard to county and state election in order to account for
unobserved heterogeneity across counties and to estimate the effects between counties for the same
gubernatorial election, as done in the main estimation models.
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Figure 1.8: Graphical representation of average controlled direct effects (ACDE)
across different sensitivity parameter, ρ: X-axis displays the correlation between the
residuals in the mediator and outcome models. Y-axis denotes the estimated average
direct effects on Democratic vote share in gubernatorial elections. The line repre-
sents the estimated effects and the shaded area refers to the 95% confidence intervals,
based on a consistent estimator for the variance proposed by Acharya, Blackwell, and
Sen (2016). Top two panels show the plots regarding HQ inflow, while the bottom
two refers to HQ outflow. In the estimations, the mediator is an indicator of local
economic performance, for which I calculated the mean of the percentage changes for
employment and wage at the county-level.
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The key assumption of this method is sequential unconfoundedness that there are
no unmeasured covariates that affect both the mediator and the outcome, conditional
on the treatment, pretreatment confounders, and intermediate confounders. However,
as this assumption cannot be tested directly in observational studies, a sensitivity
analysis is required. Through the sensitivity analysis, researchers can check whether
the estimated effects are robust even when sequential unconfoundedness is violated.
Specifically, the analysis shows the effects across different values of ρ, that denote the
correlation between residuals in the mediation and outcome models; a zero value of
ρ means that the sequential unconfoundedness is perfectly held, whereas a non-zero
value ranges from -1 to 1 of ρ means that the assumption is likely to be violated.
Figure 1.8 presents the estimated ACDE at each value of ρ. I found evidence that
instant changes in local economic conditions do not constitute a main driver of the
electoral effects of HQ relocation in gubernatorial elections. Even when accounting
for the mediating effects through the changes in local economic indicators, the esti-
mated ACDE are substantively consistent with the main findings: in the event of HQ
inflow, the incumbent party is electorally rewarded. However, in the event of HQ out-
flow, electoral support for the Republican candidate increases. In addition, as shown
in Figure 1.8, ACDE is not sensitive to the potential presence of the unmeasured
confounding for the effect of the moderator.
In addition, I explore the impacts of HQ relocation on the local economy by
estimating both OLS and LDV regressions of different economic indicators on HQ
inflow and HQ outflow in different lag structures (t − 1, t − 2 and t − 3). Overall,
the results, reported in Table A6 and A7 in the Appendix, point to the idea that
the local economic effects of HQ relocation are not immediate. For HQ inflow, the
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results from both OLS and LDV estimations indicate positive effects on employment
rate and wage, only when using three years lag structure. On the other hand, for HQ
outflow, the analysis reveals lagged negative effects on income. In short, while not
robust in all specifications, the findings reveal that immediate changes in the local
economy due to HQ relocation alone cannot explain the baseline results.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
Using an original dataset of the across-states HQ relocation cases in the U.S. during
1995-2015, I present strong evidence of electoral effects of HQ relocation on guberna-
torial election outcomes. However, the analysis reveals an asymmetry in the electoral
responses to HQ relocation between HQ inflow and HQ outflow cases. Specifically,
the negative signals of HQ outflow facilitate motivation to avoid further loss and lead
voters to support the Republican Party in gubernatorial elections. This is because of
the perceived high correlation between the primary drivers of HQ outflow—high cor-
porate tax rates and unfriendly business environments—and the Democratic Party.
On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that positive signals of HQ inflow help
voters make risk-averse choices—a vote for the incumbent party, which is already
providing voters with benefits. The findings demonstrate that locational decisions
of corporations shape electoral outcomes, but electoral responses are dependent on
beliefs about partisan policy orientation as well as the policy information behind an
event when the event has negative implications.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the impact on voters’ perception of ex-
pected welfare changes in the near future, and not the immediate effects of HQ reloca-
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tion, is what may be driving the empirical findings. The economic effects pertaining
to HQ relocation are not necessarily realized in the short run. Instead, the main ben-
efits of HQ operation such as agglomeration effects or positive externalities to local
communities accrue over time. Moreover, as evidenced in many cases such as the
relocation announcements of Boeing, Nike, Nokia, and more recently Walgreen, resi-
dents in the original location quickly anticipate adverse effects in the future. Given
that citizens often also attach local pride to HQ operation, HQ relocation further
entails the expected welfare changes in intangible values. In sum, the results imply
that the central mechanism by which economic events influence voting decisions may
be signaling effects of HQ relocation, rather than its immediate economic effects.
This article provides an insight into the broader discussion of business-government
relationship in the context of economic globalization. My findings show corporations
are able to use their heightened mobility to affect elections and the policy choices of
elected officials. Since electoral consequences will follow HQ relocation, local and state
governments compete fiercely to attract and to retain HQ. The electoral incentives,
nevertheless, do not guarantee an increase in voters’ interests, even when voters are
assumed perfectly rational (Ashworth, 2012). Acknowledging that the HQ relocation
serves as an informative signal of economic performance, political motivations can
direct politicians to spend a disproportionate amount for the incentive packages, and
thus harm development in other important issues. Such political motivations can
ultimately encourage a race to the bottom, putting voters’ welfare in further jeopardy.
The results of this paper also call for future research to take a number of directions.
One useful avenue for future research would be to examine the heterogeneous effects
of HQs across firms or industries. The relationship between changes in the state
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corporate tax rate and the likelihood of HQ relocation is not uniform across firms
and industry. The local economic effects also vary. For example, the service sector
(or information technology firms) hire fewer workers than manufacturing companies
do while the former can bring more economic value to a state. Such a difference may
allow us to have a better understanding of which attributes of firms or industries most
affect the link between voting and HQ relocation.
Also, future research should investigate the effect of a divided government. Given
that the clarity of responsibility plays a critical role in shaping voters’ evaluations of
economic events, the electoral effects of HQ relocation also differ across whether the
state government is divided or unified. For example, in the case of HQ outflow, the
Republican Party enjoys an advantageous environment in which to pursue a blame-
shifting strategy. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy will be reduced if a
unified government is in office. Furthermore, while a consideration of the effects of
media on economic voting is beyond the scope of the present study, the results suggest
that the media can contribute to the prevalence of partisan cues by spreading policy
information. Reporting the firm’s motivation for deciding to have its HQ leave a state,
news media can indirectly influence voters’ perceptions of how this negative event is
linked to a given party. In this regard, further research on the effects of media in
interaction with partisan cues will shed more light on the electoral effects of economic
events.
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Chapter 2
Partisan Responses to the Mobility of Firms:
Political Incentives to Retain Firms and Tax
Treatment
2.1 Introduction
Political science scholarship has long debated how increased mobility of capital, thanks
to economic globalization, affects the policy choices of elected officials. In particular,
given that taxes affect the location choices of mobile capital, how governments set
taxes on mobile capital has been at the center of this discussion. A number of studies
suggest that an increase in capital mobility limits the ability of governments to raise
revenue from capital and place downward pressures on tax rates, generating a “race
to the bottom” tax competition for capital (e.g., Rodrik, 1997; Genschel and Schwarz,
2011; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). Others find that the evidence that
mobility of capital is negatively associated with taxes on capital is scant (e.g., Garrett,
1998; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002).
Based on the mixed evidence of the race to the bottom hypothesis, a growing
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literature has demonstrated that the effect of capital mobility on tax policies is tem-
pered by domestic political institutions and especially partisan incentive structures
(Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Plu¨mper, Troeger, and Winner, 2009; Pinto, 2013;
Jensen et al., 2014). Political parties have set different policy platforms in various
areas to maximize the economic well-being of their constituents. Tax is one of the
areas where at the partisan divergence in policy orientation is clear. Specifically, it is
well documented that left-leaning governments tend to champion higher tax burdens
on corporations than right-leaning governments to better finance social spendings to
redistribute wealth (Garrett, 1998; Inclan, Quinn, and Shapiro, 2001; Osterloh and
Debus, 2012). Such partisan policy orientation implies different electoral burdens
across parties when lowering tax rates for capital owners: For left governments, tax
cuts can result in an electoral backlash by their core constituency since doing so
can be viewed as a defection from their expected ideological position (Basinger and
Hallerberg, 2004). In this regard, Shin (2017) argues that, to attract multinational
corporations (MNCs), left governments tend to impose fewer restrictions on transfer-
pricing of which most voters are not informed about its practice while setting high
corporate tax rates.
In this article, I advance a theory suggesting that left governments, compared to
right governments, are more likely to provide lower effective corporate tax burdens
with firms to dissuade them from relocating to other jurisdictions. When the firms
move out of the region, adverse economic effects lead voters to shift their support
toward right governments which supposedly pursue policy platforms that deter firms
from further relocating their business operations out (Yang, 2019). This suggests that
left governments face a dilemma: they have stronger political incentives to provide
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favorable tax environments with mobile firms to deter potential moves outs, but,
paradoxically, doing so could result in more burdensome electoral costs than right
governments.
Left governments overcome this dilemma by leaning on offering lucrative tax treat-
ment to retain the firms. Statutory corporate tax rates are only the tip of the iceberg:
other financial inducements account for a considerable portion of the total tax bur-
den. Noticeably, unlike statutory corporate tax rates, which are readily observable,
the practices and sizes of tax breaks and exemptions are mostly private informa-
tion that only governments and the recipient firms possess. Furthermore, incentive
packages are negotiated between governments and individual firms, allowing to target
mobile firms whose likelihood of move-outs is relatively high. As a result, de-facto
corporate tax rates that mobile firms pay can be lower under left governments than
right governments.
The theory proposed in this article generalizes across countries with distinct par-
tisan policy platform in corporate tax issues. Nevertheless, to test the hypothesis,
this article focuses on the state-level variation in the partisanship of government and
the firm-level effective corporate tax rates in the U.S., 1996-2014. Each state gov-
ernment has the authority to set its corporate tax policy and incentives, enabling
researchers to exploit variation in corporate tax burden across the states. Using the
firm-level financial data and information on locations of headquarters and major sub-
sidiaries, I estimate the impacts of partisanship of governors on corporate tax changes
for business operating in the states.
Two main estimation strategies are employed: fixed effects ordinary least-squares
(OLS) models and regression discontinuity design (RD) exploiting close gubernatorial
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elections. Counter to conventional wisdom, results show that firms with the high level
of mobility pay less effective corporate tax rates under Democratic governorships
than under Republican governorships. Hence, additional analyses employing a panel
matching method for time-series cross-section data (TSCS)(Imai, Kim, and Wang,
2018) confirm this finding.
The findings have implications for broader debates on how globalization can re-
strict policy levers of governments. An increase in mobility empowers firms to use
the withdrawal of its business operations as bargaining leverage, and to draw favor-
able policies from policymakers who fear potential electoral punishment by voters
when firms move out of their constituencies. In particular, this research suggests that
the party affiliations of politicians are an important factor determining the extent to
which the heightened mobility of firms affects policy choices. Partisan cues on tax
policy position between left and right governments incur different electoral costs and,
thus, result in divergent policymaking regarding the direction of change as well as the
choice of policy instruments.
This research also contributes to the large volume of literature on the corporate
tax policy and the politics of investment. Although a number of works find that out-
flow of business facilities and related job losses bring electoral punishments (Margalit,
2011; Mansfield and Mutz, 2013), existing studies predominantly focus on how gov-
ernments use tax policies to attract mobile firms (e.g., Pinto and Pinto, 2008; Jensen
et al., 2014). They are mostly mute on political incentives to retain firms in given
locales. This may be due to the predominant theoretical paradigm that particularly
emphasizes that investors need credible commitments from host states not to impose
harmful treatment after a firm starts operating the so-called “obsolescing bargaining”
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problem (Vernon, 1971; Kerner, 2009). In this paradigm, firms are assumed to react
to host governments’ commitments, rather than seeking for ways to mitigate political
risks, or to relocate their business due to the firm’s sunk costs (Pinto, 2013). How-
ever, the findings of my research show that the heightened mobility of firms can lead
to ex-post tax benefits, in interaction with partisan incentive structures—particularly
when left governments are in power.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the trend of increasing mobility of firms and fierce competition among governments.
Next, I introduce my theory about partisan responses to the heightened mobility of
firms. Then, I describe the data and explain the empirical strategy to estimate the
effects of Democratic governorship on the firm-level effective corporate tax rates across
firms with different level of mobility in the United States context. After describing
my results, in the final section, I discuss their policy implications.
2.2 Competition for Mobile Firms
Over the past decades, many corporations have become less dependent on their loca-
tions. Thanks to technological developments that have reduced transportation and
communication costs, firms can take advantage of cost disparities between countries
by (re)locating manufacturing operations and business functions to locations overseas
(Blinder, 2009; Mansfield and Mutz, 2013). In response to the heightened mobility
of corporations, national and sub-national governments face increasing pressure to
retain and attract firms in given locales.
In response, governments have implemented a wide range of policy inducements to
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maintain, or lure, firms in their jurisdictions. To lessen labor costs, which constitute to
a considerable portion of total business expenses, governments can formulate policies
that impose strict regulations on labor union or weaken labor right. The more direct
policy tools that affect the profits of firms has been also frequently used. For example,
regulations on transfer pricing regulations has been proliferated in many countries,
and exisiting studies find these regulations play a significant role in firms’ location
decisions (e.g., Shin, 2017). Governments have also incentives to increase expenditures
on social and economic infrastructures to provide more favorable business environment
to entice firms.
Among various policy tools, however, corporate tax policy—decreasing corporate
tax rate or offering financial incentives—has been at the core of discussing about
which policy instrument is most effective, and frequently implemented (Baaij, Van
Den Bosch, and Volberda, 2004; Voget, 2011). Firms and investors tend to choose
geographic locations with the low tax rates to maximize their profits (Wallerstein
and Przeworski, 1995; Rodrik, 1997). This high sensitivity to differences in corporate
tax rates incentivizes governments to provide generous tax environments for firms.
For example, countries such as Switzerland and Netherlands succeeded in attracting
a large number of firms by providing generous tax benefits (Laamanen, Simula, and
Torstila, 2012). Moreover, the effects of tax policies, by nature, are more direct,
compared to those of other regulations or infrastructure. Decreases in corporate tax
rates or tax abatement, for instance, do not require long time horizons to affect
firms’ profits, but are translated into increases in profits with no delay. In particular,
offering tax incentives can be considered a‘safe’ policy tool that are less likely to incur
electoral repercussions, since the amount of the offers and even the practice of it are
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private information that voters can not easily acquire in most cases. This opaqueness
provides significant leeway for politicians to manipulate tax incentives as a instrument
to influence firms’ location decisions.
Moreover, the external pressure created by fierce competition with other govern-
ments also motivates policymakers to cut their corporate tax rates or offer lucrative
incentives to the firms, thereby generating so-called a ‘race to bottom’ with ulti-
mately all countries ending up with low tax rates, but with no discernible impact
on the firms’ location decisions (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Swank, 2006; James,
2014). To successfully lure firms and to avoid the flight of firms, a country should
consider reducing tax costs as other competitor countries adopt business-friendly tax
regimes. Advanced economies, where a vast majority of firms with high mobility (i.e.,
MNC) are headquartered, have become concerned about these competitive reductions
in corporate tax burdens between countries (Fuest et al., 2005). Noticeably, the fierce
competition is found not only at the national but also at the sub-national level. For
example, since early 1980, state and local governments in the U.S. have awarded cor-
porations more than $64 billion in tax incentives to lure new investments or to reward
existing firms (Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy, 2013).1
2.3 Party Politics and Effective Corporate Tax Rates
Though it is a commonly implemented policy, providing a favorable corporate tax
environment is not cost-free. With a reduced tax revenue due to corporate tax cuts,
1Another estimate by New York Times shows that U.S. states and cities spend around $80 billion
each year as financial incentives for new investment.See http://archive.nytimes.com/www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html
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governments could face difficulty securing sufficient budget to fund government ex-
penditures for social services. In particular, given that the political demand for large
social spending to compensate the losers from the economic globalization has in-
creased, the budgetary concern is not trivial (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett, 1998; Swank
and Steinmo, 2002). Relatedly, under budget constraints, financing tax incentives is
not easy. In many cases, it is also inefficient, since the cost of inducements exceeds
economic benefits (i.e., Morisset and Pirnia, 2000; Bobonis and Shatz, 2007). As a
result, a dilemma arises: Governments have incentives to offer tax benefits to firms
to lure their operations and to deter their relocation to other jurisdictions, but, at
the same time, this practice can shrink the tax bases which can eventually jeopardize
fiscal conditions and government services (Pinto, 2013).
Nevertheless, the political costs of offering tax benefits to firms vary between
governments with different partisan orientations. Political economy scholars have
long documented that left- and right-leaning governments differ on the economic
policies and regulatory environments they tend to pursue based on clearly distinct
socioeconomic bases of support (e.g., Hibbs, 1977; Quinn and Shapiro, 1991; Swank,
1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Pinto and Pinto, 2008). Specifically, right parties,
drawing support from business owners, are more likely to support low corporate taxes
and decreases in government spendings on unemployment insurance, health, housing,
and social security (e.g., Alt, 1985; Hicks, 1988; Quinn and Shapiro, 1991). In contrast,
left parties with support from labor advocate higher corporate tax rates because they
champion the expansion of social welfare expenditures for redistribution of wealth
toward the working class and the poor, which requires large tax base (e.g., Garrett,
1998; Inclan, Quinn, and Shapiro, 2001).
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Such distinct party manifestos imply that parties will face different costs for pro-
viding corporate tax cuts. Compared to their right-leaning counterparts, left-leaning
governments must worry potential electoral backlash from their core constituency—
members of the working class—when they implement policies to decrease in corporate
tax burdens. This is because tax cuts can cause failure to provide sufficient social
spendings, which will eventually be losses for workers. Moreover, since corporate tax
cuts imply a deviation of their main policy platform, left governments that support
corporate tax cuts should risk potential electoral punishment by party supporters
(Quinn and Shapiro, 1991; Swank, 2006).
Still, left-leaning governments have greater political incentives particularly to re-
tain firms in given locales than right-leaning governments. The relocation of firms
out of the jurisdiction incurs heavier electoral costs on left parties than right parties
mainly through the following two mechanisms. First, the relocation of firms hurts
labor through job losses and heightened job insecurity, strictly decreasing the welfare
of labor (Pinto, 2013). Closure of firms’ operations means that the jobs employed
are immediately destroyed. Such observable and immediate negative consequences
on workers may turn into blames on left-leaning policymakers (Powell and Whitten,
1993; Kayser, 2009).
Second, when voters observe the flight of corporations, they are more likely to
assign blame to left governments than right governments and increase support for
right governments. The voter might select specific parties in a forward-looking fash-
ion, calculating expected economic welfare driven by partisan economic policies. A
number of studies find evidence that an increase in wage motivates voters to support
left governments. This is because of the expectations that generous social welfare
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programs can safeguard their wealth. On the other hand, voters tend to shift their
votes to right governments when perceived income change is negative since they ex-
pect economic policy orientation of left governments to increase public spending can
further shrink economic activities (i.e., a decrease in capital investment) (e.g., Durr,
1993; Stevenson, 2001).
More importantly, extensive research in cognitive psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics suggests that losses are weighed more heavily than gains (e.g., Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Lau, 1985). High sensitivity to loss implies that once a negative
event is observed, individuals tend to place more emphasis on avoiding future losses
than on simply punishing the incumbent. In this regard, the negative implications of
firms’ move-outs can magnify voters’ incentives to support the pro-business party at
the ballot to lower the chances of recurrence unlike the firms’ move-ins with positive
signals that can lead voters to reward the incumbent party. Using a dataset compris-
ing cross-state HQ relocation cases in the U.S., Yang (2019) finds empirical evidence
that counties affected by HQ inflow account for a greater share of the votes in favor
of the incumbent party, whereas those that witnessed HQ outflow exhibit an increase
in the vote share of the Republican candidate in gubernatorial elections.
Because they have greater political burdens to provide corporate tax cuts in con-
junction with stronger electoral incentives to retain firms than their right counter-
parts, left governments are more likely to rely on tax incentives and regulation as
opposed to decreasing statutory corporate tax rates. Existing studies in policy trans-
parency suggest that voters do not always possess complete information about the
effect and even practices of policy instruments (e.g., Kono, 2006; Guisinger, 2009).
The complex nature of corporate tax system enables the left government to create
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such business-friendly tax environment by pursuing opaque policy instruments. While
statutory tax rates are public information that can be easily accessible by media or
government documents, effective corporate tax rates at the firm level are private:
it requires firm’s financial records, which are confidential in many cases. In other
words, politicians have large leeway for affecting effective tax rates, keeping them
hidden. Adjusting effective corporate tax rates through various form of deductions
and exemptions are ‘safe’ in a sense that even voters who are wary of business-friendly
policies or financial concessions to firms cannot easily detect. A recent study by Shin
(2017) about transfer pricing regulations for MNCs supports this view. Shin (2017)
finds that left governments set higher statutory corporate tax rates to avoid potential
electoral backlash, but tend to impose weaker regulations on MNC’s profit-shifting of
which most voters are ignorant, in order to attract MNCs’ investments.
Nevertheless, not all mobile firms can trigger governments’ incentives to provide
generous tax benefits. Business is not a unitary interest. Firms are heterogeneous
in many aspects including its mobility even within the same industry (e.g., Antra`s,
2003; Yeaple, 2006; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). Relocation is a feasible strategy that
only the firm with a high level of mobility can choose to maximize its profit. Thus,
the high degree of mobility can read by governments as a high likelihood of relocation
even if not acted on via a threat of relocation by the firm. With a limited budget,
governments want to provide financial inducements only to the firms which are likely
to move out to seek favorable tax regimes. Again, incentive packages, which are offered
at the firm-level through the direct negotiation between governments and individual
firms, enables governments to formulate targeted tax deductions or exemption only
for mobile firms. In this regard, I hypothesize that firms with high-level of mobility
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will experience less effective tax burden under left-wing governments than under right-
wing governments.
For the low-level mobility firms, on the other hand, the partisan difference in ef-
fective corporate tax rates is less clear. Left governments may have greater partisan
incentives to levy heavier tax on the relatively less mobile firms than right govern-
ments. Yet, though governments can evaluate the firm-level mobility, the exact degree
of mobility of a firm is not always complete information (Hines, 2007). Despite its
policy platform of supporting high statutory tax, such incomplete information envi-
ronment hinders left governments to freely impose high effective corporate tax rates
even on the (seemingly) low mobility firms because it can push firms to move out,
leading to electoral costs. In the later section, I elaborate two variables that I use to
capture the firm-level mobility for empirical analyses.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
To examine the relationship between the partisanship of governments and the firm-
level tax burden, I exploit the state-level variation in the partisanship of government
and tax policies within the U.S., 1996-2014. I begin with using fixed effects estimators
that use detailed firm-level financial data. Furthermore, to estimate causal relation-
ships, I also employ regression discontinuity (RD) design exploiting gubernatorial
close elections in the U.S. Before elaborating the estimation models, first, I explain
how the U.S. context provides a unique opportunity to examine the partisan effects on
corporate tax policies. Next, I describe the data in greater detail, introduce empirical
specifications, and discuss the methodological challenges raised by the analysis.
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2.4.1 United States Context: the State-level Tax Policy and
Partisanship of Governor
The U.S. provides an excellent laboratory for testing my theory.2 There exist con-
siderable variation in tax policies and governors’ party affiliation across states are
exploitable to investigate the partisan effects of a tax burden on corporations associ-
ated with business relocation. In fact, in the U.S., the relocation across state borders
have been common (Holloway and Wheeler, 1991), and an increasing number of firms
has moved their businesses abroad (Dyreng et al., 2015). The trend of business re-
location is accelerated in the late 1970s as the state, and local policymakers started
proposing generous incentive packages to lure firms (Chow et al., 2016).3.
In the U.S., state governments have significant autonomy over imposing taxes
on corporate activities within their borders (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Dyreng,
Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013). For the firms can have a physical presence (i.e., nexus)
in multiple states, those firms are subject to tax apportionment formulas that vary
across state governments. This feature, in turn, generates a significant variation in tax
burden across states, and state taxes, in fact, constitute a significant part of the firms’
tax bill (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). According to Heider and Ljungqvist (2015)’s
estimates, for the average firm in their sample, state taxes account for 21% (13.7%
for median sample firm) of their total amount of income taxes. Also, they found that
2See Jensen and Malesky (2018) for a discussion about how the state-level variation in the United
States can provide an ideal setting to empirically investigate the electoral implications of business
location decisions.
3Since state and local officials in Pennsylvania offered a $100 million incentive package to attract
Volkswagen to build its plant in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania in the late 1970s, lucrative
packages have been popular policy instruments to lure companies in the U.S. (Chow et al., 2016).
Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy (2013) show that 16 of the Fortune 50 companies received special
deals from state and local governments.
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top marginal tax rates varied considerably by states—from 4.63% (Colorado) to 12%
(Iowa)—as of 2012, and have changed significantly over time (Heider and Ljungqvist,
2015).
Moreover, in the context of state-level corporate tax burden, governors appear to
enjoy the considerable capacity to influence it, suggesting a large room for the effects
of the governor’s partisanship. Governors are known to be more active than legisla-
tures in defining state tax agendas (Bingham, Hawkins, and Hebert, 1978). Moreover,
it is important to note that corporate tax, among other types of taxes, is determined
through interbranch negotiations over the state budget where governors exert their
power (Kousser and Phillips, 2012). Especially, tax exemptions and incentives are
frequently included in an annual executive budget proposal. For example, New York
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed FY 2018 Executive Budget include capital
and tax-credit funding worth of around $750 million.4 Also, as chief managers and
leaders of the states, governors are actively involved in negotiation with companies.
In particular, all the states in the U.S. have economic development agencies under
the governor’s office responsible for offering tax incentives and promoting investments.
Hence, though there has been no clear consensus on the role of state officials’ partisan-
ship on policy outcomes, recent studies find that the partisan differences in state-level
policies are noteworthy and have increased significantly over time (Fredriksson, Wang,
and Warren, 2013; Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017).
4For details, see https://on.ny.gov/2joDobJ
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2.4.2 Data and Sample Selection: Publicly Traded Compa-
nies in the U.S.
An empirical analysis of the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on the firm-level
tax burden requires data on the firm-level financial information and geographical
information on jurisdictions in which the firms pay taxes. I thus use data from the
Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America. The data represent a panel of all
public companies whose shares are traded in the U.S. and covers location information
of HQ at the state-level.
The main limitation of using HQ locations available in the Compustat is that
it only reports the most recent locations, ignoring changes over time. To overcome
this obstacle, I tracked the historical locations of HQ following Dyreng, Lindsey, and
Thornock (2013) and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock
(2013) developed a text search program to create a database of the historical location
of HQ from firms’ regulatory filings (10-Q form) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)’s EDGAR service from 1996. Moreover, using the Exhibit 21
of Form 10-K which provides a detailed list of the names and locations of a firm’s
significant subsidiaries, this method also allows to account for a crude family tree of
the firm and to code subsidiary locations. Then, using a CIK number in Compustat,
I link the firms covered in the Compustat to data on the database of SEC reports
from Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013). As a result, I constructed a firm-level
time series data of financial information and the locations of the headquarters as well
as its major subsidiaries.
To capture the firm’s average level of state tax burden, I calculate the annual
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state effective tax rate (ETR) for each firm-year for all public firms headquartered
in the U.S available at the Compustat. Statutory tax rates, as opposed to effective
tax rates, only tell part of the story. While statutory tax rates are an important part
of corporate tax burden, tax incentives, apportionment, throwback rules, and other
factors have a significant impact on tax burden. Effective tax rates account for not
only statutory tax rates but also the targeted tax deductions or exemptions, and thus
they capture de-facto state tax burden that a firm faces.
Following the most common specification for effective corporate tax rates used
in the accounting literature (e.g., Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013), I compute
State ETR as state tax expense (TXS) divided by the firm’s pretax income (PI). I
also exclude firm-years with negative pretax income since the interpretation of the
effective tax rates with negative denominator is unclear. Also, I truncate the effective
tax rate variable at zero, and firms with missing values of state current tax expense
are excluded. In addition, I exclude financial firms (SIC 60-69) and utilities (SIC
49) due to significant regulatory and institutional differences between these firms and
other firms. As a result, the sample consists of 41,658 firm-years for 7,150 unique
U.S. firms over the period 1996-2014.
Next, I match the gubernatorial election results to the state-year in which firm’s
HQ is located, using the Klarner Politics data.5. Existing studies in financial eco-
nomics show that a firm’s headquarters has proven to be a useful approximation for
the firm’s operating location (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Loughran and Schultz,
2005; Loughran, 2008). In particular, given that HQ are involved with significant por-
5website: http://klarnerpolitics.com/kp-dataset-page.html. Accessed on Octo-
ber 22, 2018
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tions of payroll and frequently property (i.e., capital investments on buildings), the
location of a firm’s HQ is an important factor of its tax burden (Markle and Shack-
elford, 2012; Chow et al., 2016). In addition, I account for the geographic distribution
of their tax liabilities using the number of subsidiaries operating in other states than
the state where HQ operates.
To capture the firm-level mobility, I use two variables—a dichotomous indicator
for MNCs and the number of states in the U.S. where the firm operates for the given
year. First, MNCs, which supply specific inputs and producer services such as man-
agement, engineering, marketing, and financial services to their foreign subsidiaries
(Helpman, 1984), can relocate their HQ to other countries with more favorable tax
regimes, while domestic firms rarely have such an option (Klassen and Laplante, 2012;
Dyreng and Markle, 2015). Besides, as the company grows, some of the foreign sub-
sidiaries are given essential roles in the MNC, and this lead to an increase in the
likelihood of relocation since the companies are motivated to relocate their business
operations to gain efficiency by co-locating with foreign subsidiaries (Benito, Lunnan,
and Tomassen, 2011). Also, MNCs tend to move to the lower tax countries where
their foreign subsidiaries reside (Voget, 2011). Notably, the rise in importance of
intangible assets in MNCs operation, which are easier to move across international
borders than are physical assets, is thought to facilitate MNCs’ relocation (Klein-
bard, 2011; De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2016). In the estimations, I classify
a firm as multinational in a given year if an absolute value of its pretax foreign in-
come is not zero. Approximately one-third of sample observations (28.71 %) are from
multinational firms.
However, while it is hard to refute the fact that MNCs are more likely to be mobile,
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it is important to note that MNCs can also experience less tax burden depending on
the partisanship of the elected officials, not because of mobility, but distributive effects
of MNCs operations between labor and capital owners—the core constituencies of the
left and right goverments, respectively. The idea that labor is likely winner in MNCs’
operations has been well-documented in the context of FDI. Many studies find that
wages in foreign-owned firms are as much as high as 50-70% above the wages paid by
local firms in the same occupational categories (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Graham
and Pettinato, 2002; Griffith and Simpson, 2004; Lipsey, 2003; Brown, Deardorff,
and Stern, 2003; Pandya, 2010). At the same time, the domestic capital owner is
considered as a “loser.” In particular, local firm owners face higher production costs
due to the greater labor demand from foreign capital inflow and, in some cases, must
compete with the MNCs for local consumers.6
Moreover, as MNCs penetrate the domestic market, some domestic firms experi-
ence a decline in productivity, market share and stock share prices (Aitken, Harrison,
and Lipsey., 1996; Chari and Gupta., 2008; Sembenelli and Siotis, 2008). Furthermore,
even if technology spillovers from MNCs to local firms are possible, they are not com-
mon and can only be obtained in the long term after significant industry restructuring
occurs (Pandya, 2014). Therefore, left governments may have greater incentives to
provide financial benefits to MNCs to hold them in their territories mainly due to
the positive effects on their core constituencies than their right counterpart (Pinto,
6Also, the relocation of business operation across international border lines may provoke national-
istic sentiment, which can result in harsher electoral consequences, compared to domestic relocation.
If this is the case, policymakers may possess greater incentives to offer tax benefits to dissuade
move-outs. Yet, partisan difference, which this article mainly focuses on, will not change since it will
be able only to magnify the magnitude, if any, rather than blurring partisan incentives or changing
the pattern of partisan blame attributions.
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2013).
As an alternative measure of the firm-level mobility, I utilize the number of the
states in the U.S., where the firm and its subsidiaries operate in. Firms are likely to
relocation its business operations to the locations where the firms or their subsidiaries
already operate (Henderson and Ono, 2008). The presence of business operations and
subsidiaries in multiple states can ease the firms to benefit from HQ relocation to a
state with a lower financial burden. Firms or their subsidiaries invest in production
or R&D facilities and to develop essential resources and capabilities of its own in the
states where they operate. Thus, relocation costs are typically lower when firms move
their businesses to the locations where their subsidiaries already operate. Also, by
consolidating the production facilities and other business operations in one region,
relocation to those places can help firms to achieve economies of scale.7
I also empirically check if the firms operating in multiple states are more likely to
relocate their HQ. Using a binary indicator of inter-state HQ relocation as a dependent
variable, I estimate logistic regressions where a main independent variable is the
number of states that a firm and their subsidiaries operate in a given year. The other
firm-level covariates that can directly or indirectly affect HQ relocation motivation,
such as debt, number of employees, total asset, capital expenditure and the size of
fixed assets (measured by capital expenditure for property, plant, and equipment) are
also included.8 The models include year fixed effects to account for a common shock
in each year. I also estimate conditional logistic regressions with firm fixed effects
7As another proxy for the firm-level mobility, we can also consider capital intensity. The results
using capital intensity, presented in the appendix Section B4, are substantively same as those from
main estimations.
8These control variables are logarithmized to address skewness in distribution
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to control for unobservable characteristic at the firm-level. The result, presented in
Table B1 in the Appendix, provide evidence of a positive relationship between the
number of states the firm operates and the likelihood of HQ relocation across states.
The two indicators of the firm-level mobility are correlated but only marginally.
The correlation between the two variables is 0.1533. Also, the Pearson’s chi-squared
test (χ2) using the three subgroups regarding firms’ multistate presences gives p-
value less than 0.01, suggesting that the difference between the two measures are
statistically distinguishable. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 2.1, the difference is
mostly found in the low-group (firms mostly operating in one state). For multistate
firms (mid- and high-group), the proportions of domestic firms and MNCs are almost
same.9
Number of States with Operations
Total
Low-Group Mid-Group High-Group
N % N % N % N
Domestic Firms 12,391 65.58 2,293 49.17 6,744 49.53 21,428
MNC 6,504 34.42 2,370 50.83 6,871 50.47 15,745
Total 18,895 100 4,663 100 13,615 100 37,713
Table 2.1: Two way frequencies table for indicators for MNC and the number of states
where the firm operates (Low / Mid / High-group).
2.4.3 Fixed Effects Estimations
To test for whether mobile firms pay lower effective corporate tax rates under the
Democratic governorship than the Republican governorship, I employ a split-sample
9I also check the estimation results for each of 6 subgroups—2 (domestic firms or MNCs) X 3
(Low- or Mid- or High-group). Unfortunately, the assumptions for regression discontinuity designs
and panel matching estimations do not hold when focusing on these subgroups, possibly due to small
sample sizes to have a balanced set of control and treatment groups. Still, fixed effects estimation
results (Table B7 in Appendix) show that MNCs that operate in multiple states are the firms that
are most likely to pay less effective corporate tax rates under Democratic governorships than under
Republican governorships.
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approach. I estimate separate fixed effects models in each subsample with regard to
the firm-level mobility as I expect that the effects of gubernatorial partisanship will
be only relevant for mobile firms.10 For the estimations on heterogeneous partisan
effects between MNCs and domestic firms, the classification of subsample is obvious.
For the heterogeneity across the number of states in which the firms operate as a
measure of the firm-level mobility, I group the firms by terciles.11
To account for any unobserved characteristics at the firm-level, I employ firm fixed
effects estimators. Moreover, the state and year fixed effects are included to control
for unobserved heterogeneity at the state-level and common shock in a given year
that can affect the firm-level state ETR. The models also include a battery of the
firm-level covariates: I add a set of financial variables that may affect the firm-level
state ETRs, building upon the prior research’s findings in accounting and financial
economics literature (Gupta and Mills, 2002; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Dyreng,
Lindsey, and Thornock, 2013). Specifically, I control for long-term debt, total assets,
expenditures on property, plant, and equipment, and capital expenditure. These
variables are logarithmized to deal with skewness.12 Throughout, cluster standard
errors by the firm-level are calculated.13
10Also, as the decision making of mobile firms is potentially different from that of the less-mobile
firms, I expect the effects of financial variables on the firm-level state ETR can also differ. In
this regard, a split-sample approach is preferred since it allows all coefficients to differ between the
groups, unlike the interaction models in which only the coefficient for the variable specified with
product terms is allowed to differ.
11Other classifications of groups, such as quartiles or binary, can also be considered. However, since
the distribution of the number of states variable is significantly skewed to the right with a majority
of observations operating mostly in one state (61.8%), I mainly hinge on a terciles-specification.
Still, as a robustness check, I estimate models using a binary-specification, and the results remain
substantively same.
12I add one before calculating the logarithm values not to lose observations with value 0.
13Alternatively, I also check if the results remain substantively same when the standard errors are
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To probe if corporations operating under different governorship have followed sim-
ilar trends in their effective corporate tax rates, I also estimate the models with the
party of governor in the next electoral cycle as main independent variable, limiting
the dataset to the Republican governorship (i.e., pre-treatment dataset). Through
this test, I can also check whether corporations are able to anticipate which party will
win the gubernatorial election and make business or political decisions to facilitate
or prevent it. The null findings on the binary indicator of the Democratic Governor-
ship in the next term suggests that this is not the case (Results are presented in the
Appendix B2).
2.4.4 Regression Discontinuity using Close Gubernatorial Elec-
tions
Estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial partisanship on the firm-level state ETR
poses a substantial empirical challenge. First and foremost, the difficulty lies in com-
plex relationships between the probability that Democratic governors win an election
and ETR. In other words, concerns about endogeneity are not trivial. If Democratic
vote shares in the gubernatorial elections are affected by the economic impacts of
firms’ operations in the regions through low state ETR, the level of effective cor-
porate tax rates itself can cause Democratic governorship. In this case, a negative
correlation between Democratic governors and state ETR for mobile firms would not
mean that Democratic governors set the lower state ETR.
To deal with the endogeneity of party affiliation of the governor in a state, I
clustered at the state-level.
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employ a regression discontinuity (RD) approach for gubernatorial elections between
1996 and 2014. Electoral RD designs in the U.S. context exploit that which party
wins the election for a given office is decided by a 50% of the two-party vote share
(i.e., electoral threshold) (Lee, 2008).14 By comparing states where Democrats barely
won an election with states where Democrats barely lost in gubernatorial elections,
I investigate whether Democratic governors provides more favorable corporate tax
environments for mobile firms than their counterparts. Following Calonico et al.
(2016), I utilize both with local linear and quadratic functional forms, employing a
bandwidth chosen to minimize mean-square-error (MSE).
It is also important to note that the firm-level data used in the analysis has a
clustered structure: the treatment (Democratic candidates’ wins) is assigned at the
state level, but unit of observation (a firm)— is clustered within each state where HQ
operates. To account for the cluster structure of the data and adjusting confidence
intervals to account for bias in the local-linear estimator, I specifically use the cluster-
robust bandwidth selection to minimize mean-square-error (MSE) (Calonico et al.,
2016).
The observed outcome of interest for a firm, State ETRi,s can be specified in RD
design as follows:
State ETRi,s = α + β1Dem.Govs + β2f(ms) + β3Dem.Govs ∗ f(ms) + i (2.1)
where i indexes firms, s denotes states. State ETRi,s refers to the firm-level state
14While other studies have used RD designs to estimate the effects of Democratic governors on
various policy outcomes (e.g., Leigh, 2008; Fredriksson, Wang, and Warren, 2013; Eggers et al.,
2015; Caughey, Warshaw, and Xu, 2017), I believe that this paper is the first to apply the design to
estimate the effects of Democratic governor on effective corporate tax rates.
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effective corporate tax rates. Dem.Gov refers to a binary indicator for Democratic
governorship with value 1 when Democratic governor wins an election in state s, m
represents margins of victory and f(.) is a flexible function of m (which is either local
linear or quadratic in my estimations). The parameter β1 captures the Local Average
Treatment Effects (LATE).15
A further step in this analysis includes the identification of heterogeneous parti-
san effects for different mobility of firms in the RD. To the extent that the partisan
impact of corporate tax policy may differ across firms regarding the likelihood of relo-
cation, I estimate Heterogeneous LATE (HLATE) (Becker, Egger, and Von Ehrlich,
2013). To estimate heterogeneous treatment effects in the RD setup, two identifica-
tion strategies are commonly employed (Hsu and Shen, 2016): First, RD estimations
with split-sample regressions can be employed. Alternately, linear regression models
with interaction terms between the treatment variable and the variables of interest by
which researchers aims to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. Between those
two approaches, as in fixed effects estimations, I mainly employ the split-sample re-
gression method. A recent study finds that the sub-sample regression method is
more robust in the RD set up because it allows nonparametric estimators and is less
sensitive to misspecification while the interaction method is parametric and tend to
severely over-reject especially when the model is miss-specified (Hsu and Shen, 2016).
Lastly, I limit the focus to firms whose HQs have already operated in the state before
the election, and that did not move out. To mitigate the concern that the inclusion
of newly located firms (especially mobile firms) into the state can lead to biased es-
timates. Moreover, this is particularly important since this paper mainly investigate
15I estimate all the RD models using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2017).
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the partisan incentives to provide ‘resident companies’ with tax benefits.
2.4.5 Identifying Assumptions
To generates unbiased estimates of the local average treatment effects (LATE), the
RD design requires that the identity of the winner of a close election is as-if random.
Using statistical tests on pre-treatment covariate balance across control and treatment
firms, the validity of this assumption can be investigated. Given that my design relies
on RD estimates from within subsets of firms, I conduct balance tests within each
of these subsets. These balance statistics are shown for both conventional and MSE-
optimal bandwidths in Tables B3 - B6 in the appendix. Across all tests, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that assignment to treatment is not as-if random within
these thresholds.
Moreover, the reasonableness of the RD estimators requires that observations
(firms) are not sorted themselves across a cutoff point. In the RD designs applied to
close elections, two types of sorting can be considered broadly—pre- and post-election
sorting (de la Cuesta and Imai, 2016): Pre-election sorting behavior may imply that
there exist firms that accurately predict election outcomes, and then contribute to the
electoral campaign of a preferred candidate so that she can win the race. Yet, since
firms (and other economic actors) are not practically capable of predicting outcomes
with precision in close elections, such pre-election sorting is highly unlikely.
On the other hand, the post-election sorting behavior would expect firms to re-
locate their HQ to the states where they find less burdensome, which is mostly the
states under Republican governorship. If this scenario is true, we would find that
the proportion of observations to the left side of a given threshold to be higher than
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those to the right. In order to probe this possibility, I conduct McCrary tests which
examine the continuity of the density function of the running variable across a cut-off
point (McCrary, 2008). The plots of these tests are presented in Figures B1 and B2
in the appendix. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the running
variable in each type of subset. In sum, the well-balanced state characteristics as
well as a lack of discontinuity in the density function confirm the randomness of the
governors’ party affiliations around the cutoff point, implying that the RD design in
this context will generate causal estimates. Moreover, it is important to note that
such post-election sorting, if exist, will result in the substantively lower the firm-level
ETR on the left (under Republican governors) than the right side(under Democratic
governors) for mobile firms around the threshold, which is opposite to my theoretical
prediction.
2.5 Results
This section presents main estimation results in two sets. I begin with a presentation
of the fixed effects estimation results. The results suggest that mobile firms—MNCs
and firms operating in multiple states—tend to pay the lower ETR under Democratic
governorship than under Republican governorship. The second part of the section
focuses on the results from RD estimates on the partisan effects of governorship
on the effective corporate tax rates of MNC and domestic firms, then consider the
impacts on the firms operating in multiple states. To foreshadow, the results support
the argument that Democratic governors tend to provide favorable corporate tax
environment only for the firms with higher mobility.
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2.5.1 Fixed Effects Estimation Results
The results from fixed effects models for each subsample of firms with regard to mobil-
ity are presented in Table 2.2. First, I analyze the association between the Democratic
governorship and the firm-level ETR for MNC and domestic firms subsamples, which
are estimated in models (1)-(2), respectively. In line with our theoretical expectations,
I find negative and statistically significant coefficient of democratic governorship only
in the MNC subsample. The result suggests that MNC firms pay 0.7% lower ETR
when the Democratic governor is in office in the state where its’ HQ operates. On
the other hand, in the subsample of domestic firms, the coefficient for the Demo-
cratic governorship is also negative but standard error is very large (p-value = 0.812).
Further, I conduct a Wald test to check whether the coefficient estimated for MNC
is equal to that for domestic firms. The test gives the p-value of 0.04 (F statistics
= 3.37), rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for the two
groups.
Models (3)-(5) are the results for the three split samples grouped in terms of
the number of states that a firm operates in as a measure of mobility (low-, mid-
and high-mobility group). The results provide supportive evidence of divergent tax
burdens between Democratic and Republican governorship only for mobile firms. For
the mid- and the high groups, the coefficients for the binary indicator of Democratic
governor is negative and statistically distinguishable from 0. On average, the ETR
that firms operating in multiple states pay decrease by 1.7% under the Democratic
governorship, compared to those under the Republican governors. For firms with no
major operations in multiple states, I find null results for the different ETR depending
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on the partisanship of governors, as indicated by wide confidence interval despite
negative coefficient. Moreover, a Wald test suggests that the effects of the Democratic
governorship on the firm-level ETR statistically differ between the low-mobility and
high-mobiliy groups (p-value = 0.08).16 These findings, overall, suggest that only
high-mobile firms tend to face less tax burdens under the Democratic governorship
while such partisan effects are not applied to immobile firms.
Number of States Operating
MNC Domestic Low Mid High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dem. Gov -0.007∗∗ -0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.012∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006)
Long-term Debt (Logged) 0.004∗ 0.000 -0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
N Employees (Firm) -0.001 0.009 -0.021∗∗ -0.013 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.011)
Total Asset (Logged) -0.026 0.001 0.010 -0.032∗ 0.007
(0.029) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) -0.014∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.014
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 0.026∗ 0.011 0.010 0.027 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.019)
Observations 16257 21112 17624 4442 12740
Clustered standard errors at the state-level.
Firm FE, State FE and Year FE are included in the models.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Fixed effects estimation results about the effects of the governor’s parti-
sanship on the firm-level ETR for each subsample of firms with regard to mobility.
The dependent variable is the firm-level ETR.
16I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the effects of Democratic governorship is statistically
indistinguishable when comparing (1) low- and mid- (p-value = 0.92) and (2) mid- and high-mobility
groups (p-value = 0.59), respectively.
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2.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Estimation Results
Figure 2.1 illustrates RD estimation results for the relationship between the margin
of victory (the running variable) and the firm-level ETR for all firms in the sample,
MNCs, and domestic firms, respectively. The plots on the left side of each panel
(a), (b), and (c) show the results from local linear regressions while those on the
right side are based on local quadratic regressions. The bins presented in the plots
are chosen based on optimal data-driven selectors that employ mimicking variance
evenly-spaced method proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). The
scatter plots for the observations used in the RD estimations are presented in B3 and
B4 in the Appendix.
The graphical illustration reveals several distinct patterns. Overall, the firms tend
to pay a higher ETR when the states where there HQ operate has Democratic gov-
ernors, echoing the conventional wisdom that the Democratic party is more likely to
increase corporate tax rates than the Republican party. However, the figure shows
a discontinuity when the Democratic candidate wins a close election only for MNC.
When focusing on MNCs, counter to the conventional wisdom, ETR is lower under
Democratic governors. On the other hand, for domestic firms, the direction is op-
posite: the ETR paid by domestic firms is higher under Democratic governors than
under Republican governors. Noticeably, the results do not vary depending on the
choice of functional form—local linear or quadratic specifications. Overall, the causal
estimates based on RD reveal very similar findings as the fixed effects estimations:
only MNCs experience favorable tax environments when Democratic governors are in
office.
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The regression results from the RD analysis are presented in Table 2.3. The table
shows two estimates using the data-driven optimal bandwidth—conventional, bias-
corrected with with robust variance estimator. The estimates tell a similar story.
Across all the estimations, I find the negative effects of the Democratic governorship
on effective corporate tax rates of MNCs. On the other hand, in the sub-sample of
domestic firms, the coefficient is typically small, and the estimates are not statistically
significant at the conventional level.
Total MNC Domestic
Est (Conventional) 0.462 -5.882 0.394
SE (Conventional) 0.248 0.165 0.270
Est (Bias-Corrected, Robust) 0.672 -5.934 0.385
SE (Bias-Corrected, Robust) 0.248 0.203 0.193
Obs (Main, Left) 1469 2330 958
Obs (Main, Right) 1315 1691 648
Obs (Bias-Correction, Left) 5175 3149 3058
Obs (Bias-Correction, Right) 3916 2783 2349
Bandwidth (Main) 1.387 6.899 1.871
Bandwidth (Bias-Correction) 7.076 10.799 7.310
Table 2.3: RD estimation results about the effects of the governor’s partisanship
on the firm-level ETR for MNC and domestic firms. The dependent variable is the
firm-level ETR.
Next, I investigate the partisan effects vary across low-,mid-, and high-mobility
groups in terms of the number of states the firms operate in, as a measure of mobil-
ity. The graphical illustration of the results is presented in Figures 2.2 and B4. The
results suggest that only the firms operating in multiple states (with the high level of
mobility) are more likely to experience less state tax burden under Democratic gover-
nors. The figures indicate a drop in effective corporate tax rates at the cutoff point in
the high-mobility sub-sample. On the other hand, for the firms that operates mainly
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(c) Domestic Firms
Figure 2.1: Graphical discontinuity analysis of close gubernatorial elections and the
firm-level ETR for all firms in the sample (a), MNC (b), and domestic firms (c). The
bins presented in the plots are chosen based on optimal data-driven selectors that
employ mimicking variance evenly-spaced method proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2015). The scatter plots for the observations used in the RD estimations
are presented in B3 in the Appendix.
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in one state (low group), the discontinuity is not clear in local linear estimations.
Furthermore, the bias-corrected estimations (quadratic specifications) show a jump
in ETR, suggesting that Democratic governors, compared to the Republican gover-
nors, impose the higher tax burdens for low mobility firms. Also, the results for the
mid group are mixed depending on the model specifications. While the local linear
models provide evidence of lower ETR under Democratic governors, the quadratic
models show the opposite.
For further illustration, the regression results are presented in the Table 2.4, with
no change in the interpretation of the results. In the various estimations, the sign on
the coefficient changes across models and tends to be small for the firms with low or
mid level of mobility groups while the coefficient in the multistate firms (high group)
sub-sample, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant. The results suggest
that only the firms with the higher mobility tend to face effective corporate tax rates
under the Democratic governorship than under the Republican governorship.
In the appendix, I further compare the mean values of the right (under Democratic
governors) and the left (under Republican governors) side around the cut-off point in
the bandwidths used for local linear estimations (Figure B3 for MNC and Domestic
Firms and Figure B4 for the low-, mid-, and high-mobility groups with regard to the
number of states the firm operates in). The results remain virtually unchanged.
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(a) Low Num. States Group
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(b) Mid Num. States Group
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(c) High Num. States Group
Figure 2.2: Graphical discontinuity analysis of close gubernatorial elections and the
firm-level ETR for the low- (a), mid- (b), and high- (c) mobility groups with regard
to the number of states the firms operate. The bins presented in the plots are chosen
based on optimal data-driven selectors that employ mimicking variance evenly-spaced
method proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). The scatter plots for
the observations used in the RD estimations are presented in B4 in the Appendix.
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Number of States the Firm Operates In
Low Group Mid Group High Group
Est (Conventional) -0.036 -0.667 -0.550
SE (Conventional) 0.145 1.376 0.271
Est (Bias-Corrected) 0.094 0.337 -0.516
SE (Bias-Corrected) 0.146 1.352 0.262
Obs (Main, Left) 712 151 1604
Obs (Main, Right) 571 148 1046
Obs (Bias-Correction, Left) 2143 712 2626
Obs (Bias-Correction, Right) 1779 596 2399
Bandwidth (Main) 1.371 1.646 5.763
Bandwidth (Bias-Correction) 8.611 9.012 12.438
Table 2.4: RD estimation results about the effects of the governor’s partisanship on
the firm-level ETR for low-, mid-, and high-mobility group (measured with regard
to the number of states where the firm operates). The dependent variable is the
firm-level ETR.
2.6 Panel Match Analysis: Matching Methods for
Causal Inference with Time-Series Cross-Section
Data
To further examine the causal effects of the partisanship of governor on effective
corporate tax rates, I employ a panel matching method for time-series cross-section
data (TSCS) which can contain repeated treatments on the same units over time
units (Imai, Kim, and Wang, 2018). To estimate treatment effects, first, the panel
matching method determines a set of control observations by taking a treatment
history of the treated units into accounts. Next, the matched observations is adjusted
for confounders and a possible unobserved time trend. Then, average treatment effects
are estimated by a difference-in-differences design.
To examine whether the treated and control observations are balanced with re-
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gard to observed confounders, I compare the standardized mean differences of each
covariate between treated and matched control units at each pre-treatment time pe-
riod.The mean difference is measured in terms of standard deviation units. The
results are illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. For most of the subsamples, the esti-
mated standardized mean differences, plotted as lines, are mostly near zero value and
stay relatively constant over the entire pre-treatment period. This indicates that the
balance between matched samples is sound and that the parallel trend assumption
in the matched sample is also valid. Only exception is the mid-mobility group. The
lines not only fluctuate over the pre-treatment periods but also are not around zero
value, suggesting that the validity of the key assumptions of the estimators is unclear
for the mid-mobility group.
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Figure 2.3: Checking identifying assumptions for panel matching method: covariate
balance checks for MNC and domestic firms.
The results from panel match methods are presented in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. Figure
2.5 shows the matching estimates of the effects of the Democratic governorship on
ETRs for MNCs (top panel) and domestic firms (bottom panel), respectively. I find
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Figure 2.4: Checking identifying assumptions for panel matching method: covariate
balance checks for low-, mid-, and high-mobility group.
that the point estimates are negative for MNCs but positive for domestic firms, though
the 95% confidence intervals contains zero value. Furthermore, not surprisingly, the
plots suggest that the lagged effects of the Democratic governorship are close to zero
and not statistically significant.
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Figure 2.5: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: MNC
(Left) and domestic firms (Right). Solid circles represent the point estimates. The
vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 500 block bootstrap repli-
cates.
Next, Figure 2.6 present the results for three subsamples—low (top panel),mid
(mid panel) and high (bottom panel) groups with regard to the number of states that
firms operate in. The substantive results are similar to those from other estimation
methods. The estimated effects of the Democratic governorship on ETRs are negative
and statistically significant only for the multistate firms. Considering that the average
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pre-tax income for this group is 353 million dollars, the effect size of approximately
0.5 percentage point implies that multistate firms pay around 1.8 million dollars less
under Democratic governors.
I also estimate the models using the Republican governorship as the treatment.
Figures B5 and B6 in Appendix present the results: The estimated effects for the
Republican governorship are positive and statistically significant only for mobile firms
(MNCs and multistate firms) echoing the main findings that firms face relatively less
(more) tax burdens when the Democratic (Republican) governor is in power.
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Figure 2.6: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: low-
(left), mid- (mid), and high-mobility group (right). Solid circles represent the point
estimates. The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 500 block
bootstrap replicates.
2.7 Conclusion
With other forms of economic globalization, an increasing trend of business relocation
has stirred contentious domestic political issues. The (re)location of firms not only
directly affect local economies, but also is perceived as a barometer of ‘business cli-
mate,” more generally (Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella, 2008). In particular, when
firms move their business operations out of given locales, public resentment follows.
In many cases, the resentment does not attach to the company’s decision. Instead,
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voters condemn politicians’ failure to keep them—especially pointing out inefficient
business and tax policies. The recent case of Walgreen’s HQ relocation illustrates this
points well: After the Walgreens announced a plan to move its HQ to Switzerland
in pursuit of lower taxes, President Obama, Congressmen both in House and Senate
and in Illinois State government are condemned due to their unsuccessful efforts in
lowering corporate tax and tax reform in general.17
The political costs of losing business, however, are not equally distributed to all
politicians. Specifically, given distinctive partisan policy orientation in corporate tax
rates, which are primary factors determining firms’ location choices, left governments
face dual problems: Voter’s exception that the left will increase corporate tax bur-
dens hinder pursuing favorable tax policies, but, at the same time, such perceived
policy positions lead to electoral punishment when business moves out. Thus, left
governments seek to provide favorable tax environments for firms with the high level
of mobility through the firm-level tax deductions and exemptions, which they can
more easily keep hidden from the public. This opaque nature allows left governments
to rely heavily on tax treatments policies among other possible policy tools to deter
firms’ move-outs.
The findings of this research suggest that the Democratic party is more sensitive to
HQ outflow and thus provide friendly tax environments only for the firms with a high
level of mobility. Using a database of all public firms in the U.S. from 1996 to 2014,
I find that the firms with a high level of mobility experience lower effective corporate
tax rates under the Democratic governorship. Specifically, empirical analysis shows
17In response to such public resentment, Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin has introduced legislation that
would give tax breaks to companies that stay in the U.S.. See Chicago Tribune. 2014 April 15. If
Walgreen Co. moves its HQ to Europe, blame Washington’s tax failure.
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that MNCs, as well as the firms operating in multiple states, tend to pay the less
tax burden when Democratic governors take office, while such partisan effects are not
found in domestic firms or firms operating in only one state.
The findings also have important policy implications. The electoral consequences
of firms’ location choices incentivize elected officials to provide lucrative tax incentives
and lax regulations to retain mobile firms in given locales. Under budget constraints,
such practices can ultimately put other government projects with public provision
in jeopardy. For instance, the former Maryland Governor Glendening (D) stated
later concerning the Maryland state government’s offer of millions of dollars to retain
Marriott, “At the time (when the Maryland government offered millions of dollars to
retain Marriott), we were struggling to build more schools...Should we put the money
there? On the other side of the coin were we prepared to lose 3,500 good jobs and
were we prepared for the message that would be sent, that one of the most recognized
corporations would be leaving Maryland, and particularly to our economic competitor
of Virginia?” 18
One of the key policy instruments to solve this problem would be to promote
transparency in the process of providing incentive packages. Despite the adoption
of Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 77 on Tax Abatement
Disclosures in 2016, that requires states and localities to disclose how much revenue
they spend for incentive programs for corporations, it is not easy for the public to
obtain detailed information about the incentive packages, what companies are bene-
fiting, how much money companies receive or whether companies deliver on promises
18See Jonathan O’Connell, “The trap that causes states to give millions to corporations like Mar-
riott,” Washington Post, October 21, 2016.
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to create jobs (Tarczynska, 2017). The ongoing debates around Amazon’s decision
about its second HQ support this idea. As information about the amount of incentive
packages and other tax treatments became publicized, many residents and some of
their representatives in Greater New York publicly criticize the government’s decision
of offering generous inducements and public opinion toward Amazon in the region
also became hostile. As a consequence, Amazon retracted its decision. This recent
case may suggest that, by informing voters whether the economic benefits are worthy
for what they paid for, the room for political pandering can be diminished.
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Chapter 3
The Asymmetric Effects of Party Labels: The
Roles of Partisan Cues and Policy Information in
the Attribution Process
3.1 Introduction
Holding politicians to account for their decisions through voting is a keystone of
democracy. By punishing or rewarding elected politicians at ballot boxes, voters hold
politicians accountable for policies that expect should meet their needs (Key, 1966;
Ferejohn, 1986). Firmly embedded in electoral politics is the expectation that eco-
nomic performance especially affects voters’ evaluation of politicians’ performance
and, thus, their voting decisions (e.g., Tufte, 1978; Fiorina, 1981; Erikson, 1989; Erik-
son, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002; Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg, 2014;
Healy and Lenz, 2017). A burgeoning research explores the effects of partisan bias on
evaluations of economic conditions (e.g., Conover, Feldman, and Knight, 1986; Bar-
tels, 2002; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lyons and Jaeger, 2014)
and investigates whether and how information mitigate such biases (e.g., Hobolt,
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Tilley, and Wittrock, 2013; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008).
Despite the richness of the economic voting literature, research on whether and
how partisan policy orientation affects voters’ evaluations of economic events is still in
its infancy. Compared to other economic measures, such as employment and income,
economic events, which are highly visible and frequently are highlighted by the media,
often serve as channels of information that voters evaluate to judge the economic
performance of political actors. Consequently, understanding how voters attribute
responsibility for economic events is of paramount importance.
In the attribution process in the wake of economic events, voters believe that policy
choices drive the events, and they attribute certain policy choices to one party or the
other. No economic event is random. The policy choices that political actors make
precipitate, intentionally or not, economic events. In a complex policy environment,
voters regard the party label of a policymaker as the most influential information
shortcut from which to infer the policymaker’s position on an issue (e.g., Popkin, 1994;
Rahn, 1993). Inferring policy choices from a policymaker’s party label (i.e., party
affiliation), voters evaluate whether and how much that policymaker is responsible
for a given event. Yet as suggested by well-known cognitive traits of loss aversion
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and negativity bias (e.g., Lau, 1985), the effects
of party label become potent only when the event has negative consequences. When
negative events occur, voters are incentivized to be better informed about which
policy could affect the occurrence of the event and, thus, facilitate them to match
it with the incumbents’ party policy platform to assign responsibility because they
wish to mitigate the chance that similar losses will occur in the future. In contrast, in
the case of positive events, voters have relatively fewer incentives to indulge in costly
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information gathering, and, thus, the degree to which partisan cues serve as proxies
for policy drivers shrinks.
In this chapter, to explore the asymmetric effects of incumbents’ partisanship, I
focus on the case of corporate headquarters (HQ) relocation as a salient local economic
event. Corporate HQ relocation provides a unique opportunity to study the effects
of the party label on economic events. Because the main drivers of corporate HQ
relocation are corporate tax and business policies, the distinct positions that the
Republican Party and the Democratic Party take with regards to these policies allows
us to estimate partisan effects. More importantly, the clarity of the different effects
of HQ inflow and outflow helps analysts sidestep the major challenge in estimating
the positive-negative asymmetry: positive impacts occur when a HQ moves into an
area, and negative effects occur when a HQ relocates out.
This chapter reports results from an experimental randomized survey of U.S.
adults. The survey, formatted as a mock new story, manipulated HQ inflow and
HQ outflow and the governor’s party affiliation (Republican Party or Democratic
Party). The main finding is that the partisanship of governors exerts a systematic in-
fluence on individuals’ attribution process only in the case of HQ outflow (a negative
event): respondents more unfavorably evaluate the governor’s economic competence
and support his or her re-election bid when the governor is a Democrat than when he
or she is a Republican when HQ ouflow condition is assigned. In the case of an HQ in-
flow, party label effects appear muted. Hence, the results reveal that the effects of an
incumbents’ partisanship are heterogeneous with the respondents’ own partisanship
and material interests: the effects are found mostly for Republicans, independents,
and those who belong to the potential corporate HQ workforce.
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These findings have important implications for the study of partisanship and the
role of policy information. While a number of recent studies have examined the role of
information as a mediator of partisan bias (e.g., Hobolt, Tilley, and Wittrock, 2013;
Lyons and Jaeger, 2014; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008), possible interactions between
policy information and the party labels of political actors has been understudied.
Given that in a complex policy environment voters regard party labels as reliable
proxies for the policy positions of political actors (e.g., Bullock, 2011; Popkin, 1994),
policy information often does not affect the attribution process in isolation; instead,
it interacts with perceived partisan policy preferences. In fact, voters consider the
correlation between the incumbent’s policy preference (inferred from her partisanship)
and information about why the event occurred. Then, using the perceived correlation,
they can estimate how likely it is that the incumbent’s policy affected the outcome,
and they assign responsibility to the incumbent accordingly. The findings also suggest
that when there is a perceived positive relationship between party policy orientation
and policy-relevant facts, partisan effects will be magnified rather than be lessened.
Furthermore, this research breaks new ground in research on the effects of par-
tisanship in economic voting by emphasizing the positive-negative asymmetry. A
number of recent studies suggest that partisan bias weakens when the evidence shows
unambiguously that real economic conditions, such as an economic crisis, are bad
(e.g., Chzhen, Evans, and Pickup, 2014; Parker-Stephen, 2013; Redlawsk, Civettini,
and Emmerson, 2010; Stanig, 2013). My analysis shows a different possibility: par-
tisan effects take place only in the context of blame assignment, when the negative
consequences of an event motivate voters to engage in cognitive steps that link policy
information and partisan policy preference. The findings indicate, in other words,
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that analysts should pay more to the distinct political reactions that occur under
negative and positive conditions.
3.2 Economic Events and Asymmetric Effects of
Party Label
Economic events send a clear and visible signal of economic performance. Informa-
tion processing and perceptions of economic welfare form the centerpiece of economic
voting theory. Nevertheless, it is not always apparent that voters observe or even
correctly perceive changes in unemployment and income, which are the economic in-
dicators that scholars of economic voting have predominantly utilized. This is not to
say that the traditional measures—unemployment or income level—are not suitable
indicators of economic conditions. Not only are unemployment and income determi-
nants of economic welfare (e.g., Kuechler, 1991), they also may be the most objective
measures of economic performance. Nonetheless, economic events are inherently likely
to be visible and require less judgment by voters to determine whether or not they
have occurred (e.g., the closure of a factory). Thus, they are perceived as reliable
barometers of economic conditions. Moreover, voters’ attention to and recognition of
economic events, such as HQ relocation, is also drawn by widespread media cover-
age, which also tends to convey information about the causes of the events and their
expected effects (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014).
The party labels of policymakers play an important role in voters’ attribution of
responsibility for economic events. No economic event is random. Policies affect the
likelihood of an economic event, and so voters hold policymakers accountable for the
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event. However, identifying a cause and effect relationship between a policy and an
event is not a trivial problem. In a complex policy environment where potentially
numerous institutions and programs interact, voters would have to carry out a costly
information search for specific policy choices made by particular elected officials in or-
der to accurately attribute responsibility. Many existing studies find that rather than
engage in such costly actions, voters pass judgement on the basis of the partisanship
of policymakers: the party label of a representative serves as an information heuristic
for his or her policy positions (e.g., Aldrich, 1995; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Popkin,
1994; Rahn, 1993; Bullock, 2011). Inferring the policy stances of politicians from
their party labels, voters evaluate whether the policy positions taken by an elected
official caused the event. Specifically, if the policy position of the incumbent’s party
is thought to have precipitated the event, then attribution to the incumbent becomes
easier.
Nevertheless, the impact of party labels on the attribution process can vary de-
pending on whether the event was positive or negative. The impact becomes salient
mostly when the event has negative effects. As suggested by the “loss aversion” prin-
ciple in behavioral economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the negative event is
subjectively of higher salience than its positive counterpart. Hence, a cognitive phe-
nomenon of “negativity bias” implies that negative events have a significantly larger
effect on the evaluation of an incumbent’s performance than does positive information
(e.g., Bloom and Price, 1975; Lau, 1985; Soroka, 2006). These well-documented traits
of information processing suggest that, when the event has negative consequences,
citizens will be more informed about why an event has occurred and, thus, they
will be better able to link the events with partisan policy platforms. On the other
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hand, when positive events occur, citizens pay relatively less attention to the related
policy-facts, and the role of partisan cues in evaluations of policy drivers also shrinks.
Examining such possibility of positive-negative asymmetry in the attribution of
economic events is, however, a daunting task.1. The main challenge is that evaluat-
ing domain—either gain or loss—requires a reference point which is not necessarily
determined by objective economic conditions, such as income or employment (Levy,
2003). In other words, testing the asymmetrical impact of economic conditions is
difficult because finding a valid indicator that can be used to classify the gain or loss
domain is not easy.
Addressing this obstacle, I propose that a firm’s decision about where to locate
its HQ is an economic event that can be used to test positive-negative asymmetry.
As illustrated in numerous cases (i.e., Boeing, GE, and, more recently, Amazon’s 2nd
HQ), a firm’s decisions about the location of its HQ has sizeable effects on both the
localities that gain and lose the HQ. Noticeably, because the effects of HQ inflow
and outflow are distinctive, voters can easily evaluate which domain they are in (e.g.,
positive or negative economic effects). HQ inflow is a positive economic event because
it has both direct economic effects (on income and employment) and indirect effects
that can be attributed to the agglomeration effect that HQ operation can bring. This
clear positive implications of HQ inflow on the local economy place an average voter
in the gain domain. In contrast, HQ outflow means the elimination of all the benefits
of HQ operations, which pushes voters into the loss domain.
Moreover, a focus on corporate HQ relocation provides a unique opportunity to
1In fact, only a few studies in the economic voting literature have tested this hypothesis, and
most of them fail to find supporting evidence (Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Duch and Stevenson,
2008)
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investigate how the attribution process is affected by voters’ beliefs about the policy
orientations of political parties. A burgeoning literature business scholarship about
corporate HQ shows that corporate tax burdens and business policies are potent
push (pull) factors (e.g., Baaij et al., 2015; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009; Voget,
2011). That is, firms tend to relocate their HQ out of (into) localities that have
high (low) corporate tax rates and unfriendly (friendly) business policies. The public
recognizes, for instance, the clear distinction between the corporate tax and business
policies of the Republican and the Democratic parties (Egan, 2013). The Democratic
Party is generally regarded as the champion of high corporate tax rates and stringent
business regulation, making blame attribution for HQ outflow easier. In contrast,
public perceptions of the policy prerogatives of the Republican Party are such that
voters will turn to the party when corporate HQ relocation becomes an issue. In this
regard, I expect that the effect of party label on voters’ evaluations on the governor’s
economic performance will take place only when an HQ outflow occurs (Effects under
Rep. Gov. − under the Dem. Gov. > 0), while the effects will be null when a HQ
inflow happens (Effects under Rep. Gov. − under the Dem. Gov. = 0).
To test this claim, I focus on interstate corporate HQ relocation and credit or
blame assignment on governors. In the U.S., interstate HQ relocation is driven mainly
by substantial across-state variation in corporate tax environments and business poli-
cies. Among governmental actors, governors are perceived to exert a particular influ-
ence on state-level corporate tax and business policies (e.g., Bingham, Hawkins, and
Hebert, 1978; Kousser and Phillips, 2012).
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3.3 Heterogeneous Partisan Effects: Party Identi-
fication and Material Incentives
I further explore possible heterogeneity in the asymmetric effects of party labels in
the cases of HQ inflow and outflow, and to this end I make two predictions First,
voter’s own partisanship can generate the heterogeneous effects. Perceptions of eco-
nomic performance entail a persistent processing bias that is related to whether or not
co-partisans are in office (e.g., Conover, Feldman, and Knight, 1986; Bartels, 2002;
Evans and Andersen, 2006; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002; Tilley and Hobolt,
2011; Bisgaard, 2015). Party identification, one of the most stable and enduring
social attachments (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2004), provides a ‘perceptual
screen’ through which voters selectively process and evaluate political information
(e.g., Campbell et al., 1980; Zaller et al., 1992). Consistent with a motivated reason-
ing account, partisans frequently ignore objective information that challenges their
desired outcomes or partisan beliefs and selectively absorb information that accords
with their outcomes and beliefs (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Jerit and Barabas, 2012).
As a result, partisans can have drastically different views on objective facts and dif-
ferent interpretations of the same objective economic events, even when they agree
on the policy-relevant facts (Bartels, 2002; Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2018). Recent
experimental evidence also finds that in the context of blame assignment voters will
overlook policy information (an accepted set of facts) when it does not confirm with
their own partisan expectations (Lyons and Jaeger, 2014).
In the case of corporate HQ relocations, Democrats may disagree that the Demo-
cratic Party’s policy orientation in business policies can facilitate HQ outflow. Democrats
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may also seek information about other factors that can induce HQ outflow. In the ex-
treme case, when partisan bias dominates the entire attribution process, the direction
of the effects of party labels effects can be the opposite. Alternatively, considering
the perceived contradiction between the Republican Party’s policy preference for low
corporate tax burdens and HQ outflow, Democrats might also find it difficult to at-
tribute the outflow to a Republican governor. If this is the case, the party label effects
will disappear for Democrats. In sum, my expectation is that Democrats will observe
either the null effects or the opposite party label effects (Effects under Rep. Gov. −
under the Dem. Gov. < 0).
Second, the effects of the party label can depend on expected material conse-
quences. Material concerns are one of the most influential factors that shape economic
policy preferences, particularly in the case of policy that affects trade or foreign di-
rect investment (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Ardanaz,
Murillo, and Pinto, 2013).2
In the case of corporate HQ operations, material self-interests can vary across dif-
ferent groups. Given that corporate HQ operations involve a wide range of managerial
or administrative tasks, such as strategic planning and human resources, only groups
endowed with the skill sets needed for these occupations will have strong materials
self-interests, which, not surprisingly, reflects the fact that corporate HQ relocation
has an immediate effect on the employment and income of these groups. This further
suggests that the asymmetric party label effects prompted by corporate HQ relocation
2However, in the International Political Economy Scholarship, there is disagreement about the
importance of material interests: some studies (Hiscox, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Mans-
field and Mutz, 2009) points out that sociotropic concerns can exert a greater influence on how
individuals process policy preferences than material interests.
110
will be strongest in the potential workforce of a HQ operation, who tend to be well
informed about the policy choices that can deter HQ outflow.
3.4 Experimental Design
To investigate whether and how the partisanship of the governor affects credit and
blame attributions by voters in the event of interstate corporate HQ relocation, I con-
ducted a randomized survey experiment on the Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
A total of 1,211 U.S. voters are recruited on February 6th, 2019, and the experiment
was administered by Qualtrics, an online survey tool. While MTurk samples have been
criticized on the grounds that they show potential differences from national probabil-
ity samples both in measured and unmeasured dimensions, recent studies find that
the MTurk population behaves similarly to other nationally representative samples
(Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012; Mullinix et al., 2015; Coppock, 2018). The MTurk
population provides sufficient numbers of each partisanship and education level (a
proxy for material incentives), and so precise estimates for heterogeneous effects for
each partisan and education group can be obtained.
The experiment presents respondents with a news story about a hypothetical cor-
porate HQ relocation. I manipulate two factors separately. I vary (1) the context
between “corporate HQ inflow” and “corporate HQ outflow” and (2) the partisan-
ship of the governor (Democratic or Republican). To test the hypothesis about the
asymmetric party label effects between negative and positive events, the experiment
is designed to focus on comparisons between Republican and Democratic governors
within one of two contexts of corporate HQ relocation—inflow or outflow. Thus, the
111
information about the partisanship of the governor is always given under all con-
ditions. In short, the experiment is a between-subjects, random assignment study
pertaining to a 2 x 2 factorial design
Although the treatment is delivered in a form of mock news story, it represents a
realistic event. To mimic the information environment that a voter could encounter
when reading news about a corporate HQ relocation, the details and wording of the
mock news story have been extracted from actual news articles about corporate HQ
relocation.3 The contents and wordings in the news story can be found in Appendix
Section C1.
I measure two relevant dependent variables. First, after receiving the experimental
stimulus, respondents were asked to evaluate what effects corporate HQ relocation
(specified either HQ inflow or outflow depending on the treatment condition) would
have on confidence in the Governor’s economic policies on a 5-point scale that ran
from “greatly decrease my confidence” to “greatly increase confidence.” Second, to
capture the effects of the story on voting intention, subjects were asked how much
the corporate HQ relocation would affect their support for the Governor’s re-election
bid using a scale that ran from 1 “greatly decrease my support” to 5 “greatly increase
my support.”4
3Employing similar reasoning, several experimental studies have examined voters’ evaluations
in the wake of events such as terrorism and economic shocks (e.g., Gadarian, 2010; Merolla and
Zechmeister, 2013).
4I also check the results using a 3-point scale from -1 to 1 in which negative opinion (1 or 2 in the
original scale) is coded as -1 and positive opinion as 1, with 0 denoting no effects. This robustness
check gives rise to very similar findings.
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3.5 Statistical Model
To analyze how the interactive effects between the partisanship of governors and pos-
itive (HQ inflow) and negative (HQ outflow) economic events, respectively, I estimate
the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:
Yi = α + β1HQInflowi + β2Rep.Govi + β3HQInflowi ∗Rep.Govi + i,
where i indexes each respondent; Yi represents a dependent variable—the level of
changes in either (i) confidence in the governor’s economic performance or (ii) sup-
port for her re-election bid on the 5-point scale, with the higher value referring to
a more positive opinion; HQInflowi is a binary indicator for the mock news story
that describes corporate HQ inflow into the county in which the respondent resides;
Rep.Govi represents a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was as-
signed to the “Republican Governor” condition; and i is a stochastic error term.
Given that the outcome variable is an ordered response scale, I also estimate ordered
logistic regression models. However, for ease of explanation, I rely mainly on the
OLS estimates. Still, as shown in the Appendix, the ordered logistic models produce
results that are substantively the same.
Table 3.1 presents the summary of the main estimands and the interpretation of
them. The first two columns (“Under Dem. Gov” and “Under Rep. Gov”) show
the linear combinations of the parameters from the OLS model that correspond to
the effects of HQ inflow and outflow, respectively, under a Democratic governorship
and a Republican governorship. The third column displays the gap in the effects of
HQ inflow and HQ outflow between Democratic and Republican Governors conditions
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(labeled as Partisan Effect in the table). In the fourth column, I indicate the expected
signs of the Partisan Effect for inflow and outflow cases, respectively. My theory
posits, first, that the negative economic implications of HQ outflow can incentivize
voters to use perceived beliefs about partisan policy orientation and, second, that HQ
inflow does not trigger the use of partisan cues. Thus, I predict that the partisan
difference will be found only in respondents who are exposed to the HQ outflow
treatment.
I also examine the possibly heterogeneous effects in terms of the party identifica-
tion and material incentives of respondents. I estimate the same OLS models used
in the main analysis, but here I split the samples on the basis of the respondents’
partisanship and skill endowment. Party identification is measured on both 3 and
7-point scales. I first asked, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as
a Republican, Democrat, or as an independent (check the option that best applies)?”
If a respondent identified as a Republican (Democrats), then she was asked, “Would
you call yourself a Strong Republican (Democrat) or Not very strong Republican
(Democrat)]?” For the respondents who identified themselves as independent, I asked
“Would you call yourself as closer to the [Republican Party, Democratic Party]?”
To capture respondents’ material incentives, I rely on their educational attain-
ments, which I divided into 7 categories (High school or GED (or less) / Some college
/ 2 year college degree / University degree / Master’s degree / Doctoral degree / Pro-
fessional degree). In a vast literature that examines individual preference formation
in the context of economic issues such as trade, foreign direct investment, and immi-
gration, education level has frequently been used as a proxy for skill level (e.g., Scheve
and Slaughter, 2004; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). In
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the context of corporate HQ operations, skill-level could explain some variation in
material interests across individuals. For example, a corporate HQ is more likely
to hire high-skilled labor (the main beneficiary of HQ operations) than low-skilled
labor. Yet it is important to note that a simple binary classification of labor as ei-
ther low-skilled or high-skilled is insufficient. Even among the high-skilled, there is
considerable variation in material interest. For example, individuals with a doctoral
degree or a professional degree (i.e., medical degrees) are not necessarily potential
candidates for jobs available at a corporate HQ. Moreover, the recent studies posit
that because of the possible sociotropic impact of education attainment, ordinal or
binary specifications (low vs high skill) of education attainment may not be suitable
proxies for skill-level (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). To mitigate this concern,
I estimate separate models in each education category.5
Under Dem. Gov Under Rep. Gov Partisan Effect (Rep. Gov. - Dem. Gov.) Expectation (sign)
HQ Inflow β0 + β1 β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 β2 + β3 Null
HQ Outflow β0 β0+ β2 β2 Positive
Table 3.1: Interpretation of Main Model Parameters
3.6 Findings
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before turning to estimation results, I present four descriptive statistics that support
the assumptions made in the theoretical discussion.
5The results for heterogenous treatment effects are presented graphically. The analyses for het-
erogeneity by party identification or education render a large number of separate models in each
category. I present coefficient plots in which HQ inflow and HQ outflow conditions are placed on the
vertical axis and point estimates of partisan difference (Republican Governor condition - Democratic
governor condition) with 95% confidence intervals are placed on the horizontal axis.
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First, Figure 3.1 illustrates how respondents thought about the potential effects
of corporate HQ relocation on local economic environments. Respondents were asked
how corporate HQ relocation into their counties and corporate HQ relocation out
of their countries would hurt or benefit (i) the overall local economy, (ii) the local
employment situation (iii) the reputation of the region as a business-friendly environ-
ment, and (iv) local pride. Answers were graded on a 7-point scale that ranged from
-3 (will hurt very much) to 3 (will improve very much); 0 represents no effects. As
Figure 3.1 clearly shows, respondents drew a clear distinction between the expected
effects of HQ inflow and those of HQ outflow. Specifically, respondents believed that
HQ outflow has negative economic implications while HQ inflow leads to positive
economic outcomes. Across all indicators, the mean ratings of HQ inflow were con-
sistently negative while those of HQ outflow were positive; there was variation in the
absolute magnitude.
Second, Figure 3.2 contains the average values of respondents’ evaluations of five
factors—tax rates, labor costs, tax incentives offered by their states, tax incentives
offered by other states, and social spending—that can drive a company’s decision to
move its HQ into (out of) a given locale. The values range from 1 (“not at all”) to
5 (“very much”). Respondents believed that corporate tax rates and tax incentives
are the most influential drivers of both HQ inflow and outflow. Respondents thought
that corporate tax burdens have a much greater influence on corporate HQ relocation
than other economic factors, such as labor costs and social spending.
Third, as shown in Figure 3.3, those surveyed believe that the Republican Party is
better at attracting HQ inflow and deterring HQ outflow, possibly reflecting the fact
that low (high) corporate tax rates can pull (push) corporate HQ in (out) of a given
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Reputation
Employment
Local Econ
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
HQ Inflow
HQ Outflow
Figure 3.1: Responses to the questions, “how much do you think the corporate HQ
relocation into your county would hurt or benefit...” and “how much do you think the
corporate HQ relocation out of your county would hurt or benefit...” (-3 = hurt very
much, 3 = improve very much)
locale (see Figure 3.2). About half of the respondents declared that the Republican
Party can better attract corporate HQs to move into their state (51%) and mitigate
the chance of future corporate HQ relocations to other states (46%). In contrast,
many fewer respondents attributed this capacity to the Democratic Party (29% for
inflow and 31% for outflow) or an independent party (20% for inflow and 23% for
outflow).
Fourth, I compare the average time that two groups needed to complete the
survey—respondents assigned HQ inflow and respondents assigned HQ outflow. The
comparison was undertaken to determine whether respondents were more attentive
to negative news (HQ outflow) than positive news (HQ inflow). Consistent with the
concepts of loss aversion and negativity bias, the incentives to identify the policy
driver behind an economic event are greater when the expected effects of the event
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(a) Mean responses to each factor that can affect the company’s decision
to move its HQ into a given locale.
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(b) Mean responses to each factor that can affect the company’s decision
to move its HQ out of a given locale.
Figure 3.2: Opinions about drivers of HQ inflow (Left) / HQ outflow (Right).
118
Mean = 0.29
Mean = 0.2
Mean = 0.51
SD =0.45
SD =0.4
SD = 0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Democratic Party Independent Republican Party
Pr
op
or
tio
n
(a) Political party that can better attract HQ inflow
Mean = 0.31
Mean = 0.23
Mean = 0.46
SD =0.48
SD =0.15
SD = 0.49
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Democratic Party Independent Republican Party
Pr
op
or
tio
n
(b) Political party that can better deter HQ outflow
Figure 3.3: Political party that respondents think better attract HQ inflow (Top)
/deter HQ outflow (Bottom).
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are negative and lesser when the expected effects are positive. The result evidences
that respondents who read the HQ outflow news spent more time. Respondents as-
signed HQ outflow spent an average of 511.48 seconds reading the news while those
assigned HQ inflow read the news for an average of 488.87 seconds. The p-value of
the difference is 0.09.
3.6.2 Effects of HQ Inflow and Outflow and Partisan Gap
I first describe the results for the asymmetric partisan effects between HQ inflow and
HQ outflow conditions. I found that the partisan effects are only found in the HQ
outflow case, not in inflow case. Table 3.2 presents the results of the OLS models that
predict the outcome variables. Omitted are the Democratic Governor condition and
the HQ outflow condition. As shown in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.2, respondents
assigned the HQ inflow condition showed a 0.789 higher confidence in the governor’s
economic policy and 0.650 greater support for the governor’s re-election bid than
those assigned the HQ outflow treatment (p < .01 for both dependent variables).6
More importantly, the difference between the Republican and Democratic governor
conditions is detected only in the HQ outflow case. The coefficient for Rep.Gov.
(β2) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of HQ outflow
are more favorable (less negative) under a Republican governor than a Democratic
governor. On the other hand, for the HQ inflow condition, the presence of a partisan
gap is not indicated. Indeed, the point estimate is very close to 0 (between 0.01 and
0.04 across models), and the joint-null hypothesis that β2 + β3 = 0 cannot be not
6Table C1 in Appendix presents the OLS estimation results using the HQ outflow variable as the
main independent variable (instead of HQ inflow).
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rejected at the conventional level. Results are substantively similar when adjusting
for covariates. The results are substantively similar when I adjust for covariates.
To better describe the partisan effects precipitated by HQ inflow and HQ outflow, I
graphically present in Figure 3.4 the estimated coefficients in the HQ inflow condition
(β2 + β3) and the HQ outflow condition (β2) as well as the 95% confidence intervals.
Regardless of the dependent variable, the positive estimate of the partisan difference
is greater under the outflow condition than under the inflow condition. Also the
confidence interval for HQ inflow does not contain 0, meaning that it is statistically
different from 0. In contrast, I observe statistically insignificant partisan difference
effects for HQ inflow.
Confidence in Econ. Policy Support for Reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Inflow 0.789∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.067) (0.053) (0.067)
Rep.Gov 0.140∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.071) (0.075)
HQ Inflow*Rep.Gov -0.015 -0.137
(0.110) (0.111)
Joint H Test (β2 + β3) 0.125 0.011
(0.078) (0.079)
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211
β2 + β3 refers to partisan differences in HQ inflow condition
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.2: OLS estimation results: The omitted conditions are the Democratic Gov-
ernor condition as well as HQ outflow condition. The joint hypothesis test result for
the estimated coefficients in the HQ inflow condition also is presented.
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Difference in Opinion about the Governor's Economic Policies
(Under Rep.Gov − Under Dem.Gov)
(a) Effect on confidence in the Governor’s economic policies (5-scale)
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Difference in Effects on Support for the Governor's Re−election Bid
(b) Effect on support for the Governor’s re-election bid (5-scale)
Figure 3.4: Coefficient plots with a 95% confidence level: partisan differences in the
effects of corporate HQ relocation (Under Rep. Gov - Under Dem. Gov)
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3.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Party Identification and Ma-
terial Incentives
In Figure 3.5, I assess the heterogeneous effects of party labels (i.e., the party affil-
iations of governors) by partisanship of respondents. Splitting the samples on the
basis of respondents’ partisanship, I estimate the same OLS model used in the main
analysis. The results show that party label effects are found mainly for Republican
respondents. As depicted in the red line in the right panels of the figures, when
HQ outflow is the assigned condition, Republican respondents blame Democratic
governors to a greater extent than Republican governors for both of the dependent
variables—that is, they express greater confidence in the governor’s economic policy
and electoral support.
Intriguingly, similar results are observed in the independents subsample. Among
independents, the point estimates of the partisan effects (Evaluations under Rep.
Gov - Dem. Gov) are always positive and statistically significant when in the model
electoral support for the governor is the dependent variable. This finding implies that
party label effects take place in the negative case of HQ outflow, independent of the
presence of partisan bias and motivated reasoning in attributions.
In the Democrats subsample such partisan effects in the wake of HQ outflow are
completely muted. This finding echoes the findings of partisan perceptual screen
theory and particularly the Bisgaard (2015)’s finding that partisans, even when they
agree that economic conditions are bad, disagree about whether the government is
responsible for economic hardship. However, the null effects of party labels, instead
of negative effects (in terms of evaluations of Republican governor - Democratic gov-
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Figure 3.5: Heterogeneous effects by party identification: coefficient plots with a
95% confidence level of partisan differences in the effects of corporate HQ relocation
(Under Rep. Gov - Under Dem. Gov)
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Figure 3.6: Heterogeneous effects by education (7 category): coefficient plots with a
95% confidence level of partisan differences in the effects of corporate HQ relocation
(Under Rep. Gov - Under Dem. Gov)
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ernor), indicate that Democrats, too, may perceive the weak connection between the
Republican Party and HQ outflow, but the partisan perceptual screen mechanism
offsets such recognition. In Appendix, I also present the estimation results using
a 7-scale party identification. As shown in the attribution process in the wake of
economic events, the results remain substantively the same.
Turning next to heterogeneous effects by material incentives, I reproduce the main
analysis by each subgroup regarding education attainments to capture different ma-
terial incentives. As shown in Figure 3.6, respondents’ evaluations of governors vary
with material incentives but non-monotonically with skill-level. When HQ outflow is
the assigned condition, only the respondents who hold a bachelor degree or a Master’s
degree appear to hold a more favorable (less negative) evaluation of the Republican
governor than the Democratic governor. The same difference is not found and is not
statistically supported in other education categories. Noticeably, the effects of party
labels are statistically insignificant for those who have completed doctoral or profes-
sional programs. The findings indicate that those who have strong material interests
are more likely to engage actively in partisan blame attributions because they have
greater incentives to be informed about the policies that lead, first, to HQ outflow
and, second, to direct losses in their economic well-being.
3.7 Discussion
Since Key (1966) laid the groundwork for economic voting theory, there has been
much debate about the relationship between economic conditions and voting deci-
sions. Yet we still know little about whether and how voters attribute economic
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events to political actors. Focusing on the corporate HQ relocation case, this re-
search highlights the asymmetry in the effects of the political actor’s partisanship on
economic event attributions. The results from a randomized survey experiment show
that in the aftermath of an HQ outflow, voters assign less responsibility to the Re-
publican governor than to the Democratic party, and they do so because they believe
that Democrat politicians tend to support high corporate tax rates and less-friendly
business environments, which, these voters believe, push corporate HQ out of their
states. Yet in the case of HQ inflows, such partisan differences disappear, suggesting
that positive economic events reduce incentives to undertake an important additional
cognitive step: linking policy information relevant to the event and the incumbent’s
party, which is regarded as a proxy for her position on policy issues.
Hence, in the experiment, I find supporting evidence for the idea that party label
effects also can be filtered through partisan lens. The null effects of party labels among
Democrats may suggest that Democratic partisans rarely examine information that is
inconsistent with their own partisan expectations. On the contrary, Republican and
Democratic voters whose party’s policy orientation is not consistent with policy infor-
mation relevant to the event (or who do not have a party affiliation) are more likely
to use the information to assign blame to the other party. This heterogeneous effect
of partisanship provides additional evidence of the presence of partisan bias, which
casts doubt on the ‘rational voter’ model (Achen and Bartels, 2016). Furthermore,
the analysis also reveals that partisan blame attribution is clearer among those who
likely to be the workforce targeted by corporate HQ. This finding further indicates
that material incentives, which also generate the positive-negative asymmetry, are
one of the main mechanisms that drive party label effects.
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To be clear, the results from the survey experiment are not without limitations.
First and foremost, to overcome the external validity problem, the hypothetical news
stories used in my experiment consist of actual expressions and information extracted
from real news articles. Similarly, a response in the survey does not always lead to
an actual vote choice. Still, complementing Yang (2019)’s findings actual electoral
results, the results presented in this chapter supply micro-foundations for partisan
blame assignment.
Finally, my findings about the interaction between party label and information
about the policies that drive the events can be extended to non-economic issues and
to other countries. In an environment in which the policy orientation of political
parties is clear, blame assignment could depend on party labels, although this should
be empirically examined.
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Conclusion
My dissertation interrogates political and policy implications of the heightened mo-
bility of business actors. This research agenda is grounded in the view that voters
evaluate firms’ location decisions as signals of economic performance and translate
their evaluations into voting decisions. Such electoral responses, in turn, affect poli-
cymakers’ incentives to provide firms with benefits.
Sharp decreases in transportation and communication costs have allowed corpo-
rations to take advantage of cost differentials across geographical boundaries by relo-
cating certain business functions. This has not escaped the notice of elected officials
and policymakers, who have made efforts to attract and retain corporations as an
integral part of their economic governance agendas.
In particular, my dissertation identifies and explores sources of electoral responses
to corporate headquarters (HQ) relocation and how the prospect of electoral conse-
quences motivates politicians to offer benefits—often in very large amounts—to firms.
Focusing on cases of interstate HQ relocation and its effects on governors, I address
these issues in a series of three papers. The first essay of my dissertation shows that
HQ relocation generates electoral responses but in an asymmetrical manner between
HQ inflow and HQ outflow. Building upon the findings in the first essay, the second
essay examines whether the asymmetric responses of voters to HQ outflow gives rise
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to different practices in offering lucrative incentives. Lastly, the third essay investi-
gates the mechanism behind the asymmetric electoral effects between HQ inflow and
HQ outflow using a survey experiment. Overall, using a combination of observational
and experimental research tools, together with original data gathered by an auto-
mated information extraction method, my dissertation provides robust evidence that
firms’ locational decisions influence voters’ perceptions of economic performance and,
thereby, their voting decisions as well as the decisions of policymakers.
Moving forward, the findings of may paper suggests a number of directions for
future research. For example, it is possible that the effects of corporate HQ reloca-
tion are heterogeneous across firms or industries. The relationship between changes
in the state corporate tax rate and the likelihood of HQ relocation is not uniform
across firms and industries. Local economic implications and mobility vary across
industries and even firms within the same industry. Exploiting such a difference, we
can explore which attributes of firms or industries affect voters’ perceptions of local
economic conditions and the link between voting and HQ relocation. Hence, institu-
tional factors such as whether the government is unified or divided can affect voters’
evaluations of HQ relocation events, given that clarity of responsibility plays a crit-
ical role in shaping voters’ attribution processes. Relatedly, future research should
also investigate whether the effects are different between interstate and international
HQ relocation cases, which entails both local-level and federal-level policies and can
provoke nationalism. Studies on such differences will allow us to have a better un-
derstanding of which characteristics of location decisions affect the way that voters
attribute business location decisions to political actors. Furthermore, the results sug-
gest that the media can contribute to the prevalence of partisan cues by spreading
130
policy information. In this regard, further research on the effects of media in the
context of business location decision can provide new insights on how media report
interacts with partisan cues.
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Appendix A: Nonpartisan Reward and Partisan
Punishment: Electoral Effects of Corporate
Headquarters Relocation
A1 Data Collection Process
To code information on HQ relocation incidences from media reports, I followed a
process involving several steps.
1. Collecting news reports
• I utilized various news archives such as the Nasdaq, LexisNexis, Bloomberg
Factiva, and Bizjournals.com.
• From each of the news archives, I searched the articles containing “headquarters"
or “HQ" along with the various parts of speech depicting “relocation"
or “movement" or “construction” such as:
– Relocate: relocate(s), relocated, relocating, relocation
– Move: move(s), moved, moving, movement
– Leave: leave(s), left, leaving
– Build: build(s), built, building
– Construct: construct(s), constructed, construction
– Position position(s), positioning
• Then, I removed the articles that do not contain at least one of the fol-
lowing words: “corporate," “corporation(s)," “business,"
“company(ies)," or “firm(s)” to focus on the reports about cor-
porate HQ relocation cases. As a result, total 144,486 news reports which
includes duplicated and irrelevant cases are collected.
2. Identifying the key sentences in which the words “headquarters"
or “HQ" and the words depicting “relocation" or “movement" or
“construction” (the various speech of each word used in step 1) are
included.
3. Extracting key information such as the name of an entity, and loca-
tional information, using different forms of algorithms.
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• I rely on the Python codecs module.
• To code the name of an entity, I identified the proper nouns in the title
of the news report and tried to match if the same proper nouns is noted
in the key sentences. In cases where there is no matching proper noun, I
identified the name by investigating other sentences in the news article.
• For geographical information on the original location of HQ and its destina-
tion, I used various algorithms using expressions of movement and adverbs
of place and prepositions of place, in particular.
• The smallest geographical unit (i.e., city or town) as well as state is
recorded if available.
• Below are some examples of corpus and algorithms (Note that expressions
about HQ are sometimes omitted in the sentences.) :
– relocate(s)/relocated/relocating/relocation of/
move(s)/moved/ moving/move(ment) of (expressions about HQ—
i.e., its headquarters / the headquarters / its corporate headquarters /
its HQ) ... from/out of/outside [Original Location] to/in(to)
[Destination]
(ex) Benchmark Electronics will relocate its corporate headquarters
from Angleton, Texas to Arizona.
– leave(s)/left/leaving [Original Location] for [Destination]
(ex) Insurance Giant Aetna Is leaving Hartford for New York City.
– build(s)/built/building/construct(s)/constructed/
constructing/plan(s)/planned/position(s)/positioned/
positioning (expressions about new HQ—i.e., new headquarters)
... in/at [Destination].
(ex) The company will construct a new, state-of-the-art headquarters
in Atlanta, expected to be completed in early 2017.
– In some rare cases, locational information is noted in adverb form
(e.g., New York-based executive headquarters). To capture this type
of cases, I also extract the three words before the word describing a firm
such as “company,”“corporation,” and “firm” and the word “-based.”
– When a adverb of place such as “here” or “there” is used. I inves-
tigated sentences before or after the key sentences to code a correct
geographical location.
4. Identifying whether the relocation was due to a merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) by checking if the article contains the word, merger and
acquisition or M&A or merge(d)/merging (with).
(Ex) Most AirCal workers will be offered new jobs with American Airlines when
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the two carriers merge, but some will face relocation because of the planned
closure of AirCal’s Newport Beach headquarters
5. Extracting time-related information such as the date the report was
published and the actual timing of the relocation.
• I extracted the numbers followed by the word, “years,” to figure out actual
relocation timing (i.e., three years ago). In this case, I estimated the actual
moving year based on the year of publication. For example, a news report
published in 2000 said that a company moved its HQ three years ago, the
actual relocation is coded as it happened in 1997.
• In some cases, the article noted the year of actual relocation (i.e., In 2001,
Boeing relocated its HQ to Chicago). I extracted the four digits number
if the key sentence and checked if the number represents the year when
relocation happened or is expected to happen.
• I coded whether the key sentence contains adverbs of time and prepositions
of time that describe past events, such as “ago,”“before,”“past,” as well as
that depicts future events, such as “later” and “after.”
• I also coded whether the key sentence are written in a past tense of a verb
and whether the words or corpus describing a future tense such as “plan”
or “will (would),” or “expected to” or “is going to,” are used.
• For the cases where (i) adverbs and prepositions of time or (ii) a past or
future tense is used. I investigated the raw articles to clarify the actual
year of relocation.
• In rare cases, a news article described the relocation cases in present per-
fect form. For this case, I coded the starting year — for example, the year
that comes after the word “since.”
(ex) Since 1995, more than 100 buildings have been part of a facade-
improvement program, and a number of corporations, including Bally of
Switzerland and the soft drink division of Coca-Cola Bottling of New York
have moved their corporate headquarters here.
• Rarely, a few news articles reports cancellations of relocation plants. I
coded such canceled cases. Using this information, I filtered out the cases
were planned but canceled later.
6. Coding type of HQ — (i) central, (ii) regional / division, (iii) interna-
tional or (iv) part of HQ (the case where company does not relocate
its HQ but move some function or some operations.
(Ex) 3M has not expanded its Minnesota work force for several years, and three
years ago moved some operations from its Maplewood headquarters to Austin,
Texas).
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7. Inspection of information extracted via Python codes: To minimize the
possibility both of miscoding information and of missing relevant information, 6
undergraduate research assistants and I inspected each key sentence to verify the
quality of programming-based information extraction. Also, I filled information
that the algorithms did not capture by investigating sentences or paragraphs
around key sentences.
8. Cleaning the names of firms and cities
• I cleaned up company names by checking (i) the abbreviation forms of com-
pany (e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph Company = AT&T), (ii)
another name (e.g., Freddie Mac = Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp).
To detect another possible forms of names, I also utilized Matchit command
in Stata, which calculate similarity scores between two string variables.7
• I cleaned up city names by checking another (nick)name frequently called
(e.g., Manhattan = Big Apple = New York City).
9. Removing duplicated or irrelevant cases: I filtered out duplicate and irrel-
evant cases such as those related to a non-profit organization or to a relocation
within a state. I also omit M&A cases in which the governor and/or economic
policies played a limited role or no role at all. As a result, I identified 3,546
unique cross-state HQ relocation cases.
7For detailed explanation about the command, see https://www.stata.com/meeting/
switzerland16/slides/raffo-switzerland16.pdf
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A2 Validation Check
• Tables A1 - A3 present the list of HQ relocation cases of public companies that
were covered in news articles.
• Table A4 shows the list of the relocation cases where news report and public
records are not matched exactly.
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Company Name Year From (noted in News) From (State) To (noted in News) To (State)
3COM 2003 CALIFORNIA MARLBOROUGH MASSACHUSETTS
3D SYSTEMS 2009 CALIFORNIA ROCK HILL SOUTH CAROLINA
A21 INC 2004 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
ACRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC 2000 BLUE BELL PENNSYLVANIA BALTIMORE COUNTY MARYLAND
ACSYS INC 1998 WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC ATLANTA GEORGIA
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATION CORP 2003 COUDERSPORT PENNSYLVANIA DENVER COLORADO
AEOLUS PHARMACEUTICALS 2004 RALEIGH NORTH CAROLINA LAGUNA NIGUEL CALIFORNIA
ALBEMARLE CORP 2008 RICHMOND VIRGINIA BATON ROUGE LOUISIANA
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC (ATK) 2013 EDEN PRAIRIE MINNESOTA ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC. 2005 WEST CHESTER PENNSYLVANIA CHANDLER ARIZONA
ANTARES PHARMA 2002 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA EXTON PENNSYLVANIA
ANTEC 2000 ROLLING MEADOWS ILLINOIS ATLANTA GEORGIA
ARTHROCARE CORP 2005 SUNNYVALE CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
ASBURY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP INC 2011 MANHATTAN NEW YORK DULUTH GEORGIA
ASSOCIATED MATERIALS INC. 2003 DALLAS TEXAS AKRON OHIO
AT&T 2001 MANHATTAN NEW YORK BASKING RIDGE NEW JERSEY
ATLANTIS PLASTICS 1996 MIAMI FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
ATLAS AIR INC. 2000 GOLDEN COLORADO HARRISON NEW YORK
AVANTAIR 2006 GARDEN CITY NEW YORK PINELLAS COUNTY FLORIDA
AVIAT NETWORKS 2010 MORRISVILLE NORTH CAROLINA SANTA CLARA CALIFORNIA
AXION INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC. 2013 NEW JERSEY ZANESVILLE OHIO
BELL ATALANTIC 1996 PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA BALTIMORE MARYLAND
BEMIS CO. 2010 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA NEENAH WISCONSIN
BENTLEY PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1999 TAMPA FLORIDA NORTH HAMPTON NEW HAMPSHIRE
BERRY PETROLEUMCO. 2009 BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
BIODYNAMICS 1996 TAMPA FLORIDA MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY
BIOTA 2013 ROCKVILLE MARYLAND ALPHARETTA GEORGIA
BOEING CO 2001 SEATTLE WASHINGTON CHICAGO
BORDEN INC. 1994 MANHATTAN NEW YORK COLUMBUS OHIO
BORGWARNER INC 2004 CHICAGO ILLINOIS MARSHALL MICHIGAN
BORLAND SOFTWARE 2008 CUPERTINO CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
BP 2002 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA DELAND FLORIDA
BRITESMILE INC 1999 DELAWARE PENNSYLVANIA WALNUT CREEK CALIFORNIA
BROADBAND WIRELESS INTERNATIONAL CORP 2003 CISCO TEXAS ADAIRSVILLE GEORGIA
BUILDING MATERIALS HOLDING CORP 2008 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA BOISE CITY IDAHO
CBQ 2002 ARLINGTON VIRGINIA PEMBROKE PARK FLORIDA
CBS 1998 PITTSBURGH PENNSYLVANIA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
CD RADIO INC. 1998 WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC MANHATTAN NEW YORK
CELLEGY 2005 BRISBANE CALIFORNIA HUNTINGDON PENNSYLVANIA
CENTRAL EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTION CORP. 2004 SARASOTA FLORIDA PENNWYN PENNSYLVANIA
CENTRUE FINANCIAL CORP. 2009 OTTAWA ILLINOIS CLAYTON MISSOURI
CENTURY ALUMINUM 2013 MONTEREY CALIFORNIA CHICAGO ILLINOIS
CET ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC 1997 TUSTIN CALIFORNIA ENGLEWOOD COLORADO
CHECKFREE 1996 COLUMBUS OHIO ATLANTA GEORGIA
CIRRUS LOGIC (CRUS) 1999 FREMONT CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
COLFAX CORPORATION 2011 RICHMOND VIRGINIA HOWARD COUNTY MARYLAND
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP 2001 SPINDALE NORTH CAROLINA TROY MICHIGAN
COMPREHENSIVE CARE CORP 1994 CHESTERFIELD MISSOURI NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP. 2007 EL SEGUNDO CALIFORNIA FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA
CONCURRENT COMPUTER 1998 FORT LAUDERDALE FLORIDA GWINNETT COUNTY GEORGIA
CONSOLIDATED CONTAINERCO. 2002 IRVING TEXAS COBBTOWN GEORGIA
COVISTA COMMUNICATIONS INC 2003 LITTLE FALLS NEW JERSEY CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE
CRITICAL HOME CARE INC 2003 WESTBURY NEW YORK SOUTHFIELD MICHIGAN
CROWN VANTAGE 1998 OAKLAND CALIFORNIA CINCINNATI OHIO
CSX TRANSPORTATION 2002 RICHMOND VIRGINIA JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
CURATIVE HEALTH 2005 MANHATTAN NEW YORK NASHUA NEW HAMPSHIRE
CVS CORP 1997 RYE NEW YORK WOONSOCKET RHODE ISLAND
CYCLACEL PHARMACEUTICALS, 2006 VANCOUVER WASHINGTON BERKELEY HEIGHTS NEW JERSEY
DATAFLEX CORP. 1996 EDISON NEW JERSEY TAMPA FLORIDA
DAYSTAR 2005 GRASS VALLEY CALIFORNIA NEW YORK
DELCATH SYSTEMS 2008 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT MANHATTAN NEW YORK
DONNELLEY 2006 MANHATTAN NEW YORK CARY NORTH CAROLINA
DOVER CORPORATION 2011 MANHATTAN NEW YORK DOWNERS GROVE ILLINOIS
DRESS BARN CLOTHING CHAIN 1994 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT ROCKLAND NEW YORK
DUN & BRADSTREET 1994 MANHATTAN NEW YORK WILTON CONNECTICUT
E.SPIRE COMMUNICATIONS INC 1999 ANNAPOLIS MARYLAND HERNDON VIRGINIA
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP 2003 MENLO PARK CALIFORNIA NEW YORK CITY NEW YORK
ECC INTERNATIONAL, 1998 WAYNE PENNSYLVANIA ORLANDO FLORIDA
ECHO THERAPEUTICS 2011 FRANKLIN TOWN MASSACHUSETTS PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
EDGEWATER TECHNOLOGY INC 2003 FAYETTEVILLE ARKANSAS WAKEFIELD MASSACHUSETTS
EFUNDS 2002 MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN SCOTTSDALE ARIZONA
ELTRAX SYSTEMS INC. 1997 MINNETONKA MINNESOTA SOUTHFIELD MICHIGAN
EPL OIL & GAS 2013 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA HOUSTON TEXAS
EQUAL ENERGY LTD. 2013 ALBERTA FOREIGN OKLAHOMA CITY OKLAHOMA
EXIDE 2004 PRINCETON NEW JERSEY ATLANTA GEORGIA
EXIDE 2002 READING PENNSYLVANIA PRINCETON NEW JERSEY
FAIR ISAAC 2013 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA SAN JOSE CALIFORNIA
FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR 2009 SOUTH PORTLAND MAINE SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA
FAO INC. 2001 CALIFORNIA KING OF PRUSSIA PENNSYLVANIA
FEDERAL SECURITY PROTECTION SERVICES INC 2002 CHEYENNE WYOMING NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA
FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL 2003 SANTA BARBARA CALIFORNIA JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
FIRST ADVANTAGE CORP 2007 ST PETERSBURG FLORIDA POWAY CALIFORNIA
FIRST DATA CORP 2002 ATLANTA GEORGIA DOUGLAS COUNTY COLORADO
FIRST DATA CORP 2010 DENVER COLORADO ATLANTA GEORGIA
FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP INC 1994 PROVIDENCE RHODE ISLAND BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
FLEMINGCOS. 2000 OKLAHOMA CITY OKLAHOMA LEWISVILLE TEXAS
FLORISTS’ TRANSWORLD DELIVERY INC. 1996 SOUTHFIELD MICHIGAN DOWNERS GROVE ILLINOIS
FLUOR CORP 2006 ALISO VIEJO CALIFORNIA IRVING TEXAS
FOSTER WHEELER CORPORATION 2010 CLINTON NEW JERSEY FOREIGN
FREEPORT-MCMORAN COPPER& GOLD INC. 2007 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA PHOENIX ARIZONA
GALECTIN THERAPEUTICS 2013 BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS ATLANTA GEORGIA
GENCORP 1998 AKRON OHIO SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
GENERAL MOTORS 1997 MANHATTAN NEW YORK DETROIT MICHIGAN
GENERAL MOTORS 1997 DETROIT MICHIGAN MANHATTAN NEW YORK
GENTIVA HEALTH SERVICES, 2009 MELVILLE NEW YORK ATLANTA GEORGIA
GLENAYRE TECHNOLOGIES 2002 CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA DULUTH GEORGIA
GLOBAL POWER EQUIPMENT GROUP INC 2011 TULSA OKLAHOMA IRVING TEXAS
GLOBALSTAR, 2010 SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA
GREATBATCH INC 2012 CLARENCE NEW YORK FRISCO TEXAS
GUARDIAN TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL INC 2000 DULLES TOWN CENTER VIRGINIA CAREFREE ARIZONA
Table A1: List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies Covered in News Articles
(1).
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Company Name Year From (noted in News) From (State) To (noted in News) To (State)
HALCON RESOURCES CORP 2011 TULSA OKLAHOMA HOUSTON TEXAS
HANGER 2011 BETHESDA MARYLAND AUSTIN TEXAS
HARRAH’S 2000 RENO NEVADA MEMPHIS TENNESSEE
HEALTHWATCH 1998 VISTA CALIFORNIA ATLANTA GEORGIA
HELIX BIOMEDIX INC 2002 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA BOTHELL WASHINGTON
IATROS HEALTH NETWOR 1998 ATLANTA GEORGIA DALLAS TEXAS
IBP INC 2000 DAKOTA CITY NEBRASKA DAKOTA DUNES SOUTH DAKOTA
INDUS 2002 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA ATLANTA GEORGIA
INSITUFORM TECHNOLOGIES 1998 MEMPHIS TENNESSEE CHESTERFIELD MISSOURI
INTERMET CORPORATION 1994 ATLANTA GEORGIA DETROIT MICHIGAN
INTERNAP NETWORK SERVICES CORP. 2007 SEATTLE WASHINGTON ATLANTA GEORGIA
INTERNATIONAL AMERICAN HOMES DESIGNS 1997 LANHAM MARYLAND TAMPA FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL COAL GROUP INC. 2006 ASHLAND KENTUCKY CHARLESTON WEST VIRGINIA
IOMEGA 2001 ROY UTAH SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA
JAMMIN JAVA 2013 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
JARDEN CORP. 2002 INDIANAPOLIS INDIANA RYE NEW YORK
JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS 2012 PALO ALTO CALIFORNIA DUBLIN FOREIGN
JONES SODA 2000 VANCOUVER FOREIGN SEATTLE WASHINGTON
KAISER ALUMINUM CORP 2006 HOUSTON TEXAS ORANGE COUNTY CALIFORNIA
KATY INDUSTRIES 1994 ELGIN ILLINOIS ENGLEWOOD COLORADO
KATY INDUSTRIES INC. 2006 MIDDLEBURY CONNECTICUT ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
KAYDON CORP 2000 CLEARWATER FLORIDA ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN
KINDERCARE LEARNING CENTERS 1997 MONTGOMERY ALABAMA PORTLAND OREGON
KNIGHT RIDDER 1998 MIAMI FLORIDA SAN JOSE CALIFORNIA
KOS PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2005 MIAMI FLORIDA CRANBURY NEW JERSEY
LACROSSE FOOTWEAR 2003 LA CROSSE WISCONSIN PORTLAND OREGON
LANDSTAR SYSTEM INC. 1997 SHELTON CONNECTICUT JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
LASERSIGHT 1998 ST LOUIS MISSOURI ORLANDO FLORIDA
LIGHTWAVE LOGIC 2013 DELAWARE LONGMONT COLORADO
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORPORATIONS 2001 FORT WAYNE INDIANA PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
LINN ENERGY LLC 2006 LEBANON PENNSYLVANIA HOUSTON TEXAS
MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICE 1998 ATLANTA GEORGIA COLUMBIA MARYLAND
MAGNA ENTERTAINMENT CORP. 2002 SANTA MONICA CALIFORNIA FOREIGN
MAXXIM MEDICAL CORP 1996 HOUSTON TEXAS PINELLAS COUNTY FLORIDA
MEDICONSULT.COM INC 1999 FOREIGN MANHATTAN NEW YORK
MESA AIRLINES 1998 FARMINGTON NEW MEXICO PHOENIX ARIZONA
MICROTEK MEDICAL HOLDINGS 2004 COLUMBUS MISSISSIPPI ALPHARETTA GEORGIA
MILLS CORP 1997 WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
MUELLER WATER PRODUCTS 2006 TAMPA FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
NCR CORP 2011 DAYTON OHIO DULUTH GEORGIA
NEWELL RUBBERMAID 2006 FREEPORT ILLINOIS ATLANTA GEORGIA
NEXTEL 1997 RUTHERFORD NEW JERSEY MCLEAN VIRGINIA
NEXTLINK COMMUNICATIONS INC 1999 BELLEVUE WASHINGTON VIENNA VIRGINIA
NINE WEST GROUP INC. 1997 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT WHITE PLAINS NEW YORK
NOBLE ENERGY 2002 ARDMORE OKLAHOMA HOUSTON TEXAS
NORTHROP GRUMMAN 2011 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA FAIRFAX VIRGINIA
NORTHWEST PIPE CO 2009 PORTLAND OREGON VANCOUVER WASHINGTON
NOVAVAX INC 2007 COLUMBIA MARYLAND MALVERN PENNSYLVANIA
NOVAVAX INC. 2007 MALVERN PENNSYLVANIA ROCKVILLE MARYLAND
NOVELL INC 2008 PROVO UTAH WALTHAM MASSACHUSETTS
OFFICEMAX INC 2004 BOISE CITY IDAHO ITASCA ILLINOIS
OMNICARE, 2012 COVINGTON KENTUCKY CINCINNATI OHIO
OXYGEN BIOTHERAPEUTICS IN 2008 COSTA MESA CALIFORNIA NORTH CAROLINA
PANERA BREAD CO (AU BON PAIN) 2002 BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS ST LOUIS MISSOURI
PDS FINANCIAL 1999 EDEN PRAIRIE MINNESOTA LAS VEGAS NEVADA
PENTAIR 2012 GOLDEN VALLEY MINNESOTA SCHAFFHAUSEN FOREIGN
PERFICIENT, INC. 2010 AUSTIN TEXAS ST LOUIS MISSOURI
PERMA-FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 2007 GAINESVILLE FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
PHARMACIA CORP 2000 ST LOUIS MISSOURI SOMERSET COUNTY NEW JERSEY
PHILIP SERVICES CORP 2001 FOREIGN CHICAGO ILLINOIS
PHOENIX NETWORK INC. 1996 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA GOLDEN COLORADO
PLIANT CORP 2002 SALT LAKE CITY UTAH SCHAUMBURG ILLINOIS
PLY GEM INDUSTRIES INC. 2009 KEARNEY MISSOURI CARY NORTH CAROLINA
PRECIS INC 2002 NORMAN OKLAHOMA GRAND PRAIRIE TEXAS
PREMCOR INC 2004 CLAYTON MISSOURI OLD GREENWICH CONNECTICUT
PULSE ELECTRONICS CORP 2012 TREVOSE PENNSYLVANIA SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA
QUADRAMED CORP. 2003 SAN RAFAEL CALIFORNIA RESTON VIRGINIA
QUEPASA CORP 2008 SCOTTSDALE ARIZONA AUSTIN TEXAS
RAYONIER INC 2000 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY INC. 2004 WILMINGTON DELAWARE GREENSBORO NORTH CAROLINA
RENTECH INC. 2006 DENVER COLORADO LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA
RMS TITANIC INC. 2001 CLEARWATER FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
ROBBINS & MYERS INC. 2011 BEAVERCREEK OHIO WILLIS TEXAS
ROBOTIC VISION SYSTEMS INC 2002 CANTON MASSACHUSETTS NASHUA NEW HAMPSHIRE
RTI INTERNATIONAL METALS INC 2010 NILES OHIO MOON PENNSYLVANIA
SCHLUMBERGER LTD. 2006 MANHATTAN NEW YORK HOUSTON TEXAS
SECURE COMPUTING, 1998 ROSEVILLE MINNESOTA PALO ALTO CALIFORNIA
SHEFFIELD PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 1998 MANHATTAN NEW YORK ST LOUIS MISSOURI
SHUFFLE MASTER 2001 EDEN PRAIRIE MINNESOTA LAS VEGAS NEVADA
SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY 1998 SANTA CLARA COUNTY CALIFORNIA DANVERS MASSACHUSETTS
SIRENZA MICRODEVICES INC 2003 SUNNYVALE CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
SITEL 2004 BALTIMORE MARYLAND OMAHA NEBRASKA
SMITH CORONA 1994 NEW CANAAN CONNECTICUT CORTLAND NEW YORK
SPECTRUM BRANDS 2005 MADISON WISCONSIN ATLANTA GEORGIA
SPECTRUM SCIENCES 2005 FORT WALTON BEACH FLORIDA FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA
SPEED COMMERCE INC. 2013 NEW HOPE MINNESOTA DALLAS TEXAS
SPRINT NEXTEL CORP 2005 OVERLAND PARK KANSAS RESTON VIRGINIA
STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, INC. 1998 PHOENIX ARIZONA WHITE PLAINS NEW YORK
STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, INC. 2009 WHITE PLAINS NEW YORK STAMFORD CONNECTICUT
STILLWATER MININGCO. 2003 DENVER COLORADO COLUMBUS MONTANA
STONEPATH GROUP 2000 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
STREAMLINE HEALTH 2013 CINCINNATI OHIO ATLANTA GEORGIA
STRESSGEN 2002 FOREIGN SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA
SUTTER HOLDING 2001 HALLANDALE BEACH FLORIDA SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION 2001 SPARKS NEVADA PHOENIX ARIZONA
TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 2004 SANTA BARBARA CALIFORNIA DALLAS TEXAS
TENGION INC 2011 EAST NORRITON PENNSYLVANIA WINSTONSALEM NORTH CAROLINA
THERMOENERGY 2011 LITTLE ROCK ARKANSAS WORCESTER MASSACHUSETTS
THOR 2012 OHIO ELKHART INDIANA
TIER TECHNOLOGIES INC. 2003 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA VIRGINIA
Table A2: List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies Covered in News Articles
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TRIPLE CROWN MEDIA INC 2007 FAYETTE COUNTY KENTUCKY LAWRENCEVILLE GEORGIA
TUTOR PERINI CORP. 2009 FRAMINGHAM MASSACHUSETTS LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA
UNITED NATURAL FOODS 2012 KILLINGLY CONNECTICUT PROVIDENCE RHODE ISLAND
UNITEDAUTO GROUP INC 2000 MANHATTAN NEW YORK DETROIT MICHIGAN
UNIVERSAL DISPLAY CORP 2002 PENNWYN PENNSYLVANIA EWING NEW JERSEY
UNIVERSAL ELECTRONICS INC 1998 TWINSBURG OHIO CYPRESS CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSAL SELF CARE 1996 LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA LIVONIA MICHIGAN
US AIRWAYS 2007 ARLINGTON VIRGINIA TEMPE ARIZONA
USA NETWORKS INC. 1997 TAMPA FLORIDA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
USI HOLDING CORPORATION 2003 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA BRIARCLIFF MANOR NEW YORK
VELOCITY EXPRESS CORPORATION 2003 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA WESTPORT CONNECTICUT
VERILINK 2004 MADISON ALABAMA DENVER COLORADO
VERMILLION 2010 FREMONT CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
VIRTUAL PIGGY 2013 PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA HERMOSA BEACH CALIFORNIA
W.R. GRACE &CO 2002 BOCA RATON FLORIDA COLUMBIA MARYLAND
WARNER CHILCOTT 2009 FOREIGN DUNDALK MARYLAND
WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC 2011 FOLSOM CALIFORNIA THE WOODLANDS TEXAS
WATSON PHARMACEUTICAL 2011 CORONA CALIFORNIA NEW JERSEY
WELLS FARGO 1998 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA
WESTMORELAND COALCO. 1996 PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA COLORADO SPRINGS COLORADO
WORLD AIRWAYS INC 2003 PEACHTREE CITY VIRGINIA ATLANTA GEORGIA
WORLD WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INC 2000 SALT LAKE CITY UTAH GREENWOOD VILLAGE COLORADO
WORLDHEART 2005 OTTOWA FOREIGN OAKLAND CALIFORNIA
XPO LOGISTICS 2012 ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN GREENWICH CONNECTICUT
AGILYSYS INC. 2012 SOLON OHIO ALPHARETTA GEORGIA
ALR TECHNOLOGIES INC 2002 BELLINGHAM WASHINGTON WINSTONSALEM NORTH CAROLINA
ALTRIA 2008 MANHATTAN NEW YORK RICHMOND VIRGINIA
ARBITRON INC 2009 MANHATTAN NEW YORK COLUMBIA MARYLAND
ARCADIA RESOURCES INC. 2007 SOUTHFIELD MICHIGAN INDIANAPOLIS INDIANA
ARMCO INC. 1994 MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY PITTSBURGH PENNSYLVANIA
BALL CORP 1998 MUNCIE INDIANA BOULDER COLORADO
BAR TECHNOLOGIES INC. 1998 JOHNSTOWN PENNSYLVANIA CLEVELAND OHIO
BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES 2006 PORTLAND OREGON VANCOUVER WASHINGTON
BELL ATLANTIC CORP 1997 PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
CDEX INC. 2012 ROCKVILLE MARYLAND TUCSON ARIZONA
CHIQUITA BRANDS 2012 CINCINNATI OHIO CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA GAS SYSTEM INC. 1996 WILMINGTON DELAWARE RESTON VIRGINIA
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 2000 MENLO PARK CALIFORNIA VANCOUVER WASHINGTON
COPART INC. 2011 FAIRFIELD CALIFORNIA DALLAS TEXAS
CORPORATEOFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST 2000 PENNWYN PENNSYLVANIA COLUMBIA MARYLAND
COSTAR GROUP 2010 BETHESDA MARYLAND WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC
DAVITA INC. 2010 EL SEGUNDO CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL 2006 TEXAS FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA
ECLIPYSYS 2008 BOCA RATON FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
EMISPHERE TECHNOLOGIES 2007 TARRYTOWN NEW YORK MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY
EXACT SCIENCES CORP 2009 MASSACHUSETTS MADISON WISCONSIN
FIRSTWORLD COMMUNICATIONS 1999 SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
FMC CORP. 2004 CHICAGO ILLINOIS PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
FORTUNE BRANDS INC. 1999 GREENWICH CONNECTICUT DEERFIELD ILLINOIS
FORWARD INDUSTRIES 2002 WESTBURY NEW YORK DEERFIELD BEACH FLORIDA
GTE CORP 1998 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT IRVING TEXAS
HARVARD INDUSTRIES INC 1997 TAMPA FLORIDA LEBANON NEW JERSEY
HMS HOLDINGS 2012 MANHATTAN NEW YORK IRVING TEXAS
INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING CORP. 2007 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA MOBILE ALABAMA
INTERNATIONAL WIRE GROUP INC 2007 ST LOUIS MISSOURI CAMDEN NEW YORK
INTERSTATE HOTELS & RESORTS 2004 WASHINGTON DC ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
INUVO INC 2013 CLEARWATER FLORIDA CONWAY ARKANSAS
ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS INC. 2006 BILOXI MISSISSIPPI CREVE COEUR MISSOURI
JOHN WILEY & SONS 2003 MANHATTAN NEW YORK HOBOKEN NEW JERSEY
KULICKE & SOFFA 2010 FORT WASHINGTON PENNSYLVANIA FOREIGN
LEVEL 3 1999 OMAHA NEBRASKA BROOMFIELD COLORADO
LOUSIAINA-PACIFIC CORP 2004 PORTLAND OREGON NASHVILLE TENNESSEE
MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL, TIDEWATER, ENERGY PARTNERS LTD. 2006 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA HOUSTON TEXAS
MEADWESTVACO CORP. 2008 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT RICHMOND VIRGINIA
MERISTAR HOSPITALITY CORPORATION 2003 WASHINGTON DC ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
MILLENIUM CHEMICALS INC 2003 RED BANK NEW JERSEY BALTIMORE COUNTY MARYLAND
MOMENTIVE PERFORMANCE MATERIALS INC 2008 WILTON CONNECTICUT RENSSELAER COUNTY NEW YORK
MONEYGRAM 2013 ST LOUIS PARK MINNESOTA DALLAS TEXAS
NABI PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 2009 BOCA RATON FLORIDA ROCKVILLE MARYLAND
NASTECH PHARMACEUTICALCO 2003 HAUPPAUGE NEW YORK BOTHELL WASHINGTON
NEOMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 2013 ATLANTA GEORGIA BOULDER COLORADO
NORTH FACE INC 1998 SAN LEANDRO CALIFORNIA CARBONDALE COLORADO
NPS PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 2007 SALT LAKE CITY UTAH MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY
NRG ENERGY 2004 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA PRINCETON NEW JERSEY
OLIN CORP 2004 NORWALK CONNECTICUT CLAYTON MISSOURI
PAIN THERAPEUTICS INC. 2013 SAN MATEO CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
PARKER DRILLING 2001 TULSA OKLAHOMA HOUSTON TEXAS
PARKWAY PROPERTIES INC. 2012 JACKSON MISSISSIPPI ORLANDO FLORIDA
PENFORD CORP 2001 BELLEVUE WASHINGTON DENVER COLORADO
PHARMACIA & UPJOHN INC. 1998 FOREIGN BRIDGEWATER NEW JERSEY
PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORP. 2010 PITTSBURG TEXAS GREELEY COLORADO
PITTSTON CORP. 1997 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT GLEN ALLEN VIRGINIA
POLYMER GROUP INC. 2007 CHARLESTON SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA
PONIARD PHARMACEUTICALS 2007 SEATTLE WASHINGTON SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA
PREMIER BIOMEDICAL INC 2013 FLORIDA EL PASO TEXAS
PROFFITT’S INC 1997 KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE BIRMINGHAM ALABAMA
PRT GROUP INC. 1999 MANHATTAN NEW YORK HARTFORD CONNECTICUT
R.H. DONNELLEY CORP 2004 WESTCHESTER COUNTY NEW YORK RALEIGH NORTH CAROLINA
RAYOVAC CORP 2003 MADISON WISCONSIN ATLANTA GEORGIA
RESOURCE MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1994 COLUMBIA MARYLAND RICHMOND VIRGINIA
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 1996 PITTSBURGH PENNSYLVANIA EL SEGUNDO CALIFORNIA
RUBY TUESDAY 1997 MOBILE ALABAMA KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE
RYLAND GROUP 2001 COLUMBIA MARYLAND LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA
SERVICEMASTER 2010 DOWNERS GROVE ILLINOIS MEMPHIS TENNESSEE
SIX FLAGS 2007 OKLAHOMA CITY OKLAHOMA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
SMITH & WESSON HOLDING CORP 2004 SCOTTSDALE ARIZONA SPRINGFIELD MASSACHUSETTS
SOURCE INTERLINK 2002 ST LOUIS MISSOURI BONITA SPRINGS FLORIDA
SOUTHERN UNION 2006 SCRANTON PENNSYLVANIA HOUSTON TEXAS
SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP., 1996 ST LOUIS MISSOURI SAN ANTONIO TEXAS
STANLEY FURNITURE 2013 STANLEYTOWN VIRGINIA LEXINGTON NORTH CAROLINA
SYNTELLECT 2000 ROSWELL GEORGIA PHOENIX ARIZONA
TEKELEC 2005 CALABASAS CALIFORNIA MORRISVILLE NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVELPORT 2009 LONDON FOREIGN MANHATTAN NEW YORK
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION 1997 BETHLEHEM PENNSYLVANIA DALLAS TEXAS
UNION PACIFIC HOLDING CORP 1999 DALLAS TEXAS OMAHA NEBRASKA
VENTAS 2008 LOUISVILLE KENTUCKY CHICAGO ILLINOIS
VYYO 2006 CALIFORNIA ATLANTA GEORGIA
WALTER ENERGY 2011 TAMPA FLORIDA BIRMINGHAM ALABAMA
WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE 1997 WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC BETHESDA MARYLAND
Table A3: List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies Covered in News Articles
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ANACOMP 1997 ATLANTA GEORGIA SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA CARMEL INDIANA SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA
BANC ONE 1997 COLUMBUS OHIO CHICAGO ILLINOIS COLUMBUS OHIO PHOENIX ARIZONA
GATEWAY 2004 NORTH SIOUX CITY SOUTH DAKOTA SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA NORTH SIOUX CITY SOUTH DAKOTA IRVINE CALIFORNIA
INVESTOOLS INC. 2006 SALT LAKE CITY UTAH MANHATTAN NEW YORK HOUSTON TEXAS MANHATTAN NEW YORK
MAGELLAN PETROLEUM CORP 2011 HARTFORD CONNECTICUT PORTLAND MAINE HARTFORD CONNECTICUT DENVER COLORADO
MOBILEPRO 2002 CHICAGO ILLINOIS ROCKVILLE MARYLAND CANADA ROCKVILLE MARYLAND
PURCHASESOFT INC. 2003 EDINA MINNESOTA WESTBOROUGH MASSACHUSETTS EDINA MINNESOTA IRVINE CALIFORNIA
SHILOH INDUSTRIES INC 1998 MANSFIELD OHIO TROY MICHIGAN MANSFIELD OHIO WILIMINGTON DELAWARE
APPLIED DNA SCIENCES INC. 2006 SHANGHAI FOREIGN NASSAU COUNTY NEW YORK LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA STONY BROOK NEW YORK
LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH INC. 2002 FOREIGN HACKENSACK NEW JERSEY BALTIMORE MARYLAND EAST MILLSTONE NEW JERSEY
OXIGENE 1997 FOREIGN BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS MANHATTAN NEW YORK BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
Table A4: List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies Covered in News Articles in Which Location is Differently
Noted.
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A3 Checking Partisan Trend Regarding HQ Relocation
• I also explore if there exist partisan trend regarding HQ relocation, based on
descriptive statistics represented in graphical format. First, Figure A1 sug-
gests that no distinct pattern exist for the partisanship of the governor in the
likelihood a county in a given year experiences an HQ relocation. The dif-
ferences in proportions of counties related to HQ outflow and inflow between
under Democratic and Republican governors are around 0.001 and 0.0001, re-
spectively. Considering that the standard deviation is much larger (from 0.121
to 0.132) in each case, the deviation is not well-distinguishable. Further, Table
A5 suggests that frequencies of HQ inflow and outflow are balanced across the
different treatment conditions.
• Besides, the temporal trend across partisanship of governors are illustrated in
Figure A2. Overall, the divergence is again unclear. Both inflow and outflow
cases under each party follow fairly similar trend over the period of 1995 through
2015. In the Figure A3, I present time-series plots of HQ relocation cases
in each party’s governorship by each state in the similar fashion of 1.3. The
plots evidence that partisanship of governor is not strongly associated with the
pattern of HQ relocation incidences.
Rep. Gov. Demo. Gov. Rep. Pres. Demo. Pres
HQ Inflow 932 692 677 976
HQ Outflow 944 662 642 984
Neither 7767 5622 5331 8239
Table A5: Frequencies of HQ Inflow and HQ Outflow Cases at the County-year-level
Under Each Party of Governorship and the Presidents.
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Figure A1: Proportion of Counties that Experienced Relocation by Partisanship of
Governor, 1995-2015.
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Figure A2: HQ Relocation Cases by Partisanship of Governor, 1995-2015.
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Figure A3: HQ Relocation Cases in Each Party’s Governorship by States, 1995-2015. The line colored with blue represents
net HQ influx under Democratic governors, while the red line presents that under Republican governors.. The vertical
lines denotes the gubernatorial election years.
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A4 Further Evidence from Falsification Test for Parallel Trend Assump-
tion
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Figure A4: Coefficient Plots with 95% Confidence Level about the effects of HQ relo-
cation that happened across different years after the election. t represents the election
year. Dependent variable is Democratic party vote share in gubernatorial elections.
The estimates under the Democratic governor are based on the models with state-year
fixed effects and county fixed effects. The estimates under the Republican governor
are from estimations using the interaction term between HQ relocation variables and
a binary indicator of the Democratic governorship, instead of the Republican.
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A5 Effects through Immediate Change in the Local Economy
• Other than the method proposed by Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016), re-
searchers can consider an alternative method to estimate the average direct
effect (CDE) as proposed by (Imai et al., 2011). The main difference from
(Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen, 2016) is that this does not account for inter-
mediate confounders in the estimations. This method requires the sequential
ignorability, which refers to that all relevant pre-treatment confounders are con-
ditioned on. Again, however, this assumption cannot be tested empirically, so
sensitivity analysis is required. Sensitivity analysis, same as done in Acharya,
Blackwell, and Sen (2016)’s method, illustrate the effects across different val-
ues of ρ, that denote the correlation between error terms in the mediation and
outcome models.
• Figure A5 presents the results. The results remain substantively identical.
• The main results, as well as the robustness checks, provide strong evidence of
the effects of HQ relocation on gubernatorial elections. However, this does not
assure that HQ relocation affects voting decisions through its direct impact on
local economy. The robust electoral effects are perhaps due to psychological
effects though it is not exclusive of economic effects. Thus, a natural next
question is whether HQ relocation affects the local economy. To address this
question, I estimate both OLS and Arellano-Bond GMM regressions of different
economic indicators on HQ inflow and HQ outflow. For dependent variables,
I use the three local economy variables: percent change in employment rate,
income p.c. and wage p.c. The county fixed effects and year fixed effects are
included in all models. I lag the HQ relocation variables by one to three years
to allow for a delay in impacts.
• The results are presented in Table A6 and A7. For HQ inflow, the results from
both OLS and LDV estimations indicate positive effects on employment rate
and wage, only when using three years lag structure. On the other hand, for
HQ outflow, the results show the lagged negative effects on income. Overall,
while not robust in all specifications, the results point to the idea that HQ inflow
and HQ outflow do not necessarily affect local economic indicators immediately.
The economic effects of HQ inflow may require time to be realized.
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Figure A5: Graphical Representation of Average Direct Effects across Different Sen-
sitivity Parameter, ρ: X-axis displays the correlation between the residuals in the
mediator and outcome models. Y-axis denote the estimated average direct effects on
Democratic vote share in gubernatorial elections. The line represents the estimated
effects and the shaded area refers to the 95% confidence intervals, based on non-
parametric bootstrap with 1000 re-samples.Top two panels show the plots regarding
HQ inflow, while the bottom two refers to HQ outflow. In the estimations, the medi-
ator is an indicator of local economic performance, for which I calculated the mean
of the percentage changes for employment and wage at the county-level.
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OLS with Country-level FE
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Percent Change in Employment Rate
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) -0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) -0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) -0.000
(0.001)
Observations 62193 59084 55975
Panel B: Percent Change in Wage P.C.
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) 0.001
(0.001)
Observations 62193 59084 55975
Panel C: Percent Change in Income P.C.
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.001
(0.002)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.002
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) -0.000
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) -0.002∗
(0.001)
Observations 62193 59084 55975
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors at the CZ level are in parentheses.
Table A6: OLS Estimations Results: Local Economic Effects of HQ Relocation on
Employment, Wage and Income.
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LDV with Country-level FE
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Percent Change in Employment Rate
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) -0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) -0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) -0.000
(0.001)
Percent Change in Employment Rate (t-1) 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 59083 59083 55974
Panel B: Percent Change in Wage P.C.
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) 0.001
(0.001)
Percent Change in Wage P.C. (t-1) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 59083 59083 55974
Panel C: Percent Change in Income P.C.
HQ Influx (Binary, t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-2) 0.001
(0.001)
HQ Influx (Binary, t-3) 0.002
(0.002)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-1) 0.002
(0.002)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-2) 0.000
(0.001)
HQ Exodus (Binary, t-3) -0.003∗
(0.002)
Percent Change in Income P.C. (t-1) -0.235∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 59083 59083 55974
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors at the CZ level are in parentheses.
Table A7: LDV Model Estimations Results: Local Economic Effects of HQ Relocation
on Employment, Wage and Income.
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A6 Robustness Checks
A6.1 Estimation Results from the Models with CZ-specific Time Trends.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.285 1.337∗∗ 0.210 1.259∗∗
(0.375) (0.437) (0.411) (0.474)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -2.006∗∗∗ -2.003∗∗
(0.576) (0.618)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -1.076∗ -0.911 -1.055∗ -0.845
(0.455) (0.545) (0.497) (0.586)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.119 -0.199
(0.611) (0.655)
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes No No
County FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
Year FE are included in all models.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A8: Estimation Results (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share) Including CZ-
specific Time Trends.
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A6.2 Alternative Coding of HQ Relocation Variables
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
Planned Case as +1 year Planned Case as +2 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary, including Planned) 0.216 0.986∗ -0.213 0.619
(0.283) (0.489) (0.291) (0.415)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.126∗ -1.486∗∗
(0.552) (0.523)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary, including Planned) -0.502 -0.514 -0.678∗ -0.999∗
(0.317) (0.467) (0.305) (0.447)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.036 0.378
(0.536) (0.530)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A9: Estimation Results (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share) including Cases
With Not Clear Year of Relocation. The results are based on the main estimation
models which include with county FE and state-year FE.
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DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.028 1.225 0.037 1.288∗ -0.036 1.258∗
(0.441) (0.660) (0.392) (0.602) (0.336) (0.499)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -2.008∗ -2.102∗∗ -2.160∗∗∗
(0.822) (0.753) (0.605)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -1.809∗∗∗ -1.701∗ -1.833∗∗∗ -1.715∗∗ -1.838∗∗∗ -1.602∗∗
(0.476) (0.671) (0.440) (0.608) (0.327) (0.533)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.080 -0.114 -0.310
(0.906) (0.808) (0.646)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4450 4395 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A10: Estimation Results Using Election Year Only (DV = Democratic Party
Vote Share): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
2000 CZone 1990/2000 CZone
CZone-Level County-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.001 1.149 -0.046 1.157∗ -0.076 1.125∗∗ -0.049 1.141∗∗
(0.444) (0.615) (0.400) (0.550) (0.271) (0.391) (0.271) (0.388)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.820∗∗ -1.899∗∗ -1.871∗∗∗ -1.849∗∗∗
(0.704) (0.629) (0.460) (0.457)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -0.855∗ -0.677 -0.845∗ -0.666 -0.830∗∗ -0.556 -0.797∗∗ -0.518
(0.397) (0.616) (0.358) (0.548) (0.273) (0.399) (0.268) (0.406)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.211 -0.229 -0.400 -0.404
(0.789) (0.704) (0.518) (0.500)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4230 4176 15944 15753 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A11: Estimation Results (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share) using CZone
(2000): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
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DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Influx in CZ (Cont) 0.653 1.047∗ 0.614∗ 1.030∗ 0.551∗ 0.937∗∗
(0.343) (0.459) (0.308) (0.413) (0.253) (0.322)
HQ Influx in CZ (Cont)* Rep. Gov -0.478 -0.501 -0.416
(0.493) (0.447) (0.323)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Cont) -1.713∗∗∗ -1.239 -1.723∗∗∗ -1.215∗ -1.774∗∗∗ -1.108∗
(0.456) (0.631) (0.418) (0.562) (0.329) (0.449)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Cont)* Rep. Gov -0.582 -0.635 -0.875
(0.732) (0.648) (0.483)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4450 4395 15944 15753 15944 15753
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A12: Estimation Results Using Continuous Measures of HQ Relocation (DV =
Democratic Party Vote Share): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
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A6.3 Dynamic Model Estimations
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
Prais-Winston Cochrane-Orcutt Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.483∗ 1.564∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.215) (0.204) (0.217) (0.213) (0.234)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.942∗∗∗ -2.057∗∗∗ -1.781∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.283) (0.315)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -0.268 -0.026 -0.288 -0.019 -0.410∗ -0.206
(0.181) (0.248) (0.186) (0.256) (0.203) (0.260)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.343 -0.385 -0.146
(0.303) (0.313) (0.350)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15944 15753 12832 12487 9720 9478
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A13: Estimation Results using Various Dynamic Estimations (DV = Demo-
cratic Party Vote Share): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
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DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
CZone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.371 1.612∗∗ 0.549 1.855∗∗∗ 0.155 1.430∗∗∗
(0.471) (0.590) (0.460) (0.457) (0.270) (0.340)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -2.089∗∗ -2.173∗∗ -2.046∗∗∗
(0.721) (0.749) (0.456)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -0.961∗ -0.815 -0.474 -0.600 -0.943∗∗ -0.862
(0.468) (0.540) (0.436) (0.547) (0.314) (0.452)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.066 0.225 -0.074
(0.760) (0.767) (0.486)
Lagged Dem. Gov. Vote Share 0.134∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
County FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3583 3533 15943 15752 15943 15752
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A14: Estimation Results based on Dynamic Models with Lagged Dependent
Variable (DV = Democratic Party Vote Share): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
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A6.4 Controlling for Local Economy Indicators
DV = Democratic Gubernatorial Vote Share
Commuting Zone-Level County-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary) 0.183 0.157 0.192 1.383∗ 1.357∗ 1.367∗ 0.248 0.152 0.103 1.343∗ 1.377∗ 1.390∗ 0.013 0.033 0.015 1.262∗∗ 1.271∗∗ 1.242∗∗
(0.463) (0.463) (0.459) (0.631) (0.624) (0.622) (0.434) (0.417) (0.415) (0.611) (0.569) (0.573) (0.285) (0.296) (0.290) (0.401) (0.419) (0.414)
HQ Influx in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -1.945∗∗ -1.944∗∗ -1.906∗∗ -1.804∗ -1.988∗∗ -2.068∗∗ -1.967∗∗∗ -1.956∗∗∗ -1.942∗∗∗
(0.726) (0.728) (0.721) (0.714) (0.666) (0.675) (0.510) (0.506) (0.508)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary) -1.116∗ -1.123∗ -1.088∗ -1.048 -1.081 -1.037 -1.019∗ -1.083∗∗ -1.189∗∗ -0.919 -1.034 -1.081 -1.145∗∗∗ -1.128∗∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -0.938∗ -0.933∗ -0.904∗
(0.444) (0.449) (0.448) (0.614) (0.617) (0.617) (0.415) (0.411) (0.423) (0.595) (0.557) (0.571) (0.327) (0.334) (0.316) (0.446) (0.465) (0.444)
HQ Exodus in CZ (Binary)* Rep. Gov -0.024 0.024 0.007 -0.157 -0.015 -0.099 -0.277 -0.260 -0.266
(0.765) (0.766) (0.771) (0.773) (0.696) (0.688) (0.536) (0.535) (0.548)
Econ. Growth (CZ) -0.303∗ -0.285∗
(0.137) (0.138)
Percentage change in Employment Rate (CZ) 0.144 -0.026 0.123 -0.022
(0.295) (0.202) (0.294) (0.208)
Percentage change in Wage p.c. (CZ) -0.247 -0.223
(0.160) (0.157)
Percentage change in Income p.c. (CZ) -0.218 -0.206
(0.112) (0.118)
Econ. Growth -1.484∗∗∗ -1.482∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.019
(0.236) (0.240) (0.049) (0.048)
Percentage change in Employment Rate -0.008 -0.614∗∗ 0.027 -0.612∗ 0.050 -0.071 0.051 -0.072
(0.309) (0.233) (0.315) (0.238) (0.091) (0.069) (0.096) (0.068)
Percentage change in Wage p.c. -0.369∗ -0.381∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(0.155) (0.155) (0.055) (0.056)
Percentage change in Income p.c. 0.254 0.278 -0.121∗ -0.118∗
(0.179) (0.183) (0.055) (0.056)
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
County FE No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4200 4200 4200 4145 4145 4145 14962 14962 14962 14771 14771 14771 14962 14962 14962 14771 14771 14771
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A15: Estimation Results Controlling for Local Economic Indicators (DV =
Democratic Party Vote Share): Electoral Effects of HQ Relocation.
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A6.5 Partial Residual Plots
• In order to construct partial residual plots, it was necessary to take the fol-
lowing steps. First, I regressed the dependent variable (Democratic vote share
in gubernatorial elections) in county i at election t on county fixed effects and
state-year fixed effects and stored the residuals. Then, I regressed each HQ
relocation indicator on the other variables as well as county and state-year
dummy variables, thereby obtaining the residuals of the independent variable.
For example, to calculate the residual for HQInflow, I estimated the following
equation: HQinflowi,t = α + β1HQoutflowi,t + β2HQinflow ∗ Rep.Govi,t +
β3HQoutflow∗Rep.Govi,t+µ+ζ+ i,t using the same notations in the primary
regression equation.
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Figure A6: Partial Residual Plots: X-axis displays the residual of the dependent
variable, and Y-axis denote residual of each HQ relocation indicators. Top two panels
show the plots regarding HQ inflow, while the bottom two refers to HQ outflow.
The panels on the right side represent the results from the corresponding interaction
terms with a binary indicator of Republican incumbent governor. The direction of
the predicted line shows the sign of the coefficient for corresponding independent
variables. A dot represents a corresponding county-year observation.
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A7 Additional Analysis using the CCES Panel Survey Data
Under Demo. Gov. Under Rep. Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Inflow in CZ (Binary) 0.671∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.143) (0.143)
HQ Outflow in CZ (Binary) -0.171∗∗ -0.170∗∗ 0.057 0.056
(0.072) (0.072) (0.055) (0.055)
Age -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Party ID -0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
B.A. Degree -0.027 -0.013
(0.027) (0.025)
Some College -0.040 -0.040
(0.030) (0.027)
Unemployed 0.015 -0.041
(0.031) (0.034)
Income < $20000 0.079 -0.029
(0.051) (0.043)
$20,000 < Income < $40,000 0.073∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
$40,000 < Income < $80,000 0.057∗∗ 0.016
(0.025) (0.024)
$120,000 < Income 0.056∗∗ -0.015
(0.028) (0.027)
Married 0.011 0.010
(0.021) (0.021)
Female -0.001 0.022
(0.019) (0.019)
Observations 5506 5496 6159 6154
Clustered standard errors at the CZ level in parentheses.
Respondent fixed effects are included in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table A16: Estimation Results Using Survey Data (using original 1-4 scale of the
responses to the gubernatorial approval question.): Effects of HQ Relocation on
Changes in Gubernatorial Performance Approval.
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A8 The List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies with Unspec-
ified Year in News.
Company Name Published Year Year Gap From From (State) To To (State)
AGILYSYS INC. 2011 2012 1 SOLON OHIO ALPHARETTA GEORGIA
ALR TECHNOLOGIES INC 2001 2002 1 BELLINGHAM WASHINGTON WINSTONSALEM NORTH CAROLINA
ALTRIA 2007 2008 1 MANHATTAN NEW YORK RICHMOND VIRGINIA
ARBITRON INC 2009 2009 0 MANHATTAN NEW YORK COLUMBIA MARYLAND
ARCADIA RESOURCES INC. 2007 2007 0 SOUTHFIELD MICHIGAN INDIANAPOLIS INDIANA
ARMCO INC. 1993 1994 1 MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY PITTSBURGH PENNSYLVANIA
BALL CORP 1998 1998 0 MUNCIE INDIANA BOULDER COLORADO
BAR TECHNOLOGIES INC. 1997 1998 1 JOHNSTOWN PENNSYLVANIA CLEVELAND OHIO
BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES 2006 2006 0 PORTLAND OREGON VANCOUVER WASHINGTON
BELL ATLANTIC CORP 1997 1997 0 PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
CDEX INC. 2006 2012 6 ROCKVILLE MARYLAND TUCSON ARIZONA
CHIQUITA BRANDS 2011 2012 1 CINCINNATI OHIO CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA GAS SYSTEM INC. 1996 1996 0 WILMINGTON DELAWARE RESTON VIRGINIA
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 2000 2000 0 MENLO PARK CALIFORNIA VANCOUVER WASHINGTON
COPART INC. 2011 2011 0 FAIRFIELD CALIFORNIA DALLAS TEXAS
CORPORATEOFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST 2000 2000 0 PENNWYN PENNSYLVANIA COLUMBIA MARYLAND
COSTAR GROUP 2010 2010 0 BETHESDA MARYLAND WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC
DAVITA INC. 2009 2010 1 EL SEGUNDO CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL 2006 2006 0 TEXAS FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA
ECLIPYSYS 2007 2008 1 BOCA RATON FLORIDA ATLANTA GEORGIA
EMISPHERE TECHNOLOGIES 2007 2007 0 TARRYTOWN NEW YORK MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY
EXACT SCIENCES CORP 2009 2009 0 MASSACHUSETTS MADISON WISCONSIN
FIRSTWORLD COMMUNICATIONS 1998 1999 1 SAN DIEGO CALIFORNIA DENVER COLORADO
FMC CORP. 2000 2004 4 CHICAGO ILLINOIS PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA
FORTUNE BRANDS INC. 1999 1999 0 GREENWICH CONNECTICUT DEERFIELD ILLINOIS
FORWARD INDUSTRIES 2000 2002 2 WESTBURY NEW YORK DEERFIELD BEACH FLORIDA
GTE CORP 1998 1998 0 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT IRVING TEXAS
HARVARD INDUSTRIES INC 1997 1997 0 TAMPA FLORIDA LEBANON NEW JERSEY
HMS HOLDINGS 2010 2012 2 MANHATTAN NEW YORK IRVING TEXAS
INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING CORP. 2006 2007 1 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA MOBILE ALABAMA
INTERNATIONAL WIRE GROUP INC 2000 2007 7 ST LOUIS MISSOURI CAMDEN NEW YORK
INTERSTATE HOTELS & RESORTS 2002 2004 2 WASHINGTON DC ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
INUVO INC 2011 2013 2 CLEARWATER FLORIDA CONWAY ARKANSAS
ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS INC. 2006 2006 0 BILOXI MISSISSIPPI CREVE COEUR MISSOURI
JOHN WILEY & SONS 2000 2003 3 MANHATTAN NEW YORK HOBOKEN NEW JERSEY
KULICKE & SOFFA 2010 2010 0 FORT WASHINGTON PENNSYLVANIA FOREIGN
LEVEL 3 1998 1999 1 OMAHA NEBRASKA BROOMFIELD COLORADO
LOUSIAINA-PACIFIC CORP 2003 2004 1 PORTLAND OREGON NASHVILLE TENNESSEE
MCDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL, TIDEWATER, ENERGY PARTNERS LTD. 2006 2006 0 NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA HOUSTON TEXAS
MEADWESTVACO CORP. 2006 2008 2 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT RICHMOND VIRGINIA
MERISTAR HOSPITALITY CORPORATION 2002 2003 1 WASHINGTON DC ARLINGTON VIRGINIA
MILLENIUM CHEMICALS INC 2003 2003 0 RED BANK NEW JERSEY BALTIMORE COUNTY MARYLAND
MOMENTIVE PERFORMANCE MATERIALS INC 2008 2008 0 WILTON CONNECTICUT RENSSELAER COUNTY NEW YORK
MONEYGRAM 2010 2013 3 ST LOUIS PARK MINNESOTA DALLAS TEXAS
NABI PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 2007 2009 2 BOCA RATON FLORIDA ROCKVILLE MARYLAND
NASTECH PHARMACEUTICALCO 2002 2003 1 HAUPPAUGE NEW YORK BOTHELL WASHINGTON
NEOMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 2012 2013 1 ATLANTA GEORGIA BOULDER COLORADO
NORTH FACE INC 1998 1998 0 SAN LEANDRO CALIFORNIA CARBONDALE COLORADO
NPS PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 2006 2007 1 SALT LAKE CITY UTAH MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY
NRG ENERGY 2004 2004 0 MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA PRINCETON NEW JERSEY
OLIN CORP 2004 2004 0 NORWALK CONNECTICUT CLAYTON MISSOURI
PAIN THERAPEUTICS INC. 2010 2013 3 SAN MATEO CALIFORNIA AUSTIN TEXAS
PARKER DRILLING 2001 2001 0 TULSA OKLAHOMA HOUSTON TEXAS
PARKWAY PROPERTIES INC. 2011 2012 1 JACKSON MISSISSIPPI ORLANDO FLORIDA
PENFORD CORP 2002 2001 -1 BELLEVUE WASHINGTON DENVER COLORADO
PHARMACIA & UPJOHN INC. 1997 1998 1 FOREIGN BRIDGEWATER NEW JERSEY
PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORP. 2010 2010 0 PITTSBURG TEXAS GREELEY COLORADO
PITTSTON CORP. 1997 1997 0 STAMFORD CONNECTICUT GLEN ALLEN VIRGINIA
POLYMER GROUP INC. 2006 2007 1 CHARLESTON SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE NORTH CAROLINA
PONIARD PHARMACEUTICALS 2006 2007 1 SEATTLE WASHINGTON SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA
PREMIER BIOMEDICAL INC 2013 2013 0 FLORIDA EL PASO TEXAS
PROFFITT’S INC 1998 1997 -1 KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE BIRMINGHAM ALABAMA
PRT GROUP INC. 1999 1999 0 MANHATTAN NEW YORK HARTFORD CONNECTICUT
R.H. DONNELLEY CORP 2003 2004 1 WESTCHESTER COUNTY NEW YORK RALEIGH NORTH CAROLINA
RAYOVAC CORP 2004 2003 -1 MADISON WISCONSIN ATLANTA GEORGIA
RESOURCE MORTGAGE CAPITAL 1994 1994 0 COLUMBIA MARYLAND RICHMOND VIRGINIA
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 1988 1996 8 PITTSBURGH PENNSYLVANIA EL SEGUNDO CALIFORNIA
RUBY TUESDAY 1997 1997 0 MOBILE ALABAMA KNOXVILLE TENNESSEE
RYLAND GROUP 1999 2001 2 COLUMBIA MARYLAND LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA
SERVICEMASTER 2006 2010 4 DOWNERS GROVE ILLINOIS MEMPHIS TENNESSEE
SIX FLAGS 2006 2007 1 OKLAHOMA CITY OKLAHOMA MANHATTAN NEW YORK
SMITH & WESSON HOLDING CORP 2004 2004 0 SCOTTSDALE ARIZONA SPRINGFIELD MASSACHUSETTS
SOURCE INTERLINK 2003 2002 -1 ST LOUIS MISSOURI BONITA SPRINGS FLORIDA
SOUTHERN UNION 2006 2006 0 SCRANTON PENNSYLVANIA HOUSTON TEXAS
SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP., 1992 1996 4 ST LOUIS MISSOURI SAN ANTONIO TEXAS
STANLEY FURNITURE 2013 2013 0 STANLEYTOWN VIRGINIA LEXINGTON NORTH CAROLINA
SYNTELLECT 1999 2000 1 ROSWELL GEORGIA PHOENIX ARIZONA
TEKELEC 2005 2005 0 CALABASAS CALIFORNIA MORRISVILLE NORTH CAROLINA
TRAVELPORT 2009 2009 0 LONDON FOREIGN MANHATTAN NEW YORK
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION 1997 1997 0 BETHLEHEM PENNSYLVANIA DALLAS TEXAS
UNION PACIFIC HOLDING CORP 1999 1999 0 DALLAS TEXAS OMAHA NEBRASKA
VENTAS 2008 2008 0 LOUISVILLE KENTUCKY CHICAGO ILLINOIS
VYYO 2006 2006 0 CALIFORNIA ATLANTA GEORGIA
WALTER ENERGY 2009 2011 2 TAMPA FLORIDA BIRMINGHAM ALABAMA
WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE 1996 1997 1 WASHINGTON DC WASHINGTON DC BETHESDA MARYLAND
Table A17: List of HQ Relocation Cases by Public Companies Covered in News
Articles in which Timing is not Clearly Specified.
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Appendix B: Partisan Responses to the Mobility
of Firms: Political Incentives to Retain Firms and
Tax Treatment
B1 Checking Relationship Between the Likelihood of HQ Relocation and
Number of States that the firm operates
(1) (2)
Num. States 0.029∗ 0.093∗
(0.015) (0.049)
Long-term Debt (Logged) 0.096∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.040) (0.060)
N Employees (Firm) -0.294∗∗∗ -1.787∗∗
(0.112) (0.742)
Total Asset (Logged) -0.562∗∗∗ 0.192
(0.047) (0.134)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) 0.395∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗
(0.094) (0.155)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) -0.093 -0.259
(0.092) (0.178)
Observations 71726 3139
Clustered standard errors at the firm-level.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B1: Checking Relationship Between the Likelihood of HQ Relocation and Num-
ber of States that the firm operates
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B2 Identifying Assumptions
B2.1 Fixed Effects Estimations using
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dem. Gov (next term) 0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 0.019
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.016)
Long-term Debt (Logged) 0.002∗∗ -0.000 0.004 0.007∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N Employees (Firm) -0.017 -0.036∗∗ -0.037 0.003 -0.020
(0.012) (0.014) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015)
Total Asset (Logged) -0.010 0.000 -0.001 -0.026 -0.007
(0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.025) (0.014)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) -0.025 -0.006 -0.009∗∗ -0.029 -0.015
(0.015) (0.006) (0.004) (0.032) (0.012)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 0.036∗∗ 0.022 0.030∗ 0.061 0.015
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.059) (0.013)
Observations 5406 7758 6116 1461 4520
Clustered standard errors at the state-level.
Firm FE, State FE and Year FE are included in the models.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B2: Fixed Effects Estimation Results using a Binary Indicator of the Demo-
cratic Govership in the Next Term.
B2.2 Regression Discontinuity: Balance Test
MNC Domestic
Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value
N Employees (Logged) 1.42 1.45 0.72 1.15 1.06 0.55
Long-term Debt (Logged) 3.96 3.68 0.17 3.16 3.30 0.65
Total Asset (Logged) 6.13 6.35 0.16 5.42 5.58 0.68
Capital Expenditure (Logged) 3.00 3.21 0.13 2.45 2.52 0.81
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 4.56 4.67 0.49 3.80 4.13 0.33
N (States) 57 52 109 12 23 35
N (Firms) 2330 1691 4021 958 648 1601
Table B3: Balance Statistics: Conventional estimation BW = 6.90 (MNC) & 1.87
(Domestic)
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MNC Domestic
Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value
N Employees (Logged) 1.44 1.42 0.84 1.31 1.21 0.26
Long-term Debt (Logged) 3.80 3.67 0.49 3.59 3.23 0.09
Total Asset (Logged) 6.18 6.23 0.73 5.85 5.71 0.45
Capital Expenditure (Logged) 3.09 3.08 0.93 2.71 2.72 0.98
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 4.58 4.56 0.89 4.21 4.26 0.76
N (States) 70 87 157 71 72 143
N (Firms) 3149 2783 5932 3058 2349 5407
Table B4: Balance Statistics: Bias-adjusted estimation BW = 10.80 (MNC) & 7.31
(Domestic)
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Low Num. State. Group Mid Num. State. Group High Num. State. Group
Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value
N Employees (Logged) 1.27 1.26 0.98 0.73 1.50 0.01 1.55 1.53 0.87
Long-term Debt (Logged) 3.27 3.60 0.27 2.71 3.91 0.06 3.93 4.06 0.52
Total Asset (Logged) 5.75 6.04 0.31 4.60 6.51 0.01 6.32 6.28 0.81
Capital Expenditure (Logged) 2.48 2.99 0.02 2.13 3.35 0.00 3.07 3.10 0.84
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 3.95 4.53 0.04 3.38 4.83 0.04 4.55 4.72 0.37
N 712 571 151 148 1604 1046
Table B5: Balance Statistics: Conventional estimation BW = 1.37 (Low Num. States
Group) / 1.65 (Mid Num. States Group) / 5.76 (High Num. States Group)
Low Num. State. Group Mid Num. State. Group High Num. State. Group
Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value Rep Win Demo Win P-value
N Employees (Logged) 1.22 1.20 0.88 1.28 1.53 0.11 1.47 1.47 1.00
Long-term Debt (Logged) 3.73 3.12 0.03 4.10 3.71 0.19 3.96 3.73 0.21
Total Asset (Logged) 5.88 5.72 0.52 6.17 6.38 0.25 6.24 6.27 0.81
Capital Expenditure (Logged) 2.72 2.77 0.82 3.14 3.03 0.58 3.11 3.09 0.91
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 4.35 4.23 0.61 4.69 4.60 0.66 4.49 4.64 0.36
N 2143 1779 712 596 2626 2399
Table B6: Balance Statistics: Bias-adjusted estimation BW = 8.61 (Low Num. States
Group) / 9.01 (Mid Num. States Group) / 12.44 (High Num. States Group)
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B2.3 Regression Discontinuity: McCrary Test
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McCrary Sorting Test: MNC
Margin of Victory
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Figure B1: McCrary Test: MNC and Domestic Firms
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McCrary Sorting Test: Mid Num. States Group
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Figure B2: McCrary Test by Number of States in Which a Firm Operates
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B3 Additional FE estimation result s: Low / Mid / High groups regard-
ing the number of states that a firm operates for domestic firms and
MNCs
Low Mid High
Domestic MNC Domestic MNC Domestic MNC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dem. Gov 0.001 0.000 0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.019∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.009)
Long-term Debt (Logged) -0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.010∗∗ 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
N Employees (Firm) -0.014 -0.024∗ -0.019 -0.013 0.018 -0.013∗
(0.018) (0.013) (0.036) (0.020) (0.023) (0.007)
Total Asset (Logged) 0.005 0.005 -0.036∗ -0.034 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.036) (0.018) (0.010)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) -0.017∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.027 -0.010 -0.007 -0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 0.017∗∗ 0.014 0.045 0.014 -0.022 0.022∗
(0.007) (0.012) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037) (0.013)
Observations 11393 6294 2135 2315 6014 6754
Clustered standard errors at the state-level.
Firm FE, State FE and Year FE are included in the models.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B7: Fixed Effects Estimation Results: Low / Mid / High groups regarding the
number of states that a firm operates for domestic firms and MNCs, respectively
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B4 Additional RD results: Comparison between the Mean Values Around
the Cutoff Point
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Democratic Party Margin of Victory
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 C
or
po
ra
te
 T
a
x 
R
at
e
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
−4 0 4
Democratic Party Margin of Victory
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 C
or
po
ra
te
 T
a
x 
R
at
e
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
−2 −1 0 1 2
Democratic Party Margin of Victory
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 C
or
po
ra
te
 T
a
x 
R
at
e
Figure B3: Comparing the Mean Values of the Right (under the Democratic gover-
nors) and the Left (under the Republican governors) Side Around the Cut-off Point in
the Bandwidths Used for Local Linear Estimations: All Firms (Left) / MNC (Center)
/ Domestic Firms (Right)
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Figure B4: Comparing the Mean Values of the Right (under the Democratic gover-
nors) and the Left (under the Republican governors) Side Around the Cut-off Point
in the Bandwidths Used for Local Linear Estimations: Low (Left) / Mid (Center) /
High (Right) Num. States Group
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B5 Panel Match Estimations: Using the Republican Governorship as
Treatment
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Figure B5: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: MNC
(Top) and Domestic Firms (Bottom). Solid circles represent the point estimates.
The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 500 block bootstrap
replicates.
184
ll
l
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0 1 2
Effect by Time Period
Ef
fe
ct
 S
ize
l
l
l
−0.01
0.00
0.01
0 1 2
Effect by Time Period
Ef
fe
ct
 S
ize
l
l
l
−0.010
−0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0 1 2
Effect by Time Period
Ef
fe
ct
 S
ize
Figure B6: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: Low
Num. States Group (Top) / Mid Num. States Group (Mid) / High Num. States
Group (Bottom). Solid circles represent the point estimates. The vertical lines rep-
resent 95% confidence intervals based on 500 block bootstrap replicates.
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B6 Results Using Capital Intensity
All Firms Low Cap. Int Mid Cap. Int High Cap. Int
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dem. Gov -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Dem. Gov * Capital Intensity (Logged) 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Capital Intensity (Logged) 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Dem. Gov * Capital Intensity (Terciles) 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Capital Intensity (Terciles) 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Long-term Debt (Logged) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
N Employees (Firm) -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.009 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019)
Num. Separate Filing States 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Total Asset (Logged) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) -0.013∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.015 -0.016 -0.022∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.011 0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34335 34335 34335 34335 11342 11342 14300 14300 8693 8693
Clustered standard errors at the state-level.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B8: FE Estimations: Capital Intensity (Alternative measure using capital ex-
penditure)
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All Firms Low Cap. Int Mid Cap. Int High Cap. Int
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dem. Gov -0.012 -0.012 -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.007 0.008 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Dem. Gov * Capital Intensity (Logged) 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Capital Intensity (Logged) 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Dem. Gov * Capital Intensity (Terciles) 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Capital Intensity (Terciles) 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Long-term Debt (Logged) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N Employees (Firm) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Num. Separate Filing States 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Total Asset (Logged) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital Expenditure (Logged) -0.009∗ -0.010∗ -0.010∗ -0.010∗ -0.015∗ -0.016∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Property, Plant and Equipment (Logged) 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34335 34335 34335 34335 15059 15059 12264 12264 7012 7012
Clustered standard errors at the state-level.
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B9: FE Estimations: Capital Intensity
Low Capital Intensity Mid Capital Intensity High Capital Intensity
Est (Conventional) -0.017 -0.005 0.018
SE (Conventional) 0.002 0.000 0.006
Est (Bias-Corrected) -0.018 -0.006 0.032
SE (Bias-Corrected) 0.002 0.000 0.006
Est (Robust) -0.018 -0.006 0.032
SE (Robust) 0.003 0.000 0.006
Obs (Main, Left) 1823 1001 357
Obs (Main, Right) 1517 812 327
Obs(Bias-Correction, Left) 4696 2912 1125
Obs(Bias-Correction, Right) 3457 2491 1005
Bandwidth (Main) 7.109 3.511 1.441
Bandwidth (Bias-Correction) 19.091 10.931 7.386
Table B10: RD results: By Capital Intensity (Alternative measure using capital
expenditure)
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Low Capital Intensity Mid Capital Intensity High Capital Intensity
Est (Conventional) -0.006 -0.008 0.030
SE (Conventional) 0.000 0.001 0.002
Est (Bias-Corrected) -0.006 -0.008 0.034
SE (Bias-Corrected) 0.000 0.001 0.002
Est (Robust) -0.006 -0.008 0.034
SE (Robust) 0.000 0.001 0.002
Obs (Main, Left) 1339 541 299
Obs (Main, Right) 995 543 248
Obs(Bias-Correction, Left) 2834 1350 698
Obs(Bias-Correction, Right) 2569 770 466
Bandwidth (Main) 4.250 3.123 1.903
Bandwidth (Bias-Correction) 10.873 5.396 6.599
Table B11: RD results: By Capital Intensity
188
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−4 −2 0 2 4
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
RD Plot
Democratic Party Margin of Victory
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 C
or
po
ra
te
 T
a
x 
R
at
e
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−10 −5 0 5 10
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
RD Plot
Democratic Party Margin of Victory
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 C
or
po
ra
te
 T
a
x 
R
at
e
Figure B7: Low Capital Intensity
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Figure B8: Mid Capital Intensity
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Figure B9: High Capital Intensity
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Figure B10: Low Capital Intensity (Alternative measure using capital expenditure)
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Figure B11: Mid Capital Intensity (Alternative measure using capital expenditure)
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Figure B12: High Capital Intensity (Alternative measure using capital expenditure
instead of fixed capital expenditure)
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Figure B13: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: Low
Capacity Intensity (Top) / Low Capacity Intensity (Mid) / Low Capacity Intensity
(Bottom)
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Figure B14: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator (Al-
ternative measure using capital expenditure instead of fixed capital expenditure): Low
Capacity Intensity (Top) / Low Capacity Intensity (Mid) / Low Capacity Intensity
(Bottom)
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Figure B15: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator: Low
Capacity Intensity (Top) / Low Capacity Intensity (Mid) / Low Capacity Intensity
(Bottom)
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Figure B16: Nonparametric generalization of difference-in-differences estimator (Al-
ternative measure using capital expenditure instead of fixed capital expenditure): Low
Capacity Intensity (Top) / Low Capacity Intensity (Mid) / Low Capacity Intensity
(Bottom)
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Appendix C: The Asymmetric Effects of Party
Labels: The Roles of Partisan Cues and Policy
Information in the Attribution Process
C1 Mock News Story of Corporate HQ Relocation Used in the Experi-
ment
C1.1 HQ Inflow Condition
You will first read an article reported in local news media about depicting corporate
headquarters relocation. Please note that some identifying information about the
counties, the states, and the corporation has been removed. Instead, you will see
[County A or B], [State X or Y], and [*** Corporation].
• Suppose that you are a resident of County A in State X.
• *** Corporation is moving its headquarters into your County A in State X from
County B in State Y.
• In your State X, Democratic/Republican/No party info Governor currently
holds the office.
Title: [*** Corporation] moving its corporate headquarters into County
A.
By Andrew Brown, Staff Writer
Facing the potential for higher taxes at their home state, [*** Corporation] is
moving its headquarters into County A in State X, the company announced Wednes-
day.
[*** Corporation] tapped County A in State X as the winner from among 40
potential sites reviewed in a formal process that began in September. County A
in State X won the relocation nod based on an evaluation of its business ecosystem,
talent, long-term costs, quality of life for employees, wealth of higher education centers
and other factors, [*** Corporation] said.
Also, State X offered [*** Corporation] up to $120 million in incentives through
grants, tax relief, and other programs, the officials said. Additional incentives include
$1 million in grants for workforce training and up to $5 million for an innovation.
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Starting in late 2018, about 250 jobs will relocate and another 600 workers even-
tually will be housed at the new headquarters by 2019.
[*** Corporation] signaled plans to find a new headquarters, blaming a budget
deal in its home State Y that raised corporate taxes and what company officials
described as an inhospitable business climate.
[The Democratic/Republican Governor] in State X said in a statement [*** Cor-
poration]’s arrival represents ”a clear signal that we have successfully adapted to a
changing business climate and reformed our budget to create a more sustainable and
predictable state budget.”
C1.2 HQ Outflow Condition
You will first read an article reported in local news media about depicting corporate
headquarters relocation. Please note that some identifying information about the
counties, the states, and the corporation has been removed. Instead, you will see
[County A or B], [State X or Y], and [*** Corporation].
• Suppose that you are a resident of County A in State X.
• *** Corporation is moving its headquarters out of your County A in State X to
County B in State Y.
• In your State X, the Democratic Governor currently holds the office.
Title: [*** Corporation] moving its corporate headquarters out.
By Andrew Brown, Staff Writer
Facing the potential for higher taxes at home, [*** Corporation], which has been
based in County A in State X, is moving its headquarters out to County B in State
Y, the company announced Wednesday.
[*** Corporation] tapped County B in State Y as the winner from among 40
potential sites reviewed in a formal process that began in September. County B
in State Y won the relocation nod based on an evaluation of its business ecosystem,
talent, long-term costs, quality of life for employees, wealth of higher education centers
and other factors, [*** Corporation] said.
Also, State Y offered [*** Corporation] up to $120 million in incentives through
grants, tax relief, and other programs, the officials said. Additional incentives include
1millioningrantsforworkforcetrainingandupto5 million for an innovation.
Starting in late 2019, about 250 jobs will relocate and another 600 workers even-
tually will be housed at the new headquarters by 2019.
[*** Corporation] signaled plans to find a new headquarters, blaming a budget
deal in its home State X that raised corporate taxes and what company officials
described as an inhospitable business climate.
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[The Democratic/Republican Governor] in State X said in a statement [*** Cor-
poration]’s departure represents ”a clear signal that we must adapt to a changing
business climate and reform our budget to create a more sustainable and predictable
state budget.”
C2 Questionnaires Used for Dependent Variables
Below are the questions and answer options that were used to code the dependent
variables:
Question: What effect, if any, would this event of corporate HQ relocation have
on your confidence in the Governor’s economic policies?
Answer Options : greatly increase my confidence; somewhat increase my confi-
dence; no effect on my confidence; somewhat decrease my confidence; and greatly
decrease my confidence
Question: Would the corporate HQ relocation described above have on your sup-
port for
Answer Options: greatly decrease my support; somewhat decrease my support;
no effect on my support; somewhat increase my support; and greatly increase my
support
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C3 OLS results using HQ Outflow Variable as Main IV
DV = Confidence in Econ. Policy DV = Support for Reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HQ Outflow -0.789∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.067) (0.053) (0.067)
Rep.Gov 0.125 0.011
(0.078) (0.079)
HQ Outflow*Rep.Gov 0.015 0.137
(0.110) (0.111)
Observations 1211 1211 1211 1211
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C1: OLS Estimation Results using HQ Outflow Variable as Main IV
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C4 Heterogeneous Effects by Party Identification of Respondent (on a
7-scale)
l
l
l
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l
l
l
Independent,
 but lean Republican Republican Strong Republican
Strong Democratic Democratic Independent,
 but lean Democratic Independent
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1
HQ Outflow
HQ Inflow
HQ Outflow
HQ Inflow
Difference in Opinion about the Governor's Economic Policies
(Under Rep.Gov − Under Dem.Gov)
Using DV = Effect on confidence in the Governor’s economic policies (5-scale)
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l
Independent,
 but lean Republican Republican Strong Republican
Strong Democratic Democratic Independent,
 but lean Democratic Independent
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1
HQ Outflow
HQ Inflow
HQ Outflow
HQ Inflow
Difference in Effects on Support for the Governor's Re−election Bid
Using DV = Effect on support for the Governor’s re-election bid (5-scale)
Figure C1: By Party Identification (on a 7-scale): Coefficient Plots with a 95%
Confidence Level of Partisan Differences in the Effects of Corporate HQ Relocation
(Under Rep. Gov - Under Dem. Gov)
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